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Abstract 
This thesis by papers uses rational choice theory to consider the relative 
performance of individual exit and collective voice in politics, as well as the causal 
relationships between exit and voice as individual strategies and institutionalised 
means of controlling government behaviour. Following the methodological 
approach of Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, the papers of this thesis are 
examples of ‘revisionist public choice theory,’ retaining the broad framework of 
rational choice while relaxing one or more of the standard assumptions generally 
made by economists. In particular, the papers of this thesis consider other-
regarding preferences, non-instrumental preferences, dispositional choice, 
epistemic rationality, non-efficiency evaluative standards, and non-equilibrium 
dynamics. By taking a revisionist approach, I am able to steer a path between the 
excessive abstraction of much public choice theory and the insufficient rigour of 
much normative political theory. Jointly, the papers of this thesis contribute to 
broad debates over the relative value of exit and voice in political settings, with 
relevance to questions of democracy versus the market, centralism versus localism, 
and bureaucracy versus market-like modes of governance.  Though I cover a range 
of diverse topics in this thesis, I generally argue for a strongly revisionist approach 
to political analysis which sees significant behavioural differences between 
individual and collective decisions while grounding all action in common 
motivational assumptions.    
 
  
vi 
 
 
1 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
1.1. Introduction 
When an individual is dissatisfied with a good or service they consume, an 
organisation to which they belong, or a jurisdiction in which they reside, they 
have two broad strategies of seeking improvement: exit and voice. In political 
contexts, individuals exercise voice when they sign a petition, protest a policy, or 
vote in an election. Individuals exercise exit when they choose between public 
providers, forgo public provision of some service and seek a private-sector 
alternative, or leave one jurisdiction to move to another.  
The contrast between exit and voice as responses to dissatisfaction is due to 
Hirschman (1970), though there are a number of important precursors.1 Since the 
publication of Hirschman’s book, a number of political scientists, public choice 
scholars, and political philosophers have used the distinction and refined 
Hirschman’s model in various ways (Dowding, John, Mergoupis, & Van Vugt, 
2000; Dowding & John, 2012, Chapter 2).2 This thesis is not a critique, extension, 
or refinement of Hirschman’s idea. Rather it unapologetically borrows exit and 
voice as analytic concepts and puts them to its own use. Most obviously, I 
completely ignore loyalty. Further, where Hirschman was primarily interested in 
the reciprocal relationship between exit and voice, my interests are often more 
comparative, though I will on occasion deal more directly with Hirschman’s 
central argument.  
The approach I take is grounded in the methodology of rational choice theory, 
though it is ‘revisionist’ in a number of respects. Conventional public choice 
theory generally makes a number of strong assumptions about human behaviour, 
and this has generated a great deal of criticism (J. Friedman, 1996; Green & 
Shapiro, 1994). Critics accuse rational choice theorists of making unrealistic  
                                                     
1
 Buchanan’s (1954a) comparison of market and democratic choice and Tiebout’s (1956) 
model of jurisdictional exit are the most obvious examples from a rational choice 
perspective. While Hirschman is to my knowledge the first to investigate the casual 
interrelationships between exit and voice options, these earlier works made fairly explicit 
comparative analyses of exit and voice as individual decision making processes.   
2
 According to Google Scholar, Exit, Voice and Loyalty has been cited 14,414 times as of 
July 2014. This is a popular book by any standard.  
2 
 
assumptions and ignoring a number of causally and normatively important factors. 
While I am sympathetic to such criticisms in many cases, in accepting them we 
need not abandon rational choice theory altogether.  The development of a 
‘revisionist public choice theory’ (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2008) considering the 
non-material incentives which motivate actors, paying careful attention to the 
costs of decision making and the strategies used to economise on such costs, and 
also connecting itself more explicitly to questions in normative political theory 
allows us to use economic tools such as game theory and price theory without 
ignoring important human motivations or taking the normative agnosticism of 
positive theory to mean that we cannot ‘as scientists’ connect positive results to 
normative concerns.  
Each chapter of this thesis is revisionist in its own way. While the assumptions of 
conventional public choice theory have their limits, they are often entirely adequate 
and analytically useful. When I relax the assumptions of conventional economics, I 
do so reluctantly. Models cannot and should not attempt to reflect the real world in 
every respect. Social theorists are not in the business of building faithful 
representations of external reality, but simplified descriptions which capture 
interesting causal mechanisms. As Dowding  (2001, p. 95) says, ‘[w]ithout oxygen 
on this planet there would be no policy process, but I have never seen oxygen 
mentioned in an explanation of any policy outcome.’  A complete and realistic 
model is a world. We already have one of those, and it’s unclear whether adding a 
second will provide much in the way of analytic traction. Rational choice theory is 
a framework which allows for a variety of alternative assumptions, while forcing 
the theorist to make assumptions explicit. Stigler and Becker (1977) did not deny 
that people had preferences any more than scholars of the policy process deny that 
there is oxygen on this planet. Stigler and Becker simply thought that preferences 
were sufficiently homogeneous and stable that they can be safely ignored as 
explanatory devices in economic analysis. This is undoubtedly correct for many 
economic questions, and so it is with this thesis. I argue that epistemic irrationality 
and expressive preferences are important in many contexts, but when such concepts 
are not doing any analytical work, I happily ignore them.  
This introductory chapter begins in section 1.2 by outlining the existing positive 
and normative literature on exit and voice in politics, beginning with definitional 
and conceptual issues and moving on to debates about the connections between exit 
and voice and their relative desirability as tools of individual communication and 
collective control. In section 1.3 I introduce the approach of revisionist public 
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choice theory. I first summarise the description provided by Brennan and Hamlin 
(2008) and suggest that this approach can be extended in a number of ways which I 
take to be consistent with Brennan and Hamlin’s outline of revisionist public 
choice theory as a research programme. Finally, I briefly describe each of the 
central chapters of this thesis and point to the major themes connecting these 
papers. 
1.2. Exit and voice 
For Hirschman, exit and voice are potential responses to decline in the quality of a 
good or service consumed or the value of belonging to an organisation. However, 
his framework can be generalised by considering exit and voice as responses to 
dissatisfaction, defined broadly as perceived imperfection in the status quo or a 
possible future path. There are three general cases here: 
1. An individual perceives decline and seeks improvement 
2. An individual sees an opportunity for improvement, despite stable or 
improving quality overall  
3. An individual perceives a threat of decline and seeks to maintain the status 
quo 
Hirschman is interested only in case one, but exit and voice are possible responses 
in all three cases. Voice can be used to bolster the performance of well-performing 
governments or to maintain the status quo. Exit and voice as I use them are best 
understood as instruments of influence. It is also important to note that I am here 
interested in exit and voice only in the context of politics. This focus is narrower 
than Hirschman’s but broader than, for example, Dowding and John’s (2012) focus 
on public services.  
1.2.1. Types of exit and voice 
Exit and voice can occur in politics in a variety of ways, and a useful framework 
is provided by Dowding and John (2012).3 They distinguish four types of exit 
(Dowding & John, 2012, pp. 37–43) and three types of voice (Dowding & John, 
2012, pp. 43–46). Gofen (2012) adds an additional form of exit (entrepreneurial 
exit), and I add a final type which is not relevant to public services but is 
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 See also Dowding et al (2000) and Dowding and John (2008).  
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important for broader debates in political theory (cultural exit). These types of exit 
and voice are summarised in tables 1.1 and 1.2 respectively and described below.  
Table 1.1: Types of political exit4  
Type of Exit  Description 
 
Internal Exit 
 
Leaving one public service provider for another in the 
same jurisdiction 
 
Private Exit 
 
Leaving a public provider for a private alternative 
 
Geographical Exit  
 
Leaving one jurisdiction for another  
 
Tiebout Exit  
 
Geographical exit motivated by differences in law, policy, 
institutions, or public services 
 
Complete Exit  
 
No longer consuming a service and not seeking a 
replacement 
 
Entrepreneurial Exit  
 
Leaving a public service and creating a replacement  
 
Cultural Exit  
 
Leaving one non-government cultural or religious 
community for another (whether mainstream society or 
another subcultural group) 
 
 
Internal exit occurs when an individual leaves one public provider for another, 
such as when a patient chooses between alternative public hospitals or a parent 
chooses between alternative public schools. This type of exit is often impossible, 
since zoning rules or other means of rationing often prevent individual exit 
options. In general, internal exit options need to be designed in to public services. 
Such institutionalised exit options (Warren, 2011) can be seen in charter school 
systems (Buckley & Schneider, 2009) and various quasi-market policies (Le 
Grand, 2007). 
Private exit occurs when an individual opts out of some public service or policy 
and seeks an alternative in the private sector, whether for-profit or voluntary. 
When parents send their children to a private school despite public sector 
alternatives or when companies opt for private dispute resolution over government 
courts, they are engaging in private exit.  
                                                     
4
 This is based on Dowding and John’s table 2.4 (Dowding & John, 2012, p. 38).  
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Geographical exit occurs when an individual, household, or firm relocates from 
one jurisdiction to another. In the case of people, such relocation is 
straightforward, but in the case of firms partial relocation is possible. Companies 
may operate in one jurisdiction but be incorporated in another and multinational 
firms may be able to partially exit the tax policies of one country by shifting 
assets across borders.  
When geographic exit is motivated by differences in governance, it is Tiebout 
exit. Tiebout (1956) developed a model of local government in which individuals 
are able to vote with their feet for the policies they prefer by moving between 
governments. While Tiebout’s model was highly stylised, there is evidence that 
household locational decisions are influenced by policy differences at the local 
level (Dowding, John, & Biggs, 1994), and companies seem to make locational 
decisions based partly on the basis of law and tax policy (Ribstein & O’Hara, 
2009).  
Complete exit occurs when an individual simply stops consuming a service 
without seeking an alternative. A consumer dissatisfied with the public health 
system but unable or unwilling to resort to the private sector may simply stop 
visiting the doctor or seeking medical treatment. While this type of exit is 
presumably rare, I mention it here for the sake of completeness.  
Entrepreneurial exit occurs when an individual creates their own alternative to 
public provision. A parent dissatisfied with the school system may opt for home-
schooling, a community feeling unprotected by police may form a neighbourhood 
watch group, or individuals worried about inflation might create a private 
currency. While entrepreneurial exit is, like complete exit, is presumably 
extremely rare, it is potentially of much more relevance, since entrepreneurial exit 
will sometimes create new private sector alternatives for others (Gofen, 2012).   
Cultural exit occurs when an individual leaves a subnational religious or cultural 
group to join another such group or integrate into mainstream society. Many 
religious groups engage in practices at odds with  the liberal values of 
contemporary western democracies, and there was been a great deal of debate in 
political theory over the permissibility or obligation of intervention in such 
communities. An important part of this debate rests on exit options: if exit options 
are sufficiently strong, many insist that other protections are unnecessary to 
protect individual freedom and unnecessarily restrict religious liberty. Others 
claim that exit options are almost never strong enough or that even with strong 
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exit rights there are some things a liberal state cannot abide (Barry, 2001; 
Kukathas, 2003; Mazie, 2005; Okin, 2002).5    
Table 1.2: Types of political voice6 
Type of Voice  Description  
 
Individual voice 
 
Individual communication aimed at securing 
changes in the voicer’s situation 
 
Collective voice voting   
 
Voting in elections 
 
Collective voice 
participation 
 
Participating in non-electoral collective voice 
activities such as protesting a policy, signing a 
petition, or campaigning for a candidate.   
 
 
Dowding and John do not make such a fine-grained distinction between types of 
voice in politics, seeing only three broad categories, and they are reasonably 
straightforward. Individual voice occurs when an individual asks for some 
specific action or complains about some specific grievance. All action is 
individual, of course, but individual voice is defined by its goals – to change 
outcomes through an individual act of voice rather than contributing to a 
collective effort. Examples would be calling the council to fill a pothole or writing 
a letter of complaint about a particular interaction with a government official. 
Collective voice voting occurs when an individual votes in an election, and 
collective voice participation is a residual category of collective voice including 
protest and advocacy. For the purposes of this thesis, I am mostly concerned with 
collective voice voting and collective voice participation. Individual voice may be 
important in some contexts, but it is sufficiently different from collective voice 
that joint analysis is pointless and I simply have nothing interesting to say on it.  
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 An additional form of exit occurs when a consumer exits from one publicly funded but 
privately run provider to another, as in voucher-based private school systems. It is not 
immediately clear how this should be classified. If we consider publicly funded but 
privately run schools as public organizations we have internal exit. If we consider them 
private organizations we have simple market exit which should not be included in the 
classification of political exit. It is plausible that we ought to consider movement between 
publicly funded but privately run schools as a type of political exit, but it is not clear where 
we should draw the line. A consumer choosing where to spend food stamps seems like a 
clear case of simple market competition, despite the public funding. Though I admit there is 
a grey area here, I will not spend any time considering whether and where we ought to draw 
the line between public and private organizations. For any given dividing line, some types 
of exit will be considered internal in the above schema and some will be excluded from the 
domain of political exit.   
6
 This is based on Dowding and John’s table 2.5 (Dowding & John, 2012, p. 44).  
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There are other important dimensions on which types of voice can be 
distinguished, however. One important distinction is between horizontal and 
vertical voice (Dowding & John, 2012, pp. 16–17).  Vertical political voice is 
directed at the agents of government (e.g. voting, petitions), while horizontal 
voice is directed at other citizens (e.g. issue advocacy, political argument). This 
thesis tends to focus on vertical voice, and particularly voting, though the 
arguments often also apply to horizontal voice.    
1.2.2. The relationship between exit and voice 
Hirschman’s central claim in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty is that exit options make 
voice less attractive and will in some cases lead to a decline in quality. 
Economists generally think that competition – i.e. the existence of consumer exit 
options – increases service or product quality by providing incentives for 
improvement. Hirschman points out that curtailing exit is not always a motivating 
factor, however, and argues that exit can sometimes undermine the only effective 
response many individuals have. Hirschman uses the example of Nigerian 
railways, which faced competition from trucking but did not have the institutional 
features encouraging a response to the threat of exit. The result was that the most 
dissatisfied customers left and those left behind were denied their most vocal 
allies, leading to further declines in quality (Hirschman, 1970, Chapter 4).  
For Hirschman, exit options reduce the quantity of voice (i.e. the likelihood any 
individual will use voice to influence the organisation) through a simple 
substitution effect, and points out that this is problematic for two reasons. First, 
exit options will prompt the most quality-conscious consumers to leave first. 
Since the most quality conscious are, other things equal, the most likely to voice 
their concerns, exit will tend to remove the most vocal consumers from the 
organisation (Hirschman, 1970, pp. 45–46).  Moreover, Hirschman sees voice as a 
skill which must be exercised if it is to be developed and maintained. By 
substituting for voice in one instance, exit has a negative effect on the prospects 
for future voice: ‘The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy 
the development of the art of voice’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 43 emphasis in 
original).  
Hirschman also recognised that exit options can in some instances be a 
complement to voice. When exit can be wielded as a threat by individuals, their 
bargaining position relative to the organisation is increased and the organisation 
will have stronger incentives to listen (Gehlbach, 2006; Hirschman, 1970, pp. 82–
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86). Many individuals might use voice in the first instance and only exit if the 
organisation is not responsive (Dowding & John, 2012, pp. 11–12). The 
incentivising effect of exit, however, depends crucially on the institutional 
environment (Warren, 2011, pp. 692–694). This is particularly important in the 
context of politics. While profit-seeking firms can reasonably be assumed to be 
motivated by threats of exit, this is not necessarily the case with public 
organisations, whose objective functions are not nearly so uniform or observable. 
It is impossible to make general statements about the compatibility or 
complementarity of exit and voice, since the relationship between the two 
concepts is highly dependent on the context. Sometimes exit and voice will play 
nicely together, but there will also be situations of genuine conflict. When such 
conflicts arise, the relative desirability of exit and voice becomes an important 
consideration. While desirability is also context-dependent, it is worthwhile 
making some general points here.  
In the political context, the distinction between exit and voice is closely related to 
that between individual and collective choice. Many of the arguments raised in 
support of markets over democratic government (or vice versa) can be repurposed 
as arguments for exit over voice (or vice versa). The most compelling general 
argument for voice and against exit is the need for collective action. When market 
failures exist – when pollution needs to be reduced or a public good such as 
national defence needs to be produced – collective action often depends on a lack 
of exit options (Warren, 2011, pp. 685–686). A powerful argument for exit over 
voice – and one I will return to in this introduction and throughout the thesis – is 
that exit decisions tend to be more rational and well-informed than (collective) 
voice decisions. Since voters, protestors, and policy advocates have only a small 
chance of influencing policy outcomes, they have little incentive to gather 
information and impartially weigh the options. Exit decisions, on the other hand, 
make individuals decisive and provide stronger epistemic incentives (Caplan, 
2007; Somin, 2011, 2013). 
These points regarding the relationship between and relative merits of exit and 
voice can be made concrete by discussing contemporary debates over Tiebout 
exit. As mentioned above, Tiebout exit occurs when individuals, households, or 
firms physically relocate in order to consume a different set of public services or 
live under a different set of policies. While Tiebout’s (1956) original model was 
one of citizens sorting themselves into local governments, the Tiebout model has 
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been modified and extended in various ways. One important extension has been to 
consider the competitive response of governments and the ability of exit to 
constrain government power (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1980, Chapter 9; S. Sinn, 
1992; Weingast, 2009). Another has been the application of the Tiebout model to 
international jurisdictional competition (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008; R. McKenzie 
& Lee, 1991; Somin, 2008).  
Tiebout models have been the catalyst for a number of politically-charged 
debates. While the Tiebout idea is often treated as economically right-wing, this 
characterisation is misleading for a number of reasons. First, even if we accept 
that jurisdictional mobility has ‘right-wing’ effects, those on the left should not 
reject the model as an analytical device on these grounds. A better strategy would 
be to take the positive dynamics of Tiebout seriously and use it as an argument for 
policies which restrict mobility or otherwise prevent competition (Dowding & 
Hindmoor, 1997, p. 457). Moreover, Tiebout exit options might be designed in a 
variety of ways and some of these may be highly conducive to left-wing goals. 
John (1997) argues for a modified version of the Tiebout framework, suggesting 
that ‘the institutional framework could be better designed to make the best of 
Tiebout behaviour’ (John, 1997, p. 75). Similarly, King (2004) argues that 
features of polycentric systems should be justified and chosen piecemeal. It is 
difficult to deny, however, that Tiebout exit is generally viewed positively by 
those favouring expansions of the market and negatively by those favouring 
expansions of the state. This is perhaps not surprising, since in the limiting case of 
sufficiently many competing governments and low-cost mobility, Tiebout 
competition reduces to ordered anarchy, with competing local jurisdictions facing 
constraints similar to those of competing protection agencies (Bell, 1991; 
Boudreaux & Holcombe, 1989; D. Friedman, 1989; MacCallum, 1970).  
One important debate has been the efficiency properties of Tiebout competition. 
Advocates of Tiebout competition argue that it allows for the efficient sorting of 
individuals by preference (Tiebout, 1956), incentivises government efficiency (S. 
Sinn, 1992), organises dispersed knowledge (Stansel, 2012; Vihanto, 1992), 
encourages rational deliberation (Somin, 2011, 2013), and promotes desirable 
institutional reform (Kerber & Vanberg, 1995). Just as markets in ordinary 
economic goods force producers to compete for consumers by giving them what 
they want, markets in governance force states to give consumers what they want. 
While externalities and other market imperfections exist at the margins of Tiebout 
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competition, proponents argues, these are small compared to the inefficiencies of 
centralised monopoly government.    
Opponents have insisted that exit options prevent the correction of large-scale 
market failures (Cai & Treisman, 2004; H. Sinn, 2003). A much-studied example 
is the apparent ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental regulation. The coercive 
prevention of pollution through regulation or taxation is justifiable on liberal 
grounds insofar it prevents people from harming unwilling third parties. However, 
the benefit of a cleaner environment is often not tied to residence in a particular 
jurisdiction. This is particularly true of genuinely global public goods such as 
global warming mitigation. Even if everyone were better off in a world of strong 
environmental regulations, each person would prefer to free-ride on the mitigation 
effort of others by moving to a low-regulation jurisdiction. If policy-makers 
respond to the demands of foot-voters, we will have lower than optimal levels of 
environmental regulation (H. Sinn, 2003, Chapter 5) 
A related argument is that Tiebout exit undermines the welfare state by allowing 
the rich to move away from their obligations to the poor.7 If exit is low-cost, any 
non-benefit tax will encourage the taxed to leave the jurisdiction. Insofar as 
welfare payments are simply redistributive (i.e. not producing a public good for 
all those living in the jurisdiction), welfare payments are made less feasible by the 
threat of exit. In the limiting case of costless exit, any redistribution would 
instantly prompt complete exodus by the fiscal losers and beneficiaries would lose 
their base of support. A social safety net or some stronger form of rich-to-poor 
redistribution is important to many liberals on the grounds of equality of 
opportunity or simple humanitarianism (H. Sinn, 2003, Chapter 3).  
Another consideration is the effect of Tiebout exit options on democratic 
participation, competence, and empowerment. Many see political fragmentation 
and exit options as enabling a withdrawal from mass society which undermines 
democracy (Blakely & Snyder, 1997; E. McKenzie, 1996). Others claim that 
mobility erodes social capital and thereby reduces democratic participation 
(Putnam, 2001; Schiff, 1992). On the other hand, Tiebout exit options can be a 
                                                     
7
 This is not a market failure in a technical sense, but many see redistribution as an 
important role of the state and demanded by justice (Rawls, 1971). Some have made the 
argument that social insurance can be seen as correcting a market failure arising from a lack 
of a market for insurance against adverse outcomes in the genetic lottery and randomness in 
career opportunities (H. Sinn, 1995).  
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tool of democratic empowerment which forces governors to respond to voice 
(Sørensen, 1997; Vanberg, 2008).  
The general point here is that exit places limits on collective action. If we see 
government as generally efficient and benevolent, exit might prevent it from 
doing good. If, on the other hand, we see government as inefficient or predatory, 
exit might prevent it from doing evil. We know, of course, that governments are 
neither perfectly good nor perfectly evil, and this means that exit option will have 
both costs and benefits and this calls for comparative analysis.    
Other forms of exit have been the topic of similar debates. Consider exit in the 
school system, whether internal exit as in charter school systems or private exit as 
in systems which encourage private school education through vouchers or tax 
credits. Advocates see exit as promoting the efficient production of education 
(Chubb & Moe, 1990; M. Friedman, 1962, Chapter 6) and enabling deliberative 
engagement (Mintrom, 2003) while opponents see exit options as increasing 
inequality and eroding public education (Barber, 1993; Gutmann, 1999). 
1.3. Revisionist public choice theory  
In addition to the normative divide in the exit and voice literature, there is a more 
pronounced methodological divide. To simplify, we have one group taking an 
economic approach – using a thick conception rational choice as hyper-rational 
selfishness, using rigorous mathematical theory and statistical empirical methods, 
and using some form of economic efficiency as the normative standard of 
evaluation. An example of this approach is the debate over the efficiency of 
environmental regulation given Tiebout competition which compares the 
equilibrium outcome of interaction among self-interested and fully-informed 
agents against an optimal level defined in terms of efficiency (Cumberland, 1981; 
Oates & Schwab, 1988). 
On the other side, we have those taking a more informal approach to normative 
and descriptive argument. These theorists deny that normatively-relevant concepts 
can be reduced to simple and measurable concepts and that human motivation can 
be reduced to a well-behaved preference function. Following the maxim that it is 
better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong, these theorists argue about 
important things but often somewhat vaguely. An example of this approach is the 
work in political theory asking whether the possibility of exit is sufficient to 
12 
 
protect individual rights in non-liberal communities (Galston, 1995; Kukathas, 
2003; Kymlicka, 1995; Okin, 2002). 
Each of these approaches has value, and we would not have such a rich 
understanding of the world were it not for an intellectual division of labour based 
on the comparative advantages of philosophers and economists. I maintain, 
though, that combining these two approaches will yield insight unavailable to 
either in isolation. McCloskey (1994, Chapter 13) sees a trade-off between rigour 
and relevance, and argues that modern economics has become too rigorous and 
made itself irrelevant. While I would not make such a broad claim about the 
irrelevance of mathematical economics, the methodological approach of this 
thesis rests on the idea that we can gain new insights by trading a little rigour for a 
good deal of relevance at the margin. This, I think, is what revisionist public 
choice theory does. 
Thomas Christiano (2004) first made the distinction between mainstream and 
revisionist rational choice theory, applying the former label to Hardin (1999) and 
the latter to Brennan and Hamlin (2000).8 Christiano’s distinction is focused on 
Brennan and Hamlin’s account of dispositional motivation:   
Mainstream rational choice theory, as I shall conceive of 
it, adheres strictly to the thesis of homo economicus. In 
other words, it explains the operation of institutions and 
justifies the reform of those institutions under the 
assumption that individuals normally maximize their own 
utility in every action they undertake. … By contrast, 
revisionists think of individuals, at least in a large set of 
cases, as not maximizing utility in every action but as 
adopting dispositions to act that maximize utility for the 
person on the whole (Christiano, 2004, p. 123).  
Brennan and Hamlin (2008) embrace Christiano’s label but extend the scope of 
the definition to include various other amendments to the mainstream view. 
Though not offering a precise definition of revisionist public choice theory, 
Brennan and Hamlin argue that the approach ‘seeks to move away from the strict 
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 Other important revisionist works which predate the label include Brennan and Buchanan 
(1984), Gauthier (1986), Brennan and Lomasky (1984, 1985, 1989, 1993), Brennan and 
Hamlin (1995, 1998, 1999, 2002), Hamlin (1996, 2003), Hamlin and Jennings (2004), 
Hirschman (1984), Schuessler (2000a, 2000b), and Glazer (1987).  
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conception of homo economicus, and this movement operates in several 
dimensions’ (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2008, p. 77). They then identify three of 
these dimensions – the motivational, the dispositional, and the expressive – 
without claiming that these dimensions exhaust the scope of revisionist public 
choice theory. I will discuss these dimensions and add some of my own shortly, 
but it is first worth pausing to consider the value of realism in political theory 
more generally.  
Formal rational choice theory provides a coherent framework which makes 
assumptions explicit and allows arguments to be evaluated for logical validity. 
While the assumptions of rational choice theory are always simplifications of 
reality and often false, all theory makes simplifying assumptions and informal 
theory generally makes assumptions which are less transparent (Morton, 1999, 
Chapter 2). The papers of this thesis retain the framework and methods of rational 
choice theory but reject in various ways the additional assumptions often made by 
economists in the name of simplicity. By relaxing assumptions of the universal 
pursuit of instrumental self-interest, we are giving up some rigour in the sense that 
we can no longer guarantee consistency in assumptions. In exchange, we can 
make our analyses more relevant by more closely approximating real-world 
conditions. Meanwhile, the rational choice framework makes assumptions explicit 
and thus prevents us from losing too much rigour. 
Public choice theory is the application of economic methodology – i.e. rational 
choice theory – to political processes. Whereas traditional public finance often 
implicitly assumed a benevolent despot model of government, public choice 
theorists claimed that we should treat economic and political decision makers on an 
equal footing. People do not abandon their interests as when they enter parliament 
or the voting booth, and motivational symmetry is required. Economic actors are 
generally assumed to be self-interested utility maximisers, and the same 
assumption should be made of political actors.9  
Conventional public choice theory sought to rid political analysis of romance 
(Buchanan, 1984), but the method by which this was often achieved – strong 
rationality assumptions, the use of economic efficiency as the normative criterion, 
and a focus on equilibrium analysis – also led to neglect of causally-important 
motivational factors and normatively-interesting outcome variables. Rational 
                                                     
9
 Mueller (2003) is the canonical overview of the field. Hindmoor (2006) provides a more 
balanced introduction to rational choice theory in politics.   
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choice theory is, I maintain, an indispensable organising framework for positive 
analysis. Strong assumptions about selfishness and epistemic prowess or a narrow 
focus on equilibrium and efficiency, however, are not necessary for rigorous social 
science or analytic normative theory and can hinder the pursuit of interesting 
questions.  
Rational choice theory assumes that people can rank alternative states of the world, 
have beliefs, and will act on the basis of these beliefs to bring about their most 
desired state of the world as constrained by the opportunities at hand. A full 
rational choice explanation of action makes reference to both beliefs and desires, 
since rational action is conceptually incoherent without both elements (Dowding, 
1994; Elster, 1989, Chapters 2–3; Hindmoor, 2006, Chapter 8).10 There is nothing 
in this framework which requires selfishness, omniscience, or infallibility. 
Altruistic, selfish, and spiteful motivations are equally consistent with rational 
choice theory, as are all manner of beliefs. Nor is there anything in public choice 
theory which requires that efficiency be privileged as a normative standard of 
evaluation or equilibrium as the analytic focus.   
Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute Christiano’s claim, endorsed by Brennan and 
Hamlin, that mainstream rational choice political analysis does in fact make more 
restrictive assumptions which render incoherent ideas such as non-instrumental 
motivation, moral preferences, and dispositional choice. Consider Dennis 
Mueller’s influential definition: 
Public choice can be defined as the economic study of 
nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of 
economics to political science. The subject matter of 
public choice is the same as that of political science: the 
theory of the state, voting rules, voter behavior, party 
politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of 
public choice is that of economics, however. The basic 
behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, 
is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer 
(Mueller, 2003, pp. 1–2).  
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 In rational choice models beliefs and desires are often fused together as preferences with 
no explicit recognition of the cognitive and motivational components. This is generally fine 
when we take desires and beliefs as given, but I take the conceptual distinction between 
desires and beliefs as a necessary element of rational choice theory as a formalisation of the 
Humean vision of action as elaborated by Davidson (1963).  
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All but the final sentence of this passage is consistent with revisionist public 
choice theory. If we deny that public choice is the application of economic 
methodology (i.e. rational choice theory) to politics, it is difficult to conceive of 
what public choice theory could be. The final sentence is where revisionist 
theorists begin to take issue with Mueller’s characterisation of the field. Brennan 
and Hamlin have no problem with the idea of utility maximisation, when this 
approach is understood as not making any specific assumptions about the content 
of individual utility functions (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2000, Chapter 2; Dowding, 
2011; Hindmoor, 2006, pp. 183–189). Their issue is with the assumption of 
egoism. I also endorse the idea of utility maximisation as a defining feature of 
rational choice theory while rejecting any definition of rational choice theory in 
terms of the content of utility functions. Without attempting to exhaust the 
possibilities of revisionist public choice theory,11 I would like to expand Brennan 
and Buchanan’s list of dimensions as follows: the motivational, the dispositional, 
the expressive, the epistemic, the evaluative, and the dynamic. Each of these 
dimensions will be discussed below, though I will skip over elements of these 
dimensions which I do not use in this thesis.12   
1.3.1. The motivational 
The motivational dimension of revisionist public choice theory concerns the 
content of political actors’ utility functions. Mainstream public choice theory 
assumes political man to be self-interested, whereas the revisionist theorist can 
introduce the possibility of other-regarding and moral preferences.  Other-
regarding preferences have received a reasonable amount of attention from rational 
choice theorists. People have preferences over the welfare and behaviour of others, 
and these can be incorporated in an individual’s utility function in much the same 
way as any other good (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). Individuals may have 
preferences which are altruistic (Andreoni, 1990; Margolis, 1982), reciprocal 
(Rabin, 1993), meddlesome (Becker, 1957; Buchanan, 1986; Sen, 1970), envious 
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 One notable possibility is the introduction of endogenous preferences (Bowles, 1998). 
For a public choice application see B. Taylor and Crampton (2010).  
12
 Two notable examples from the motivational dimension are esteem as a motivational 
force (G. Brennan & Pettit, 2000, 2004) and the heterogeneity of moral preferences (G. 
Brennan & Hamlin, 1995). The absence of these elements here is due simply to the fact that 
I do not use these concepts in the thesis, though the concept of esteem will be used in the 
concluding chapter nine. I do use the concept of agent heterogeneity more generally in 
chapter seven and discuss it more explicitly in chapter nine.   
A more comprehensive overview of revisionist public choice theory would no doubt give 
these ideas a great deal of attention.  
16 
 
(Chaudhuri, 1985; Kirchsteiger, 1994; Kolm, 1995), or spiteful (Morgan, Steiglitz, 
& Reis, 2003; Saijo & Nakamura, 1995). 
The existence of other-regarding preferences has serious implications for 
normative political theory. Many rational choice liberals see externalities as 
providing a prima facie justification for state intervention, and externalities are 
often defined in terms of preference. If we define externalities in this way, 
however, we open the possibility of ‘mental externalities’ being used to justify 
policies any self-respecting liberal would reject. If homosexuality, for example, 
were sufficiently offensive to a sufficient number of people, welfare economics 
would have no grounds to oppose coercive regulation of sexuality (Rasmusen, 
1997, 1998). Even if we reject the normative implication that meddlesome 
preferences should be given normative weight, it is clear that such preferences do 
motivate people, and this will have implications for institutional design (Goodin, 
1995, Chapter 9; Sen, 1970, 1979a; B. Taylor & Crampton, 2010).    
Individuals may also have a preference for behaving morally independently of the 
welfare or behaviour of others (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2000, Chapter 1; Schmidtz, 
1995). On this understanding, a preference for moral behaviour would be included 
as an element in the individual’s utility function alongside a preference for wealth 
and leisure. Rational actors would then tend to behave morally when the cost of 
doing so in terms of these other preferences is low.13 If people hold non-
consequentialist moral views and a preference for being moral, they will other-
things-equal prefer certain courses of action over others quite apart from the 
consequences for themselves or others. A philosophical libertarian, for example, 
will prefer not to coercively interfere in the private affairs of another, regardless of 
the outcome of such interference.  
More generally, preferences over states of the world need not be, to borrow a term 
from probability theory, ‘memoryless.’ That is, preferences need not be restricted 
to outcomes narrowly defined as observable states of the world regardless of how 
they came about. People might also have preferences over the processes through 
which states of the world are reached (Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 2004; Frey & Stutzer, 
2005; Sen, 1997). Of course, a full description of the state of the world will include 
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 It is also possible to model moral commitments deontologically as binding motivational 
constraints or preferences with lexical priority over others (Etzioni, 1988; Rabin, 1995). 
Vanberg (2008) argues that preferences for acting morally are preferences over actions 
rather than outcomes and as such must be incorporated into an account of rule following. 
This argument is similar in many respects to Brennan and Hamlin’s dispositional account, 
which is the subject of section 1.3.2.   
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its history, so in a tautological sense processes are outcomes. Still, there is an 
important distinction here between preferences over culmination outcomes and 
comprehensive outcomes (Sen, 1997). Consider the methodology of social choice 
theory. Here, attention is focused on the distribution of utilities across individuals 
without considering the identity of those individuals or the processes through 
which outcomes emerge. As Dowding (2004) argues, this blindness to process 
(including consent) is what generates Sen’s (1970) proof of the impossibility of a 
Paretian liberal and renders the result irrelevant to the concerns of liberal political 
theory, which is interested in process (and particularly with consent).14   
A key point about the rational choice analysis of other-regarding and moral 
preferences is that such preferences are included in individuals’ utility functions 
along with more conventional economic goods. Morality has a downward sloping 
demand curve, and neither morality nor self-interest is given lexical priority over 
the other. The satisfaction of other-regarding or non-instrumental preferences is a 
good which often needs to be paid for with the frustration of self-regarding 
instrumental preferences. As the cost of such satisfaction changes, behaviour will 
respond in certain predictable ways.  
1.3.2. The dispositional  
Many of the choices we make on a daily basis are guided by habit and or intuition 
rather than rational deliberation. When we have a tendency to make certain choices 
or think about decisions in certain ways, we can be said to have dispositions.  
Dispositions as non-rational influences on choice may seem like a challenge to 
rational choice theory, but Gauthier (1986) and Brennan and Hamlin (1995, 2000, 
Chapters 3–6; Hamlin, 2006) argue that dispositions are also the objects of rational 
choice. Dispositions can be seen as general tendencies which influence, but do not 
absolutely determine the outcome of a series of future decisions. Consider the 
familiar example of the possibility of self-defeating egoism. If, as Parfit (1984) 
suggests, strict adherence to instrumental rationality would be self-defeating (i.e. 
one could better satisfy their preferences by not actively seeking their satisfaction), 
an individual may rationally adopt a non-rational disposition. On this reading, ‘it is 
the actor who is rational, not each and every action’ (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2000, 
p. 36).15  
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 See also Dowding (1997) for a similar critique of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.  
15
 Robert Frank’s (1988) discussion of the strategic role of emotions uses similar logic.  
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Brennan and Hamlin offer the example of trust. A serious challenge in securing 
mutually beneficial exchange is the problem of ex post opportunism. Repeat 
interaction and external enforcement mechanisms will be capable of solving or 
mitigating the problem some of the time, but this will often be costly or impossible. 
A dispositional commitment to keeping one’s promises regardless of the incentives 
to the contrary will often be a more effective solution. Similarly, a rational 
individual seeking to avoid conflict will often back down when threatened and let 
bygones be bygones when it comes be being wronged by others. Cultivating a 
stubborn and vengeful disposition will prompt irrational behaviour in certain 
circumstances, but if visible it will also discourage others from bothering you.  
Trust and vengeance are in a sense two sides of the same coin: they both involve 
committing now to certain actions which will later be against our interest but which 
alter others’ expectations and secure us a greater long-term payoff. The relationship 
between trust and vengeance is well-illustrated by the violent insinuation of House 
Lannister’s unofficial motto in George R. R. Martin’s A Song of Fire and Ice Series 
of fantasy novels: ‘A Lannister always pays his debts.’ The adoption of an honest 
disposition allows the Lannisters to realise trades which would be impossible for 
rational utility maximisers due to the possibility of ex post opportunism. The 
imprisoned Tyrion Lannister could not credibly promise gold to his jailer Mord in 
exchange for his delivery of a message to Lady Arryn (G.. Martin, 1997, Chapter 
38). Meanwhile, the adoption of a vengeful disposition, as reflected in Tywin 
Lannister’s willingness to start a war in retaliation for the imprisonment of a son he 
despises, reduces the expected value of aggressing against House Lannister and 
thus increases their long-term security by encouraging irrational decisions in 
particular situations. 
Of course, in some cases such as those described above there will be selfishly 
rational reasons to behave honestly. With repeated interaction and long time 
horizons it may indeed make sense to pay one’s debts in a one shot sense. Gauthier 
and Brennan and Hamlin are however interested in dispositions which allow one-
shot interests to be overridden. If Tyrion knew he would never again interact with 
Mord and that no potential future trading partners would learn of the encounter, the 
selfishly rational action would be to renege on the promise ex post. Mord, being a 
simple but rational chap, would predict this and refuse to deal with Tyrion. In such 
circumstances only a visible disposition to behave irrationally ex post can secure 
compliance ex ante and increase greater long term payoffs. Simply behaving 
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rationally ex post will not work, since (a) the opportunity to do so will not arrive, 
and (b) if it did opportunism would be a more attractive option.     
Thus dispositions can be analysed as tools used instrumentally by knaves in order 
to pursue their own welfare. This does not exhaust the possibilities, however. 
Individuals may also adopt dispositions to behave in certain ways in order to 
pursue non-selfish preferences of the type discussed above. An individual with a 
desire to maximise the aggregate happiness of sentient beings and a belief that 
meat production generally reduces aggregate happiness may adopt a vegetarian 
disposition. Such a disposition is obviously related to beliefs and desires but it 
cannot be identified with either. Rather it is a general inclination which in the long 
term can be influenced by beliefs and desires and in the short term influences how 
beliefs and desires are converted into action. The ethical vegetarian does not on a 
case-by-case basis consider whether eating this or that portion of meat will 
decrease aggregate happiness. Being a vegetarian normally means taking certain 
food choices off the table. Moral reasoning plays a role, but reflection is over 
whether and how to modify the disposition rather than whether particular choices 
are morally permissible (Hamlin, 2006, pp. 4–9).   
It should be noted that dispositions do not absolutely determine actions. Most 
vegetarians would be willing to choose bacon over starvation without seeing this as 
a rejection of the disposition. More commonly, vegetarians may periodically 
succumb to weakness of will while vowing to maintain their vegetarianism 
thereafter. Dispositions form part of our motivational machinery and will compete 
for influence over choice with preferences and perhaps other dispositions.  
1.3.3. The expressive  
Perhaps the most well-developed strand in the revisionist literature is the theory of 
expressive voting. This idea can be seen in embryonic form in a number of early 
works (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1984; G. Brennan & Lomasky, 1984, 1985, 1989; 
Buchanan, 1954a; Fiorina, 1976; Goodin & Roberts, 1975; Tullock, 1971), but 
received its first general and rigorous statement in Brennan and Lomasky (1993).16 
Brennan and Lomasky distinguish between instrumental and expressive 
preferences. Instrumental preferences are over outcomes while expressive 
preferences are over the individual’s own choices. The defining feature of 
expressive preferences is that they are procedural in this restricted sense. When 
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 Hamlin and Jennings (2011) review the literature on expressive political behaviour, 
outlining the important recent developments.   
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acting instrumentally we take some action in order to bring about some outcome, 
and our preference is only satisfied in the case that the desired outcome eventuates. 
When acting expressively, we are taking an action for its own sake, and our 
preference is satisfied by the very act of choice.17  
Rational actors, in the expressive voting model, have utility functions which 
feature both expressive and instrumental arguments. When expressive and 
instrumental elements point in opposite directions in some choice situation, the 
expressive benefits of one option will need to be weighed against the instrumental 
benefits of the alternative to reach an all-things-considered preference. Other things 
equal, we would expect expressive preferences to have more sway in low-stakes 
decisions, since here instrumental preferences will be relatively weak.  
The central claim of expressive voting theory is that voting choices in large 
elections will be made significantly, and perhaps even entirely, on expressive 
rather than instrumental grounds. When making a choice which only 
probabilistically produces the intended outcome, potential instrumental benefits 
need to be discounted by this probability. In the case of voting, the individual voter 
decides electoral outcomes only in the extremely unlikely event that they make or 
break a tie. There is no generally accepted way of calculating this probability in 
general, but Gelman et al (2009) estimate that the average voter in the 2008 US 
Presidential election had a roughly 1 in 60 million chance of pivotality, with those 
more pivotally placed in swing states having as much as a 1 in 10 million chance. 
Suppose that an average voter in this election had an expressive preference for 
Obama but an instrumental preference for McCain. That is, they would directly 
value the act of voting for Obama but would prefer that McCain become President. 
The choice situation this individual faces is whether to give up a certain expressive 
gain in exchange for a 1 in 60 million chance of securing a, presumably greater, 
instrumental gain. Unless the instrumental preference for McCain is more than 60 
million times greater than the expressive preference for Obama, and further 
assuming that the actor is neutral or averse to risk, they will vote for Obama.   
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 The concept of expressive choice has been used in a number of ways inconsistent with 
the definition given above. For a thorough analysis of definitional issues, see Hamlin and 
Jennings (2011, pp. 648–655). Whereas their focus is on the expressive nature of choice I 
wish here to emphasise the potential for non-instrumental nature of preferences over 
actions. I believe my framing of the issue is consistent that that of Hamlin and Jennings, but 
I see no need to identify non-instrumental choice so closely with symbolism at a 
methodological level.  
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The normative implications of this view are potentially very significant, but it is 
not entirely clear whether on balance they undermine or support democracy as a 
mode of decision making.18 Most obviously, expressive voting decouples electoral 
choice from preference and thereby undermines the standard instrumental case for 
democracy (G. Brennan & Lomasky, 1989). In extreme cases we could see 
unanimous support for options which would be unanimously rejected if voters were 
each allowed to choose decisively (G. Brennan & Lomasky, 1984). Moreover, if 
we think expressive preferences are likely to be meddlesome, bigoted, or 
malicious, expressive voting could produce illiberal outcomes (Glazer, 2008; 
Hillman, 2010; Roback, 1986). If expressive preferences are based on sound moral 
reasoning, on the other hand, the low-stakes nature of the voting booth could create 
a ‘veil of insignificance’ which encourages impartial deliberation (G. Brennan & 
Lomasky, 1985; Goodin & Roberts, 1975; Kliemt, 1986).   
1.3.4. The epistemic 
A common complaint levelled against economics as a framework for positive 
prediction and normative evaluation is that it assumes full information and 
superhuman powers of calculation. While these complaints are often seriously 
overstated,19 it is true that full information and costless discovery of the optimal 
choice is often assumed in economic models. It should be emphasised that such 
assumptions are reasonable in answering certain questions, but the revisionist 
would argue that relaxing such assumptions is often necessary. While costly 
information has become an important component of mainstream economic 
analysis, the possibility of epistemic irrationality in the sense of having beliefs at 
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 A similar point could be made about the positive predictions of expressive voting theory. 
Instrumental theory makes a number of predictions which might be rejected if we accept 
the expressive account. Many of the precise predictions of expressive theory, however, 
depend crucially on the nature of expressive preferences and are indeterminate as far as the 
positive political theorist is concerned. See Brennan and Hamlin (1998) for an analysis of 
electoral equilibrium under expressive voting.  
19
 Economists have modelled information imperfections for some time. George Stigler 
(1961)  – a paragon of the Chicago price theory approach against which such attacks are 
most often directed -  was a pioneer in this area, with later  work in the 1970s on 
asymmetric information proving extremely influential and producing a Nobel prize in 2001 
(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975). The neglect of non-informational decision 
making costs has been more serious in mainstream modelling, but the large literatures of 
behavioural economics and bounded rationality and two Nobel prizes suggest that the 
mainstream is at least aware of such problems. Again, even die-hard neoclassical theorists 
recognise this: ‘The making of decisions is costly, and not simply because it is an activity 
which some people find unpleasant. In order to make a decision one requires information, 
and the information must be analyzed. The costs of searching for information and of 
applying the information to a new situation are such that habit is often a more efficient way 
to deal with moderate or temporary changes in the environment than would be a full, 
apparently utility-maximizing decision’ (Stigler & Becker, 1977, p. 82).   
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odds with the available evidence has remained on the margins of academic 
discourse. 
In considering the issue of epistemic rationality it is important to distinguish 
between beliefs and desires in the Humean sense. Preferences in rational choice 
models are often an amalgamation of belief and desire, with the ranking of 
alternatives emerging from their combination. There are a number of ways we 
might distinguish between desire and belief, including taking an explicit belief-
desire approach or distinguishing between basic and non-basic preferences, the 
former being free of epistemic content and the latter not. Humans presumably have 
very few basic preferences, with non-basic preferences being built from these 
primitive desires along with beliefs (Hausman, 2012, p. 36).  
The revisionist account of rational choice accepts that information is costly to 
gather, that decisions are costly to make, and that an instrumentally rational actor 
will therefore often be ignorant, epistemically irrational, and may rely on heuristics 
and dispositions rather than thinking at the margin about every decision. This view 
of human action receives empirical support from behavioural and experimental 
economics. As Kahneman (2011, p. 35) puts it: ‘In the economy of action, effort is 
a cost, and the acquisition of skill is driven by the balance of benefits and costs. 
Laziness is built deep into our nature.’ In addition to the effort required for optimal 
choice, there may be psychological costs of dispassionate rationality in terms of the 
overturning cherished beliefs or admitting that we got things wrong. People seem 
to engage in motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 2000) and rely on 
affect in many situations (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2002). 
While experimental evidence has shown that individuals often behave irrationally, 
it also shows that such irrationality can be overcome when the question at hand is 
deemed important (J. Evans, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993). A useful way of interpreting the evidence from behavioural economics in 
rational choice terms is that provided by Caplan (2000, 2001a, 2001c, 2002, 2003, 
2007), who argues that individuals have preferences over beliefs and over 
outcomes. When updating our beliefs in order to make a decision, we need to trade 
off the benefits of being able to take instrumentally optimal actions against the 
costs of abandoning the beliefs we most prefer intrinsically. In a move similar to, 
and inspired by, the one made by Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Caplan argues that 
preferences over beliefs will be given greater relative weight for relatively 
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inconsequential decisions, and that since voting decisions are more-or-less 
completely inconsequential they will be made on the basis of beliefs people like to 
hold rather than beliefs best supported by the evidence.20  
There are, however, many difficult unanswered questions for the revisionist 
theorist here. It cannot be that people rationally invest in information acquisition 
and analysis until the marginal benefit of such equals the marginal cost, since the 
benefits and costs of information or decision making cannot be known before the 
fact (Elster, 1986, pp. 19–20). This suggests that the decision about whether to 
collect more information will not be based on optimisation but some other decision 
procedure such as habit (Hamlin, 2006; Ostrom, 1998). The switch which shifts us 
from epistemically irrational choice rules to rational optimisation cannot be 
triggered directly by the costs of decision making failure, since the proper 
evaluation of such costs would require rational and costly optimisation. The extent 
to which such choices can be brought within a rational choice framework able to 
retain the rigour for which it is known is debatable.   
1.3.5. The evaluative   
Conventional rational choice theory is sometimes said to be normative in the sense 
that it is concerned with what individuals should do given their preferences, though 
it remains silent about what they should prefer (Elster, 1986, p. 1). A good deal of 
rational choice theory is normative in another sense: if we take preference 
satisfaction to be a good thing, either because we consider preference satisfaction is 
good in itself or because we think preferences track interests, various conceptions 
of economic efficiency emerge as standards of evaluation which are both 
normatively relevant and analytically tractable. 
There are a variety of efficiency concepts in economics which vary in their 
willingness to trade off welfare across individuals. There are, however, two 
properties common to all efficiency concepts which I suggest revisionist public 
choice theorists should be willing to relax in some situations: welfarism and 
anonymity.21 All efficiency concepts are welfarist as defined by Sen (1979b, p. 
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 The rational irrationality approach is similar in many ways to Herbert Simon’s (1955) 
model of bounded rationality. An important difference, however, is that Simon relaxes the 
assumption of optimisation (which I take to be a component of instrumental rationality) 
while Caplan relaxes the assumption of epistemic rationality. I generally prefer Caplan’s 
approach since it allows us to move beyond conventional rational choice theory while 
keeping a great deal more of its analytic machinery. 
21
 I take these to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for a normative standard to be 
one of efficiency.  
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468): ‘The judgement of the relative goodness of alternative states of affairs must 
be based exclusively on, and taken as an increasing function of, the respective 
collections of individual utilities in these states.’ Sen defines utility in terms of 
preferences, and thus welfarist standards of evaluation take individual preferences 
as given and compare actions, rules, institutions, etc. on the extent to which they 
satisfy individual preferences. An additional requirement of efficiency concepts is 
anonymity as used in social choice theory and welfare economics (Campbell & 
Fishburn, 1980). A standard of evaluation is anonymous when it treats like 
individuals alike. That is, nobody in society is given priority over another simply 
because of their identity. In practice, this means that if we switch the preferences of 
any two individuals, we will end up with the same result.  
In general then, efficiency standards consider only the preferences of individuals, 
without reference to the content of those preferences or the identity of those 
holding them. Pigouvian efficiency sums welfare without recourse to extra-
welfarist standards, the content of preferences, or the identity of individuals. The 
Pareto criteria as used by Buchanan (1959) to evaluate changes from the status quo 
is likewise welfarist and anonymous, though unlike Pigouvian efficiency it 
privileges whichever state of the world we begin from.22  
Efficiency standards have a lot to recommend them, especially for economists and 
liberals. Efficiency is precisely defined and can in principle be objectively 
measured, meaning that normative analysis can be rigorous, formal, and 
algorithmic. Moreover, the anonymity requirement satisfies the liberal condition of 
impartiality regarding individual interests and neutrality regarding the nature of the 
good life (Barry, 1995; Kukathas, 2003; Rawls, 2005).   
While efficiency is clearly a useful axiological standard, revisionist public choice 
theory is also capable of considering other normative standards. Normative criteria 
move beyond efficiency to the extent that they give some (equally-intense) 
preferences or utilities priority over others, consider non-welfare factors such as 
liberty or the distribution of some resource, or otherwise rank alternatives in 
abstract terms based on the distribution and intensity of preferences. For many 
normative questions, non-welfarist standards of evaluation are crucial. If we are 
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 This violates the principle of neutrality, which requires that options identical in terms of 
the ordinal preference rankings be treated identically. Many social choice theorists argue is 
a normatively important feature of a reasonable social welfare function. See Mueller (2003, 
pp. 138–140) for a comparison of this approach to social choice and Buchanan’s.  
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interested in liberty, for example, we need to think philosophically about what that 
concept means, rather than attempting to redescribe it in terms of preferences.  
Liberty as understood by many political theorists requires the definition of a private 
sphere which cannot legitimately be involuntarily invaded by other individuals or 
collectives. Apparently simple rules such as Mill’s harm principle do not tell us 
much, since more-or-less every action has some impact on others and thus the 
notion of ‘harm’ is empty without an initial allocation of rights (Buchanan, 1978, 
pp. 24–26). As Coase (1960) pointed out, externalities are always reciprocal: when 
there is a conflict between two parties, each can be said to be harming the other 
depending on how rights are allocated. While there have been attempts to define 
what should be thought of as a harm within a welfarist framework, the most useful 
being Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962), most liberals find such answers 
unsatisfactory. For most of us, the question of what one person can justly do to 
another without permission cannot be answered without thinking about the content 
of the act. Sen (1970) famously tried to show that liberalism was incompatible with 
the weak Pareto criteria (i.e. a change preferred by some and opposed by none is 
socially preferable to the status quo), though he has rightly been criticised for using 
an idiosyncratic and implausible conception of liberalism which prevents 
individuals from voluntarily waiving their rights (Barry, 1986; Dowding, 2004; 
Hillinger & Lapham, 1971).  
The problem with using non-welfarist standards of evaluation is that they are often 
not amenable to rigorous positive analysis. There is simply no way to define 
‘liberty’ in a way which is simultaneously rich enough to please normative 
theorists and precise enough to be used in a formal model. To a certain extent, 
there is an unavoidable trade-off between rigour and relevance. For many 
questions, however, it is useful to pick out certain non-welfarist aspects of broader 
values which can be defined precisely. While Hohfeld’s (1913) schema of liberty is 
not capable of capturing everything liberals deem important, it has the great virtue 
of being precise enough to be included in rational choice analysis.23   
It is interesting to note that the argument for moving outside a normative rational 
choice (i.e. efficiency) framework for normative evaluation mirrors the argument 
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 A willingness to eliminate imprecise language and replace it with explicitly defined and 
analytically tractable concepts might also, as my colleague William Bosworth (2014) 
argues, allow political argument to avoid merely verbal disputes and force impartial 
deliberation, or at least allow truth-seekers to recognise when others are engaged in 
sophistry and exclude them from debate.  
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for remaining within a rational choice framework for positive analysis. Positive 
rational choice theory makes positive assumptions about human motivation 
explicit, whereas many arguments outside rational choice theory contain strong 
assumptions which are less transparent. Similarly, the flexibility of the welfarist 
framework allows many strong normative assumptions to be made in a way which 
is ostensibly value-free. The fact that a policy is not Pareto-improving, for 
example, is often taken by public choice theorists to be an argument against it, and 
this biases normative conclusions towards the status quo and away from 
redistributive policies (Dowding & Hindmoor, 1997, p. 459). The contractarian 
stance of much public choice theory suggests that collective action should be 
mutually-beneficial (Buchanan, 1959, 1975a), but without careful consideration of 
the initial allocation of rights this is morally problematic. Since everything can be 
considered as causing harm, an analyst motivated to find inefficiencies will be able 
to do so.24 While using the enforcement of meddlesome preferences as a standard 
of evaluation is certainly not normatively neutral, it is biased in a transparent way. 
Strict adherence to efficiency when the analyst is really committed to non-welfarist 
values often produces covert bias.  
The way I have framed the issue here suggests that revisionist public choice theory 
involves the importation of ethical ideas into positive economic analysis. Another 
way of framing the same approach is as the use of positive economic theory as a 
means of feasibility analysis (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2009). If normative theory is 
to be a useful tool for institutional design, it needs to be nonideal (Schmidtz, 2011). 
Nonideal theory takes humans as they are and asks which institutions can best be 
built from this crooked timber. The way humans are and the aggregate effects of 
decentralised action are far from obvious, however, and this is where positive 
economic theory comes in.  
We need to know not only how institutions behave under the best case scenario or 
the most likely scenario, but also the worst case scenario. Given that our social 
scientific knowledge is always imperfect, we need to subject institutions to 
sensitivity analysis. Further, the world is not a static place and political institutions 
need to be able to withstand a variety of exogenous shocks. In other words, we 
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 Crampton et al (2011, 2012), for example, argue that recent estimates of the social cost of 
alcohol – the focus being Collins and Lapsley (2008) – are seriously inflated. The most 
plausible explanation for the assumptions made in these studies is that the analysts were 
motivated to find large social costs and made methodological choices on this basis. 
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need robust institutions (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1981, 1983; Hayek, 1949; 
Leeson & Subrick, 2006; D. Levy, 2002; Pennington, 2011; B. Taylor, 2010).    
While robustness analysis can be conducted on welfarist grounds, this does not 
need to be the case. Comparative robustness analysis requires that we define the 
institutional alternatives under investigation, the normative standard being used, 
and the range of assumptions/external changes under consideration (B. Taylor, 
2010, p. 101).  Taylor and Crampton (2010), for example, take negative liberty as a 
normative standard and consider the relative robustness of market anarchy and 
democracy to the existence of meddlesome preferences in varying distributions.   
Feasibility analysis has generally been concerned with defining the feasible set 
among which society or a benevolent despot might choose and ignoring the process 
by which collective choices are made. The incentives of decision makers within 
constitutional rules has of course been a central concern of constitutional political 
economy (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 2000), but when subjecting a particular 
institution to feasibility analysis the question of how we get from here to there in a 
political sense is rarely asked. While there is much value in defining the feasible 
set and abstracting away political challenges, there is also a great deal of value in 
considering political feasibility as a meaningful constraint on normative theory.   
1.3.6. The dynamic  
Conventional public choice theory has followed mainstream neoclassical 
economics in its focus on equilibrium (Ordeshook, 1982). A number of scholars in 
the Austrian and evolutionary schools of economics, however, have stressed the 
need for non-equilibrium analysis (Boettke, Horwitz, & Prychitko, 1986; Boulding, 
1991; Rosser, 1999). There is no doubt that equilibrium is a crucial concept for 
social scientists in general and rational choice theorists in particular, but it is 
important to recognise the limitations of the neo-Walrasian approach which treats 
equilibrium as the analytic core of economics.  Markets and other social systems 
often have a tendency towards equilibrium, but focusing on the comparative statics 
of equilibria at the expense of the forces which push social systems toward or away 
from equilibrium does not provide a complete picture (Wagner, 2010).  
Again I emphasise that no one work of social science should aim at providing a 
complete picture of the social world, since such a picture would be as complex as 
that which it represents and will be worthless in analytic terms. My point is simply 
that disequilibrating forces have been relatively understudied by rational choice 
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theorists and so models in this area might be less likely to bump into decreasing 
marginal returns to theory. Increasing the realism of theoretical assumptions is not 
a general imperative but is likely to be worthwhile in this case.  
A major dynamic force in economics, and the one which has received the most 
attention, is entrepreneurship. For Schumpeter (1934, 1942), entrepreneurs destroy 
existing equilibria while putting the economy on the path to a different one. For 
Kirzner (1973, 1997), entrepreneurs are an equilibrating force but need to be 
understood as contributing to a dynamic process of equilibration. Evolutionary 
economists (Dopfer & Potts, 2007; Loasby, 1991; R. R. Nelson & Winter, 2002) 
and economic historians of technology (Mokyr, 1992, 2002; Rosenberg, 1982, 
1994) have seen innovation as an open-ended process of knowledge accumulation. 
Rather than upsetting some existing equilibrium or pushing back uncertainty in 
order to reach equilibrium, inventors and entrepreneurs are gradually and jointly 
altering the capacities of economic actors.  
In general, we know that human behaviour is not based on constrained optimisation 
in stable environments. The world is complex and humans are imperfect. Except 
for the most trivial of matters, the parameters of the choice problem are not defined 
and humans are forced to rely on open-ended trial and error learning rather than 
mathematical optimisation (Buchanan & Vanberg, 1991; Potts, 2001).  
Nevertheless, rational choice theory is a useful tool for the consideration of 
economic and political dynamics. Consider, for example, the work of Elinor 
Ostrom (1998) and others of Bloomington school of political economy.25 Here, 
actors are modelled as rational in the sense of having beliefs and desires, but also 
as being able to originate new ideas in order to overcome collective action 
problems. In mainstream rational choice theory the constraints of the environment 
are taken as given, but in the behavioural model of rational choice advocated by 
Ostrom, individuals are able to reach outside their immediate situation in order to 
attempt to change those constraints.26 There is nothing inconsistent with rational 
choice theory as a framework here. A consideration of how entrepreneurs originate 
ideas would require that we move beyond rational choice theory, but the logic of 
relative prices remain crucially important to understanding how entrepreneurs 
behave and how people respond to innovations.   
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 See Aglicia and Boettke  (2009) for an overview of this approach.  
26
 There are obvious parallels between this view and the distinction in constitutional 
political economy between constitutional and in-period choice.  
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1.4. The Thesis 
The thesis consists of seven papers, along with this introduction and a conclusion. 
Each of these chapters is either published, accepted, under review, or has revisions 
requested at an academic journal. Each of these papers deals with exit and/or voice 
and is revisionist in one or more of the specific sense described in section 1.3. In 
this section I will outline the argument of each substantive chapter, pointing to its 
relevance to the exit and voice literature and discussing the revisionist elements of 
the chapter when these are not obvious in light of the discussion above.  
1.4.1. Chapter two: Rational irrationality as dual process theory  
Chapter two ‘Rational irrationality as dual process theory’ is focused on voice, 
with the comparison to exit being implicit in the comparative analysis of individual 
and collective choice. This paper responds to critics of Bryan Caplan’s (2007) 
rational irrationality model of electoral choice as incoherent or psychologically 
implausible. The most sustained argument to this effect is provided by Bennett and 
Friedman (2008),27 who interpret Caplan as claiming that voters knowingly and 
deliberately choose to hold beliefs they know to be false. Launching a sustained 
attack on this implicit assumption of Caplan, they conclude that Caplan’s entire 
model is incoherent ‘simply because [they] do not know what it would mean for 
someone to hold an [opinion] if she did not think the opinion were correct’ 
(Bennett & Friedman, 2008, p. 211).  
This paper argues against Bennett and Friedman’s interpretation of Caplan, 
pointing out that Caplan is attempting to construct a parsimonious abstract model 
rather than an accurate description of how humans actually choose. Nevertheless, I 
show that Caplan’s theory as stated is reasonably consistent with the widely-
accepted view of dual process theory in cognitive psychology. In dual process 
theories, humans are modelled as making decisions via a cognitively costless 
automatic subsystem and a costly reasoning subsystem. Many decisions are made 
automatically and are thus prone to various cognitive biases. Questions which 
cannot be answered automatically and which are deemed sufficiently important, on 
the other hand, must be handled consciously and here cognitive biases can be 
corrected. I interpret Caplan’s model in terms of dual process theory, concluding 
that Caplan’s model does identify an interesting causal mechanism which is 
plausible and consistent with the extant experimental evidence. I also argue that 
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 See also A. Evans and Friedman (2011) for a more general argument premised on a 
similar critique of information economics.   
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dual process theory suggests a number of points at which Caplan’s model might be 
extended, most importantly a consideration of feedback and learning.   
The argument of this paper, I think, has important implications for debates on the 
relative merits of exit and voice as means of controlling government. Caplan’s 
model makes extremely pessimistic predictions about the epistemic quality of 
collective voice decisions, and acceptance of these predictions would be a very 
strong argument for replacing voice with exit wherever feasible and possibly 
radically reducing the scope of collective action. If Bennett and Friedman are 
correct that Caplan is talking nonsense and that economic theory is completely 
irrelevant to the study of political knowledge or rationality, democracy would be 
relieved of one of its most serious criticisms. Although this chapter does not show 
that Caplan’s conclusions are correct, it does show that they are coherent, 
psychologically plausible, and worthy of further investigation. I suggest the forms 
such investigation might take, both theoretically and empirically.  
1.4.2. Chapter three: Exit and the epistemic quality of voice  
Chapter three ‘Exit and the epistemic quality of voice’ applies the ideas of rational 
ignorance and rational irrationality to the causal relationship between exit and 
voice by considering a potential spill-over effect between individual and collective 
decisions in terms of epistemic rationality. Exit options, by providing stronger 
individual incentives, can mitigate problems of rational ignorance and rationality 
irrationality in the voting booth. Taking as given the claim that individual exit 
decisions are more well-informed and rational than otherwise similar collective 
voice decisions,28 the paper argues that the existence of exit options can in some 
cases be expected to increase the epistemic rationality of collective voice decisions. 
If citizens are empowered to make individual exit decisions regarding public 
services, the knowledge gained and beliefs updated during this process will be 
available in their capacity as democratic citizens making collective voice decisions. 
When there is overlap between the informational requirements of exit and voice 
decisions, exit will increase the epistemic quality of voice.  
This could happen, for example, if a parent in an education system which 
encouraged school choice considered educational policy. Educational policy issues 
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 Note that I make no assumption about the magnitude or generality of rational ignorance 
and/or rationality. The argument requires only that some class of collective decisions are 
made less rationally than would be otherwise similar exit decisions. The magnitude and 
generality of such differences determines the scope and power of the argument, however.    
31 
 
such as class sizes and the extent of assessment are complicated and sometimes 
emotively engaging, meaning that voters are unlikely to form accurate beliefs most 
of the time, and, if we accept the arguments of Caplan (2007) and Somin (2013), 
this will lead to bad policy outcomes. If a voter is also a parent who is able to 
choose between schools offering various combinations of class size and assessment 
focus, they will have incentives to rationally update their beliefs, and these updated 
beliefs will improve their voting decisions and, if democratic institutions are 
working efficiently, lead to better policy outcomes.  
This paper is relevant to the academic literature testing and elaborating 
Hirschman’s model of exit, voice, and loyalty. Whereas existing studies have 
considered the relevant dimensions of voice to be its quantity and effectiveness – 
i.e. we should be interested in how likely citizens are to voice their concerns and 
how willing governments or public agencies are to listen – I show that the 
epistemic quality of voice has been largely neglected, despite a long-standing 
concern in political theory with democratic competence and a large literature in 
political science on the nature and importance of political knowledge.     
In a practical sense, the paper has relevance to questions of institutional design. In 
one sense, the paper shows that exit options are more valuable than we would 
otherwise have thought. Rather than fearing that exit options will crowd out voice, 
we should welcome the prospect of voice being disciplined by personal experience. 
Further, the paper suggests that exit and voice ought to be considered jointly as 
mutually reinforcing mechanisms of democratic control. We cannot simply think 
about how to design accountability mechanisms based on voice without 
considering the exit options which make voice worthy of consideration.  
1.4.3.  Chapter four: Strategic and expressive voting  
Chapter four ‘Strategic and expressive voting’ considers non-instrumental 
preferences in democratic decision making, arguing contra a number of rational 
choice theorists and political philosophers that strategic voting is entirely consistent 
with a complete lack of instrumental motivation in a way which does not 
undermine the predictive or normative power of expressive theory.  
The general claim made by the critics is that if voters made choices on an entirely 
expressive basis, they would not engage in strategic voting. Since strategic voting 
is a well-documented empirical phenomenon, particularly in the form of not 
‘wasting votes’ on first choice candidates with no realistic chance of winning 
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office, we can conclude decisively that votes are cast at least partly on instrumental 
grounds (Christiano, 2004; Dowding, 2005; Mackie, 2011). Drawing on a 
suggestion made by Brennan (2008), I take issue with the premise that expressive 
voters would not vote strategically. If people have an expressive preference for 
casting votes which seem serious or reasonable, the observed behaviour may arise 
without individuals considering their instrumental preferences at all.  
In a narrow sense, this paper is a rejection of an impossibility claim and as such 
need not concern itself with plausibility. In a broader sense, however, I wish to 
argue that this is a plausible claim about how individuals make political decisions. 
To make this argument, I draw on the idea of dispositions and suggest that there 
may be a great deal of expressive value in strategically optimising a set of 
expressively-defined preferences. The optimisation looks instrumental, and 
whether we wish to label it as such seems to be a merely verbal dispute. The 
important point in my view is that voters are interested in how they vote rather than 
how their votes influence outcomes.   
This is an important question for the positive and normative comparison of exit and 
voice, since the claim that voters in large elections give no consideration at all to 
instrumental concerns increases the predictive and normative power of expressive 
theory a great deal. Few would deny that voting is partially expressive, but as long 
as instrumental motivation also plays a role we have some basis for retaining the 
positive and normative assumptions of instrumental theory.  By rejecting what is in 
my view the most plausible argument for instrumental voting, this chapter keeps 
the extreme revisionist view of political motivation on the table.  
1.4.4. Chapter five: Children’s rights with endogenous fertility 
Chapter five ‘Children’s rights with endogenous fertility’ shifts attention from 
positive to normative theory, using rational choice contractarianism as a form of 
hypothetical exit to consider the interests of a class of individuals who by 
definition have neither exit nor voice options. Since parents have a great deal of 
power over their children, a number of liberal political theorists favour the 
expansion of children’s rights legislation which restricts parental sovereignty with 
the intention of protecting children from their parents.  
The debates on this issue have contained themselves to normative theory narrowly 
defined, with little consideration given to questions of feasibility. This chapter 
seeks to address this shortcoming by considering the indirect effect of children’s 
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rights legislation on the number of children born. As Gary Becker (1960, 1991) has 
shown, children can for analytic purposes be considered economic goods subject to 
the law of demand. Parents have children because they value the services such 
children provide more highly than the costs of raising children. I argue that 
children’s rights legislation, if effective in altering parental choices, will tend to 
reduce the demand for children among targeted groups and thus reduce the total 
number of children born. I argue on liberal grounds that, assuming such lives are 
worth living, this is a normatively significant possibility which ought to be factored 
in to political claims and policy evaluation concerning children’s rights.   
To consider the normative tradeoff between more and better lives, I adopt a 
modified version of Harsanyi-Rawls contractarianism. By considering the 
hypothetical choice of the population of possible persons behind a veil of ignorance 
which obscures not simply one’s place in society but also one’s very existence, I 
am able to weigh up competing interests in a way which is impartial between them. 
I show that children born in illiberal communities might prefer their parents be 
given sovereignty over their treatment even when this leads to significant and 
predictable harms. I take this as a potential argument against children’s rights 
legislation.  
This chapter shows that the concept of exit can be used hypothetically as a 
normative device, and also contributes to the debate on the importance of cultural 
exit from illiberal communities by showing that care is needed when making 
claims about what liberalism requires without considering the indirect effects. 
Requiring subnational communities to provide exit rights may seem like a good 
idea when we consider the interests of those actually existing, but if my argument 
is accepted we should also think about the second-order effects of such 
requirements.  
Since the revisionist elements of this paper are not as obvious as in the previous 
three, it is worth explicitly noting them. First, the argument I provide restricts 
normative standing to children and ignores the preferences of parents. Thus, in its 
violation of the anonymity principle, the standard of evaluation I am using is not 
one of efficiency.29 My analysis is best seen as a type of feasibility/robustness 
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 This is not because I think parents’ preferences should be ignored, but because the 
purpose of children’s rights legislation is to protect children and the costs of such laws to 
children are far more interesting than costs to parents. Further, the advocates of children’s 
rights legislation I am questioning generally consider only the interests of children and I 
simply follow this in order to provide an internal critique.   
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analysis of children’s rights legislation: I consider how liberal (with liberalism 
defined here in terms of impartial preference satisfaction of the relevant 
population) children’s rights laws are when we introduce the possibility of 
endogenous fertility. If liberalism is undermined in such situations, which I argue is 
the case, the laws in question are in this sense fragile.  Secondly, the preferences of 
parents which concern us in a predictive sense are other-regarding - malicious or, 
more plausibly, meddlesome. All parents, it would seem, are interested in raising 
children with certain values, dispositions, and capabilities. In most cases we find 
this unobjectionable, but problems arise for the liberal when parents’ other-
regarding preferences are in sufficient conflict with children’s interests.  
1.4.5. Chapter six: Analytic radicalism  
Chapter six ‘Analytic radicalism’ continues the normative focus on feasibility and 
robustness, combining this normative standard with consideration of non-
equilibrium dynamics. The paper is a clarification of the ‘analytic conservatism’ 
argument of Brennan and Hamlin (2004, 2006) that a risk-neutral decision maker 
will, due to the commonly-observed concavity of value functions, act as if risk-
averse in the realm of institutional choice. This makes the adoption of a 
conservative disposition appropriate on standard efficiency grounds.  
I accept this argument in its general form, but this chapter is interested in setting 
some scope limitations to the argument. In particular, I show that strong Tiebout 
exit options will introduce local convexity to institutional value function and thus 
make risk-neutral decision makers behave as risk-seekers with respect to certain 
institutional gambles. Thus, in an environment with sufficiently strong Tiebout exit 
options, the adoption of a radical disposition to institutional change might be 
preferable in the long term to a neutral or conservative disposition.  
In terms of the exit and voice literature, this chapter can be seen as an argument in 
favour of Tiebout competition as a particular type of institutionalised exit. One of 
the arguments for Tiebout competition, which I develop along with Patri Friedman 
as co-author in the following two chapters, is that it allows for institutional 
experimentation and thus improvement in the quality of governance over time. 
There is a prima facie inconsistency between this claim and the general view of 
many public choice scholars and constitutional political economists that innovation 
in policy and institutions is to be avoided on robustness grounds. I also hold this 
view in general, but this paper is aimed to show that robustness does not require 
stability when sufficiently strong exit options are presents. 
35 
 
1.4.6. Chapter seven: Entry barriers and Tiebout completion  
Chapter seven ‘Entry barriers and Tiebout competition’ (co-authored with Patri 
Friedman) is concerned with the institutional requirements for effective Tiebout 
competition in a dynamic sense. Two of the major purported advantages of Tiebout 
competition are that it allows for institutional innovation and robustly protects the 
wellbeing of citizens. We show that the power of these factors is limited by 
institutional inertia and the possibility of collusion or endogenous centralisation. 
Our argument is that these problems would be less serious if the creation of new 
jurisdictions (through the settlement of uninhabited areas or secession, for 
example) was a more realistic response to dissatisfaction.30 We argue that just as 
economic markets are most efficient and dynamic when entry barriers are low, 
Tiebout exit options would more robustly prevent rent extraction and encourage 
beneficial innovation when there exist means of creating new jurisdictions rather 
than simply reforming existing ones.31   
This paper is primarily intended as a contribution to debates over the desirability of 
Tiebout competition. We claim that the potential benefits of such competition are 
large but that the requirements for such gains to be reaped are more restrictive than 
is generally recognised. This makes questions of institutional design more 
complicated than simply whether or not to decentralise. More generally, it 
emphasises the point that questions of the relative desirability of exit and voice 
cannot take the options on the table as given. The institutional environment 
determines not only how people make choices but also how agenda-setters or 
entrepreneurs create the menu of options.  
The revisionist element of this paper is its concern with non-equilibrium dynamics, 
and particularly its concern with institutional innovation. Innovation economists 
have long argued that static efficiency considerations pale in comparison to the 
benefits of technological innovation and economic growth: fixing all the market 
failures of the medieval economy would not produce people of that time anything 
                                                     
30
 In terms of the types of exit introduced in section 1.2 above we could think of this as 
entrepreneurial Tiebout exit.  
31
 Revisions have been requested on this paper, but the request came too late to be able to 
make these revisions prior to submission of the thesis. The comments were generally 
supportive, with the most significant changes required being a restructuring and reframing 
of the argument as a response to the argument by Caplan (2001b) and Powell (2004) that 
tax capitalisation in land values undermines the power of Tiebout competition.  
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close to the standard of living residents of developed nations enjoy in the 21st 
century, despite all the inefficiencies which remain.32   
1.4.7. Chapter eight: Seasteading: Competitive governments on 
the ocean 
Chapter eight ‘Seasteading: Competitive governments on the ocean’ (also co-
authored with Patri Friedman) is also concerned with the non-equilibrium 
dynamics of political institutions. It argues that those advocating the reform of 
current political systems in order to promote jurisdictional competition are in a 
catch-22: jurisdictional competition has the potential to improve policy outcomes 
and make citizens better off, but such reforms must be enacted by currently 
uncompetitive governments. Since the argument for competitive government rests 
significantly on the notion that uncompetitive governments cannot be relied upon 
to enact worthwhile reforms, there is a whiff of circularity in the proposed path to a 
better world. To engage in only slight hyperbole, reform designed to increase 
competition among governments is possible if and only if it is not desirable.  
Since existing governments are resistant to change, we argue that the only way to 
overcome the deep problem of reform is by focusing on the bare-metal layer of 
society – the technological environment in which governments are embedded. It is 
at this level that political equilibria are ultimately determined, and attempts to 
intervene piecemeal in the political process provides less leverage than attempting 
to alter the technological base from which the political superstructure emerges. 
Developing the technology to create settlements in international waters, which we 
refer to as seasteading, changes the technological environment by lowering 
mobility costs and entry barriers. Crucially, it does so without attempting to push 
against the incentives of existing political systems. As such, it sidesteps the 
problem of reform and is, counterintuitively, more likely than conventional 
approaches to significantly alter the policy equilibrium.  
Like chapter seven, this paper is intended as a contribution to the debate on 
decentralisation and Tiebout competition. Here, we identify a new problem with 
existing arguments for increasing Tiebout exit options and propose seasteading as a 
solution to this problem, as well as the entry barriers problem identified in chapter 
seven. The revisionist elements of this paper are, again like chapter seven, the 
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 See Baumol (2002) on innovation and economic growth. Holcombe (2009) argues for a 
reformulation of welfare economics in recognition of the normative significance of 
economic growth.  
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focus on non-equilibrium dynamics as a process and dynamic innovation as a 
normative consideration.  
1.4.8. Summary  
The papers outlined above have each been submitted to peer-reviewed journals and 
are at various stages of the review/publication process. Table 1.3 below 
summarises the status of each paper. This thesis includes the last submitted version 
of each paper, though references, formatting, and spelling have been standardised. I 
have included the abstract at the beginning of each chapter but have excluded 
metadata required by journals such as keywords and JEL codes. Chapter eight was 
published in Kyklos with an abstract as well as a longer summary, the latter of 
which has not been included here.  
Table 1.3: Thesis summary  
Title  Status  Journal  Notes 
 
Rational Irrationality as Dual 
Process Theory  
 
Under review 
 
Rationality and 
Society  
 
 
Exit and the Epistemic 
Quality of Voice  
 
Submitted 
 
New Political 
Economy  
 
 
Strategic and Expressive 
voting  
 
Revisions 
requested   
 
Constitutional 
Political Economy 
 
 
Children’s Rights with 
Endogenous Fertility  
 
Revisions 
requested  
 
Rationality, Markets, 
and Morals 
 
 
Analytic Radicalism 
 
Published33  
 
Constitutional 
Political Economy  
 
 
Entry Barriers and Tiebout 
Competition  
 
Revisions 
requested  
 
Review of Austrian 
Economics 
 
Co-authored 
with Patri 
Friedman 
 
Seasteading: Competitive 
Governments on the Ocean 
 
Published34  
 
Kyklos 
 
Co-authored 
with Patri 
Friedman 
 
 
Each chapter has been drafted as a stand-alone work, but there are a number of 
common themes running through the chapters which, I hope, can be discerned 
easily enough. These will be more fully discussed in the conclusion, chapter 9, but 
it is worth briefly flagging them here. First, each of the papers the papers consider 
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 As Taylor (2013).  
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 As Friedman and Taylor (2012).  
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from various angles the relative merits of exit and voice as means of decision 
making. This is an extremely important question in that it is at the heart of a 
number of big questions in normative political theory, including debates over 
geographic decentralisation and devolution, markets versus states, quasi-markets in 
public services, tax competition, and multiculturalism. While I do deal with some 
of these issues explicitly at times, my approach is for the most part in the realm of 
abstract theory and can be expected to contribute indirectly to these debates. 
Second, many of the papers (in particular chapters 2,3,4 and implicitly chapters 
5,6) deal with the possibility than political and economic choices are made on quite 
different grounds, even though it is assumed that people have the same basic 
motivational structure in every context. I take this to be a central issue in positive 
political science and normative political theory, and I will have much to say about 
this in the conclusion.  
Third, each of the chapters attempts to relax some of the assumptions of rational 
choice theory while doing so reluctantly. It is worth repeating Dowding’s (2001, p. 
95) retort to critics of abstraction in political science: ‘Without oxygen on this 
planet there would be no policy process, but I have never seen oxygen mentioned 
in an explanation of any policy outcome.’ Good theory is as simple as possible but 
no simpler, and the revisionist elements I introduce are best seen as grudging 
concessions that the phenomena I wish to consider are too complex for 
conventional rational choice assumptions.   
In summary, this thesis contributes to the debate on exit and voice and does so 
from a particular methodological perspective. The thesis addresses two broad 
questions, both of which I take to be important in its own way. At a theoretical 
level it considers the behavioural and epistemic difference between individual and 
collective choices while retaining a basic motivational symmetry. I take this to be a 
foundational issue in normative political theory and positive political science, 
particularly in its rational choice variety. In terms of institutional design, the 
question of whether to emphasise exit or voice as means of control is one of the 
biggest questions there is, and it still generates a great deal of debate. I approach 
these issues by using revisionist public choice theory. This methodological 
perspective has been underutilised in both positive and normative theory, and while 
there has been a great deal of exploration in recent years it seems to me that 
revisionist public choice theory opens the way to a number of analytic vistas 
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unreachable by either the conventional public choice theorist or those working 
outside the rational actor tradition.  
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2. Rational Irrationality as Dual Process 
Theory 
Abstract: Caplan’s rational irrationality model of political choice has been 
accused of being psychologically incoherent or implausible. While Caplan’s 
account is no doubt counterintuitive, this paper argues that it is consistent with 
widely-accepted dual process theories of cognition. Caplan’s model is best 
interpreted as a ‘default-interventionist’ account in which a biased intuitive 
subsystem produces automatic responses which are overridden by rational 
reflection when the prospective costs of error are significant. Caplan’s model 
requires further empirical investigation and perhaps stronger psychological 
foundations, but accusations of incoherence and implausibility are based on a 
mistaken interpretation of Caplan’s argument and the methodology of rational 
choice theory in general. However, these critiques and a consideration of the dual 
process literature do suggest areas in which Caplan’s model could be extended to 
increase its predictive and evaluative power.  
2.1. Introduction 
Bryan Caplan’s (2001a, 2007) model of rational irrationality attempts to explain 
how generally rational agents could behave in an apparently irrational way in the 
political sphere. Caplan argues that individuals have preferences over their own 
beliefs. We enjoy holding beliefs which are consistent with our biases or which 
inflate our sense of self-worth.35 False beliefs will often lead to poor choices, 
however, and so the material costs of making poor choices need to be weighed 
against the psychological benefits of holding false but pleasant beliefs. In other 
words, people have a taste for irrationality and will weigh the psychological 
benefits of irrationality against the material costs of holding unnecessarily false 
beliefs. It is instrumentally rational to be epistemically irrational when the benefits 
of epistemic irrationality exceed the costs.  
The expected value E(X) to an individual of holding belief X depends on the 
material benefits MX and psychological benefits PX of holding this belief. In 
                                                     
35
 Caplan’s approach is similar to but distinct from Brennan and Lomasky’s (1993) 
expressive voting model and Kuran’s (1995) preference falsification model. Hamlin and 
Jennings (2011) provide a survey connecting these and other approaches to expressive 
political behaviour.  
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Caplan’s model, rational individuals will choose whichever X maximises E(X) = 
MX + PX.36 For many beliefs PX will be trivial and MX will dominate. For beliefs of 
little or no practical importance, however, MX will be at or close to zero, leaving PX 
to determine outcomes. In the context of electoral choice, the material benefits to a 
desirable electoral outcome EX need to be discounted by the probability of 
pivotality α. The voter will choose a belief X which maximises E(X) = αEX + PX.  
Since the probability of casting a decisive vote in a real-world election is 
approximately zero, αEX will be trivially small and PX will dominate the voting 
calculus. For example, Gelman et al (2009) estimate that the average voter in the 
2008 United States presidential election had a one in 60 million chance of deciding 
the outcome. A voter who valued the electoral result at $1 million dollars would be 
losing less than two expected cents by voting incorrectly. With so little on the line 
from an instrumental point of view, voters will indulge their biases virtually to the 
point of satiation, votes will be cast on the basis of prejudice and emotion rather 
than reason, and policy outcomes will suffer as a result.  
Caplan’s argument has been heavily criticised from a number of theoretical and 
empirical directions (Bennett & Friedman, 2008; Elster & Landemore, 2008; 
Lomasky, 2008; Mackie, 2012; Wittman, 2008). One prominent line of criticism 
has focused on the psychological plausibility of rational irrationality. The paper 
defends the rational irrationality framework against these accusations by 
connecting Caplan’s model to recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive 
psychology falling broadly under the heading of ‘dual process theory.’  
The widely-accepted framework of dual process theory provides a wealth of 
experimental evidence consistent with Caplan’s model. While there are many 
varieties of dual process theory, they make a common distinction between two 
types or systems of cognition. ‘System 1’ processes are fast, intuitive, and make no 
demands of working memory. ‘System 2’ processes are slow, critical, and require 
conscious effort. Dual process theories hold that humans use both of these systems 
in their everyday life, with system 1 being used for many familiar tasks and system 
2 being called in when required and performing a supervisory role.  
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 Caplan does not specify his model explicitly in these terms. The formulation here is my 
interpretation of Caplan’s argument based on his informal argument and graphical 
representation.  
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I argue that Caplan’s critics have misunderstood the purpose of Caplan’s project 
and that properly understood his model is quite consistent with a great deal of 
respected theory and evidence from psychology. The dual process literature also 
points to areas where Caplan’s model might be further developed, and in the latter 
part of this paper I will argue that the predictive and evaluative power of the 
rational irrationality framework could be increased by consideration of the 
institutional correlates of learning from feedback.   
2.2. The implausibility critique 
The rational irrationality framework is highly counterintuitive. We do not normally 
think of beliefs as consciously chosen and we certainly don’t think of belief 
formation as involving a cost-benefit analysis. The most sustained attack on the 
psychological plausibility of Caplan’s argument comes from Bennett and Friedman 
(2008, pp. 206–211).37 In their view, rational irrationality is a fundamentally 
incoherent concept. Their central claim is that Caplan’s model requires voters to 
knowingly hold false beliefs: individuals must know their beliefs are false but 
deliberately choose to accept them in order to reap the psychological benefits. This, 
for Bennett and Friedman, is incoherent. To accept a belief is simply to believe it to 
be true.  Without the absurd claim that individuals knowingly hold false beliefs, 
Bennett and Friedman argue, Caplan’s model collapses into an account of simple, 
inadvertent ignorance about which rational choice theory can have nothing to say. 
If individuals do not know that their beliefs are false, they have passively and 
involuntarily fallen into error rather than actively choosing it. Since there is no 
choice here, incentives don’t matter and economic theory has nothing to say.   
Bennett and Friedman’s interpretation of the argument is understandable. Caplan 
(2007, pp. 14–15) approvingly quotes Ayn Rand’s conception of irrationality as 
‘the wilful suspension of one’s consciousness, the refusal to think – not blindness, 
but refusal to see; not ignorance, but refusal to know.’ Indeed the very structure of 
the model suggests that individuals consciously and rationally choose between 
truth and falsehood. Utility functions in the rational irrationality framework contain 
information about the material consequences of holding a belief. If this information 
is in some sense inside the individual’s head, they must be consciously throwing 
away this information when choosing to accept false beliefs.  
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 See also Mackie (2012, pp. 300–301) and Elster and Landemore (2008, pp. 286–287). A. 
Evans and Friedman (2011) launch a broader attack on the economic approach to 
information acquisition on similar grounds. 
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In a sense, critiques of the psychological plausibility of rational choice models are 
beside the point. Analytic models of choice in economics and political science are 
generally not intended as accurate descriptions of psychological processes, but 
rather as abstractions which capture some important features of a real world 
process in order to highlight some interesting causal relationship. The value of the 
model, on this view, is not to be judged on the degree to which its variables 
represent real world phenomena but on the degree to which the model as a whole 
produces novel and interesting empirical predictions (M. Friedman, 1953).   
We cannot completely ignore the plausibility of a model, however. Useful formal 
models by necessity ignore many factors and include assumptions we know are, 
strictly speaking, false. They do, however, pick out important processes in the real 
world and represent them in a simplified form which nevertheless captures 
important causal relationships (Morton, 1999). We know that consumers do not 
literally use the mathematical formulas found in microeconomics texts when 
making decisions, but these formulas do represent features of real world decision 
making in an analytically tractable way. In applying microeconomic theory to the 
real world we need to keep in mind that it ignores some things which will 
sometimes be relevant – as has become increasingly clear in the heuristics and 
biases literature and various findings in behavioural economics – but 
microeconomic theory is an extremely useful abstraction because it picks out some 
relevant features of how people make decisions and abstracts them in a simple and 
highly predictive way.  
Bennett and Friedman’s objection is not completely beside the point, then. We 
should not demand that Caplan as a political theorist explain precisely how people 
make decisions and include such complexity in his formal model, but a theory with 
no relationship to how people actually make decisions will generally be lacking in 
an explanatory sense and would require strong empirical support to prove its worth 
as a predictive device. The psychological foundations of rational irrationality are 
therefore important.  
Caplan makes it clear that his model is consistent with a variety of psychological 
interpretations (Caplan, 2007, pp. 125–131). The most literal psychological 
interpretation of the model is that individuals choose between truth and falsehood 
while in some sense knowing all along what is really true. This decision process, 
the plausibility of which Caplan does not seem to accept but thinks is ‘underrated,’ 
is the one attacked by Bennett and Friedman. Caplan emphasises that the 
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psychological process underpinning rational irrationality should be seen as tacit 
and offers a more plausible interpretation in which individuals remain irrational on 
topics which seem inconsequential while keeping a lookout for errors likely to be 
materially costly: ‘There is no need to posit that people start with a clear perception 
of the truth, then throw it away. The only requirement is that rationality remain on 
“standby,” ready to activate when error is dangerous’ (Caplan, 2007, p. 126). 
Even this model is clearly not intended as a literal description of the steps people 
go through. As a rational choice model, rational irrationality attempts to capture 
meaningful causal relationships in the real world – what Dennett (1991) calls ‘real 
patterns.’ In evaluating Caplan’s argument we should not ask whether it makes 
false assumptions – all models do – but whether it reveals causal relationships not 
immediately visible. Drawing on dual process theories of cognition, the remainder 
of this paper argues that it does.  
2.3. Dual process theory 
Caplan’s conception of rationality as a faculty which is on standby for important 
questions is consistent with the framework of dual process theory, which is widely 
accepted in psychology. Dual process theories in general distinguish between two 
broad types of cognitive process: the automatic and effortless ‘system 1’ and the 
conscious and effortful ‘system 2.’ While dual process theories come in a variety of 
flavours, I here outline a ‘default-intervention’ (J. Evans, 2007, p. 109) model in 
which system 1 automatically uses associations and simple heuristics to suggest 
answers to system 2, which can endorse, modify, or reject these answers and will 
be called on to answer any questions system 1 finds beyond its ability (D. T. 
Gilbert, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 1999).    
While these processes are not strictly divided into two mental subsystems, I will 
here follow Kahneman (2011) in writing of ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ as mental 
subsystems rather than abstract collections of processes. This simplifies discussion, 
though it should be kept in mind that statements like ‘system 1 provides an 
intuitive answer’ are shorthand for statements like ‘some mental process which 
does not make use of working memory automatically produces an answer.’ 
System 1 is, in Kahneman’s (2011, p. 79) words, ‘a machine for jumping to 
conclusions.’ It uses associations and simple heuristics to reach plausible 
conclusions. When asked to make a judgement or decision, an intuitive answer 
often comes to mind automatically and without mental effort. When asked to 
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evaluate ‘2 + 2’ or asked ‘are you thirsty?’ an answer automatically and effortlessly 
presents itself.  The defining characteristic of system 1 is that is does not require 
working memory. As such, it tends to produce answers quickly and has a high 
capacity. System 1 tends to work unconsciously and often uses associations 
between concepts and simple heuristics to reach conclusions.  
A basic tool of system 1 is ‘attribute substitution.’ When system 1 faces a difficult 
question it is unable to answer, it will often substitute a related but distinct question 
it is capable of answering. Kahneman and Frederick (2002, p. 56) suggest that there 
are three general purpose heuristics falling under the broad category of attribute 
substitution: the representativeness, availability, and affect heuristics. Each of these 
heuristics will generally be useful in reaching fast and frugal judgements and 
decisions, but each can produce bias when their application is not properly 
supervised by system 2.  
The representativeness heuristic is best illustrated by the classic ‘Linda’ problem of 
the heuristics and biases literature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Participants in an 
experiment are given a description of a fictional person:  
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. 
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
 
They are then asked to rate the likelihood of various propositions being true: 
Linda is a teacher in elementary school. 
Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F) 
Linda is a psychiatric social worker. 
Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters. 
Linda is a bank teller. (T) 
Linda is an insurance salesperson. 
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Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement. (T&F)  
Since the bank tellers active in the feminist movement are a subset of bank tellers, 
T&F cannot be more likely than T. An individual rating T&F as more likely than T 
commits the conjunction fallacy, treating a subset of an event as more likely than its 
superset. However, the description of Linda is designed to resemble the 
stereotypical feminist more than the stereotypical bank teller, and this prompts most 
people to rate T&F as more likely than T. 89% of those without statistical training 
committed the conjunction fallacy on the Linda problem. Statistically sophisticated 
subjects (doctoral students in decision science) performed slightly better but error 
rates remained at 85%. Even when the complexity of the problem is reduced to a 
stark and transparent choice between T and T&F, 85% of respondents commit the 
fallacy. Framing the problem in ways which emphasised the fact that group T&F is 
a subset of T, including providing a clear and valid argument for the greater 
likelihood of T,38 reduced the proportion of subjects committing the error but never 
brought it below 57%. The bias revealed by this question is quite pronounced and 
robust.   
The standard interpretation of the results is the representativeness heuristic: the 
substitution of the question ‘How representative of this group’s membership is 
Linda?’ for the one actually asked. Kahneman and Tversky asked a separate group 
to rate the representativeness of Linda as a member of the groups and found an 
almost perfect correlation (.98) between these responses and probability judgments. 
System 1 does not have the tools to answer questions of probability theory but does 
have strong associations between individual traits and group membership which 
suggest that Linda is more like the typical feminist bank teller than the typical bank 
teller.  The substitution of probability for similarity need not lead to outright 
incoherence as it does in the Linda case, and the representativeness heuristic may 
bias our thinking in more subtle ways. People routinely ignore base rates when 
making probability judgements, scope when evaluating environmental 
interventions, and duration when evaluating the unpleasantness of a painful 
episode. For the vast majority of Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental subjects in 
the Linda problem, system 1’s intuitive answer to the wrong question was endorsed 
by system 2. Similarly, those asked various other questions which should be 
                                                     
38
 ‘Linda is more likely to be a bank teller than she is to be a feminist bank teller, because 
every feminist bank teller is a bank teller, but some women bank tellers are not feminists, 
and Linda could be one of them’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 299). 
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extension-sensitive will intuitively make scope-insensitive judgements. When 
system 2 does not intervene this can produce systematic and predictable biases 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, pp. 73–81).    
The availability heuristic involves judging likelihood or frequency based on the 
cognitive availability of examples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). When asked 
whether there are more English words starting with K or X, we intuitively search 
for K words and X words, find members of the former category much more 
available and conclude that there are in fact more words in the English language 
whose first letter is K words than those whose first letter is X. Like other system 1 
heuristics, availability is generally an efficient and useful way of making fairly 
good judgements, since availability is highly correlated with frequency or 
probability. Reliance on this heuristic can lead to bias when there are factors 
affecting availability independently of frequency or probability. When asked 
whether more English words have K as their first or third letter, we find it much 
easier to think of first-letter K words than third-letter K words. This is due to our 
search algorithm rather than the real frequency of the two categories, however, and 
in this case system 1 produces an incorrect answer. Despite the fact that there are 
more third-letter K words, a large majority of people rate first-letter K words as 
more common (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, pp. 211–212). Similarly, the fact that 
murders and motor accidents are reported in news and discussed more often than 
suicides and strokes makes the former events more available than the latter and 
biases risk assessment (Kahneman, 2011, Chapter 13).  
The affect heuristic is used when people use their general evaluation of a stimulus 
as a guide to judgement and choice (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007; 
Slovic et al., 2002). In attribute substitution terms, questions such as ‘should I 
choose X or Y?’ are replaced by questions such as ‘which option provokes the most 
positive affective response?’ A number of experimental studies have shown that 
affective associations can influence judgment and choices. Exposing people to an 
image a smiling face for 1/250th second before another stimulus will persistently 
increase their evaluation of that stimulus despite the positive priming of the smiling 
face being too brief for recognition (Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997). The 
most interesting application of the affect heuristic has been to risk perception. A 
number of studies have shown that perceptions of risk depend on feelings of fear, 
and that perceptions of risks and benefits are negatively correlated. People rate 
dreaded events as riskier, exaggerate risks when perceived benefits are low, and 
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exaggerate benefits when perceived risks are low (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, 
Read, & Combs, 1978; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).  
While each of these heuristics economises on decision making costs and produces 
decent answers in most situations, they do result in systematic biases which could 
potentially be removed by more complicated decision rules. This becomes apparent 
when we consider the effect of normatively-irrelevant contextual factors on 
judgements and decisions. Arbitrary numbers which we know to be unrelated to the 
question at hand influence numerical responses, and framing questions can 
influence answers (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Tversky 
& Simonson, 1993). 
In dual process theories, the role of system 2 is to monitor the output of system 1 
and override it when error is detected, as well as to tackle any problems for which 
system 1 has no answer at all. This monitoring is far from perfect, however. 
System 2 will often to endorse system 1’s intuitive judgements even when a small 
amount of cognitive effort would reveal that a mistake has been made (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2011, Chapter 3). Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 
p. 58) provide the following puzzle as an example: ‘A bat and ball cost $1.10 in 
total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?’ Most 
people will initially report an intuitive judgment that the ball costs 10 cents, though 
this answer is obviously mistaken when take the time to check the intuitive result. 
System 2 will normally, but not always, catch this type of system 1 error. 
The degree of scrutiny intuitive judgements face depends in part on the subjective 
feeling of confidence in the judgement. When making judgements in a familiar 
situation and we have a strong intuition consistent with the available evidence, 
subjective confidence will be high and system 2 will tend to endorse system 2 
judgements. Given the associative and heuristic nature of system 1, this produces 
systematic bias. Confidence depends on cognitive ease, and this can be 
manipulated quite simply in order to influence judgement. Alter et al (2007), for 
example, conduct a series of experiments in which decreasing cognitive ease 
reduced subjective confidence in judgements and led to greater system 2 reasoning 
and superior performance on questions where intuitive answers are wrong but 
easily correctable by system 2. Questions printed in harder to read type or 
answered while furrowing one’s brow (as opposed to puffing one’s cheeks) created 
a sense of cognitive unease and encouraged system 2 intervention. Confidence also 
depends on associational coherence. When asked how many of each animal Moses 
49 
 
took on the ark, many will confidently give two as the answer without noticing the 
substitution of Moses for Noah. Since Moses makes associational sense in the 
context of the question, system 1 provides a confident answer for the question it 
thinks it is being asked and system 2 trusts this judgement. If asked how many 
animals Plato took on the ark, the trickiness of the question would be more obvious 
(Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010).  
System 2 also has its own set of heuristics used to simplify decisions but also 
giving rise to bias (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, pp. 59–60). Humans are bad 
intuitive statisticians, at least when information is presented in the form of 
proportions rather than natural frequencies. Even when consciously attempting to 
estimate probabilities, people systematically err by ignoring or underweighting 
base rates (Bar-Hillel, 1980). Moreover, people use a ‘positive test strategy’ when 
assessing the truth of hypotheses. Searching for evidence which supports rather 
than undermines a hypothesis leads to confirmation bias (Klayman & Ha, 1987; 
Klayman, 1995). More generally, people seem to engage in motivated reasoning. 
Rather than impartially seeking the truth, people will gather, evaluate, and interpret 
information in order to reach conclusions valued independently of truth. 
Information which threatens an individual’s identity may be rejected, while a weak 
argument in favour of a pet theory may be evaluated as favourable (Kunda, 1990).  
In summary, dual process theory suggests that judgment and decisions are made by 
two distinct classes of cognitive operation. The first is automatic, associative, and 
cognitively free. The second is deliberate, inferential, and cognitively costly. There 
is much experimental support for a default-interventionist view in which system 1 
intuitively forms judgements and assessments of confidence in those judgements, 
and system 2 chooses whether to accept the judgement as true, modify it in some 
way, or reject it as false. The level of scrutiny depends on a number of factors, 
including the degree of confidence system 1 assigns to the judgement.  
2.4. Rational irrationality as a dual process model 
While the structure of Caplan’s model and some of his remarks make it appear that 
voters must consciously weigh the costs and benefits of irrationality, it is easy to 
interpret the model in default-interventionist terms. Indeed, this reading seems to 
be what Caplan actually has in mind given his claim that rational irrationality 
requires that ‘rationality remain on “standby,” ready to engage when error is 
dangerous’ (Caplan, 2007, p. 126).  
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Rather than thinking about the psychological benefits of irrationality, however, it 
makes more sense to think of rationality as involving costs. The notion of 
preferences over beliefs could be interpreted to cover the affect heuristic, but the 
biases stemming from representation and availability, which seem potentially 
important to politics, make no sense in this context. In the default-interventionist 
framework, system 1 automatically produces an intuitive response without the need 
for conscious thought or the utilisation of working memory. This can be thought of 
as a free but fallible answer which, if system 2 chooses to intervene, will be 
replaced with a more reliable one at some cost.      
On this understanding, individuals are not balancing instrumental and 
psychological preferences, but seeking to maximise their instrumental utility, 
which depends negatively on the level of cognitive effort expended in judgement 
and decision making. Intuitive answers might suggest themselves due to priming, 
the representativeness heuristic, or the affect heuristic. Thinking in these terms 
allows for a more general consideration of bias and rational correction in 
alternative choice contexts than is possible when focusing on affect as preference.  
An agent does not face the choice between accepting a false belief and a true one, 
but between subjecting an intuitive judgement to rational scrutiny. An intuitive 
answer comes for free, and the agent needs to consider whether to engage in costly 
evaluation of that judgement. The benefits of reflection consists of the extra utility 
the agent would gain by making superior choices and the costs are defined by the 
cognitive effort expended during deliberation.  
We can model this in expected utility terms. For simplicity, we assume that 
cognitive costs, the stakes of a choice, and the reliability of the heuristic are known 
quantities and that rational reflection is infallible. Let E(Ri) be the expected utility 
of subjecting intuitive judgement i to scrutiny, U(X) be the utility of choice X, ci be 
the cognitive cost of rationality evaluating i, and pi be the probability that the 
intuitive judgement is correct. 
An agent is asked to choose between two options A and B, knowing that one option 
is instrumentally better than the other by a specified amount but not knowing 
which is which. An intuitive answer a with some probability of being correct 
suggests itself, and the agent can either accept this answer of expend some mental 
effort to discover the correct answer with probability 1. Assuming risk-neutrality, 
the agent will maximise: 
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 E(Ra) = (1-pa)(|u(A) – u(B)|) - ca   
The expected value of rational reflection depends on three things: the reliability of 
intuitive judgement, the stakes of the decision, and the costs of rationality. Now 
consider how this calculus changes for a collective choice with the probability of 
pivotality of α. The stakes of the choice (i.e. the absolute value of u(A) – u(B)) 
must be multiplied by α, giving: 
E(Ra) = (1-pa)(|u(A) – u(B)|)α - ca  
The benefits of rational reflection here depend strongly on α, while the costs 
remain the same regardless of the chances of pivotality. If we assume that α is very 
close to zero, the first term in this equation will become small even for decisions 
which are very important at the aggregate level and for which our intuitions are 
highly unreliable. For judgements with non-trivial costs of cognition, then, we 
should generally expect the expected value of rational reflection to be negative.   
This approach, I believe, captures the essential features of Caplan’s rational 
irrationality argument in a way consistent with dual process theory. Being a model, 
it leaves out many things and could potentially benefit from including some of 
these, as I will discuss in the conclusion. It does, however, provide a simple 
representation of some potentially interesting causal relationships and produces 
testable empirical predictions. Moreover, it is consistent with what we know about 
the way humans actually make judgements and decisions.  
2.5. Incentives and epistemic rationality  
The question of whether incentives do in fact remove biases is, of course, an 
empirical one. Unfortunately, empirical evaluation is complicated by a number of 
factors, and the extant literature does not offer simple and conclusive answers. 
Camerer and Hogarth’s (1999, p. 8) summary remains apt: ‘The studies show that 
the effects of incentives are mixed and complicated. The extreme positions, that 
incentives make no difference at all, or always eliminate persistent irrationalities, 
are false.’  
The questions we need to be asking in order to empirically evaluate Caplan’s 
model are whether and to what extent voters fall prey to biases they would avoid if 
given an individual choice. These questions have not been asked, though a number 
of more general findings are relevant. If individuals in general are unresponsive to 
incentives when it comes to overcoming bias, Caplan’s model becomes much less 
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plausible. Further, the distinction between a decisive low-stakes choice and a large 
number collective choice with large consequences may not be as similar in 
psychological terms as expected utility theory would lead us to believe. We know 
that folk probability theory often produces some odd results, and some of these 
might lead us to wonder whether voters give electoral politics more weight than it 
deserves in rational choice terms.  
At the risk of tautology, we can in general claim that individuals will partially or 
fully overcome their biases when they have the ability and motivation to do so. The 
rational irrationality model restricts its attention to a subset of motivation – 
extrinsic, instrumental incentives. We could interpret Caplan’s model in dual 
process terms as claiming that low-cost decisions are made using cheap but fallible 
type 1 processes while more costly and accurate type 2 processes remain on 
standby for high-stakes decisions. A number of experimental economic studies 
have sought to determine whether and when financial incentives improve 
performance on judgement, decision making, and problem solving tasks. While this 
literature is too large to review here (See instead Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Smith 
& Walker, 1993a; Smith, 2008, pp. 173–181), the general answer to the question of 
whether incentives increase rationality is a resounding ‘it depends.’ Fortunately, we 
do have some idea of what it depends on, and the general patterns in the literature 
tell us something about the plausibility of the rational irrationality model.  
Firstly, the difficulty of the task at hand influences the power of incentives. As 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. S274) point out, ‘[i]ncentives do not operate by 
magic: they work by focusing attention and by prolonging deliberation.’ If an 
accurate judgement or a normative decision is beyond the cognitive capacity of the 
individual, we should not expect incentives to improve performance. On the other 
hand, individuals will often perform optimally on very simple tasks even when 
incentives are absent. Humans often appear to have an intrinsic motivation to 
answer questions correctly and make decisions optimally. Camerer and Hogarth 
(1999, p. 22) refer to these factors as ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ effects: when tasks are 
too easy or too difficult, incentives should not be expected to have a major effect 
on performance.  
Secondly, the effect of incentives seems to be mediated by their effect on cognitive 
effort. While this may seem obvious, the point is important and easy to overlook. 
Incentives do not work by removing the biases of system 1 but by tightening 
system 2’s supervision of intuitive judgment. The effect of incentives on cognitive 
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effort has been physically measured via pupil dilation (Kahneman & Peavler, 1969) 
and brain imaging (Farrell, Goh, & White, 2012). The mediating effect of effort 
means that incentives will be more powerful in tasks where performance depends 
strongly on effort, such as memory tasks, probability judgements which require 
attention to multiple cues, and other conceptually simple problems requiring some 
level of focus but no complex inferential reasoning (Libby & Lipe, 1992).  
Thirdly, there are important interactions between incentives and experience in the 
task at hand. Repetition provides opportunities for learning from feedback and may 
improve performance independently of incentives. For some tasks, repetition seems 
to be a strong substitute for incentives. According to Smith and Walker (1993b), 
for example, one round of experience in an auction game has a similar effect to a 
10-fold increase in incentive. Jamal and Sunder (1991) find that incentives 
increased the performance of inexperienced subjects but had no effect on 
experienced ones, meaning that learning perfectly substituted for incentives in this 
case. Incentives and repetition can often work together to improve performance, 
however. Incentives may prompt greater attention to feedback and more careful 
application of learned strategies. J. Lee (2007) reviews experimental studies with 
repetition and incentives and finds that, using the experiments reviewed by 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) as a baseline, incentives make a difference more 
frequently with repetition.  Shanks et al (2002) consider the effects of incentives 
and performance feedback on probability matching, finding that each factor 
contributes to optimal performance.  Payoffs only improved performance in later 
trials, however: participants needed to learn how to play, and monetary incentives 
encouraged them to do it better. 
These general findings neither support nor undermine Caplan’s model of rational 
irrationality in any serious way. To consider whether voters are likely to make 
suboptimal judgments and decisions they would avoid if given greater incentives, 
we need to think about the difficulty of optimal political choice (is it above the 
relevant ‘floor’ and below the relevant ‘ceiling?’), its responsiveness to effort, and 
the potential interactions with the learning environment of democracy. It is easy to 
identify relevant mechanisms which make electoral choice more or less likely 
responsive to incentives – perceptions of civic duty might provide strong intrinsic 
motivation, electoral choices are too infrequent and the relevant outcomes affected 
by too many other factors for meaningful feedback – but problem is that there are 
so many countervailing forces and so much disagreement about their importance 
that firm conclusions are difficult.  
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There are, however, a few pieces of empirical work which have a more direct 
bearing on the relevance of the rational irrationality model. Since Caplan’s analysis 
is so firmly based on the affect heuristic, an interesting question is whether bias 
stemming from this system 1 process is responsive to incentives. First of all, we 
know that the affect heuristic can withstand incentives for its avoidance at least 
some of the time (Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic, & Starmer, 2007, pp. 376–377). 
The most direct and compelling test of the idea that incentives can induce system 2 
thinking comes from an unpublished paper by Farrell et al (2012), which uses an 
experimental design and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
determine the extent to which financial incentives are able to shift focus in a 
decision making task from affective response to consequential reasoning. 
Participants were asked to choose between alternative investment projects 
proposed by hypothetical colleagues.  The options varied in terms of the financial 
desirability of the investment, the affective valence of colleague, and the type of 
contract which governed reward.  Financial desirability was manipulated 
straightforwardly by altering risk and expected value. Affect was manipulated by 
providing positive or negative affect-laden descriptions of the colleagues along 
with a name and photograph. Incentives were varied by providing participants a 
flat fee for the first set of choices and a performance-based reward structure for the 
second.  Some decisions involved choices between options with unfamiliar 
colleagues (neutral affect), while others paired affect-laden colleagues with neutral 
ones. In the latter case, the decisions were structured such that the affectively-
preferred choice was financially inferior to the alternative.   
For both incentivised and unincentivised choices, the introduction of an affect-
laden option increases activity in areas of the brain associated with emotion and 
produced a bias towards non-normative decisions relative to choices without 
affective valence. Incentives did not have a significant effect on performance when 
affect was absent. This can be explained by the ease of the decisions, with over 
95% of decisions in neutral choices being normative.  Incentivised participants also 
showed more activity in brain areas associated with analytic reasoning, however, 
and the bias induced by affect was reduced. For affect-laden decisions, 
performance-based pay increased the proportion of normative responses from 
66.2% to 82.7%. Incentives reduced the bias caused by the affect heuristic, but did 
not eliminate it altogether, and unincentivised neutral choices were superior to 
incentivised but affective ones.  
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Another question is whether people see voting as a low-stakes choice. To an 
economist’s ear, that question sounds absurd – in expected value terms the stakes 
must surely be trivial. We know that people have odd intuitive attitudes towards 
low probability events, however. In particular, people often overweight extremely 
low-probability events and lump all unlikely events into the same category of 
‘probably not going to happen.’ People might know that their vote is unlikely to 
make a difference but give the possibility of pivotality undue weight in their 
decisions. On the other hand, people may see remote possibilities as sufficiently 
close to zero that they treat them as impossible (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; 
Kunreuther et al., 2002; G. F. Loewenstein et al., 2001). The evidence on this 
question has focused on attitudes towards risks such as natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks. Since framing can have such a strong impact on intuitive 
probability judgement, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this literature on 
whether voters are likely to overestimate or underestimate their chances of 
pivotality, and if so what the magnitude of this effect might be. Experimental 
studies in politics have shown that people do make different choices in collective 
and individual contexts, though these have not considered epistemic rationality 
(Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, & Murphy, 1997; Fischer, 1996; Shayo & Harel, 
2012).  
Finally, there is some evidence that political beliefs are subject to bias from the 
affect heuristic and that this bias can be reduced by incentives, though the evidence 
on the latter question is much more limited. A number of experiments have shown 
that people will seek and interpret information in ways which support their political 
attitudes, and political judgements can be manipulated by priming and framing 
effects (Druckman, 2001; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Taber, Lodge, & Glathar, 2001; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006). Two recent experimental studies show that small monetary 
incentives can reduce partisan bias in factual survey questions (Bullock, Gerber, 
Hill, & Huber, 2013; Krupnikov, Levine, Lupia, & Prior, 2006).39  
2.6. Conclusion 
The psychological framework of dual process theory provides a strong 
psychological foundation for the rational irrationality hypothesis and adequately 
                                                     
39
 It should be noted that these authors interpret their results as showing that partisan bias is 
not sincere. This is a possible interpretation, but a dual process interpretation is more 
plausible given our other psychological knowledge and introspective evidence which 
suggests partisans really do disagree on matters of fact. See also Prior and Lupia (2008) on 
the effect of incentives and learning opportunities on survey measurements of political 
knowledge.  
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responds to accusations of incoherence levelled by Bennett and Friedman. 
Moreover, the evidence which does exist provides strong but qualified support for 
several of Caplan’s key claims. People do make judgements and decisions based on 
gut-level responses, and emotional factors do have an impact on choice. These 
biases can in the right circumstances be overcome by material incentives, which 
increase the cognitive effort people devote to finding the correct answer. Although 
these findings are evidence for Caplan’s hypothesis in a Bayesian sense, they are 
far from conclusive and a number of unanswered questions remain. The literature 
clearly shows that incentives are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality. 
Voters may be intrinsically motivated to make rational political judgments without 
incentives. Alternatively, the biases which plague voting decisions may be so 
deeply ingrained and impervious to conscious correction that decisive choices 
would be just as irrational. Another possibility is that voters radically overestimate 
their chance of deciding an election and consequently devote more effort to 
political choice than they ‘should’ on rational choice grounds.  
The dual process literature also suggests a number of factors which could be added 
to Caplan’s model in order to increase its predictive power. The most important of 
these, I would suggest, is learning. Experimental studies have shown that repetition 
and meaningful feedback can improve rationality and interact with incentives. 
Elections are infrequent, policy consequences temporally remote, and it’s difficult 
to find evidence of what would have happened had the other guy won. Democracy 
may fail not simply because it provides inadequate incentives, but because it 
provides inadequate incentives and poor feedback. Further, learning is not simply 
an automatic response to feedback, but often a conscious choice. Camerer and 
Hogarth argue that a narrow focus on the mental ‘labour’ required for rational 
decision making – as in Smith and Walker’s cognitive cost model and my 
interpretation of Caplan here – neglects the fact that individuals may make long-
term investments in cognitive capital. If someone expects to make a series of 
important probability judgments in the future, they might find it reasonable to 
investigate ways of improving their statistical reasoning and make investments 
such as learning Bayes’ rule or taking an introductory course in applied statistics. 
Such decisions will be responsive to incentives, but they cannot be picked up by 
lab experiments as they are currently designed. If incentivised people in the real 
world invest in capital in order to make better choices with less cognitive labour, 
the laboratory evidence we have will tend to underestimate the power of incentives.  
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Taking this broader view of the institutional determinant of rationality would, it 
seems to me, strengthens Caplan’s critique of democracy. Joseph Schumpeter’s 
(2003, p. 262) claim that ‘the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental 
performance as soon as he enters the political field’ is often cited as a precursor to 
rational irrationality. Indeed, Schumpeter did point to lack of individual 
responsibility as encouraging irrationality. Equally important for Schumpeter, 
however, was familiarity. In their everyday lives individuals are ‘subject to the 
salutary and rationalizing influence of favorable and unfavorable experience’ 
(Schumpeter, 2003, p. 258). Many consumer choices may be biased by various 
irrationalities, but these can be eliminated by prolonged experimentation. 
Democracy provides weaker opportunities for learning: ‘Many decisions of fateful 
importance are of a nature that makes it impossible for the public to experiment 
with them at its leisure and at moderate cost’ (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 263).  
Caplan builds on half of Schumpeter’s claim but neglects the other half. This does 
not invalidate the rational irrationality model. As I have argued in this paper, 
Caplan identifies an interesting and plausible causal mechanism and models it in a 
parsimonious way and should not be criticised for leaving out other relevant 
factors. Schumpeter’s early insight and recent findings by psychologists and 
experimental economists suggest that incentives and feedback are both important to 
rational decision making, with important interactions existing between them.   
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3. Exit and the Epistemic Quality of Voice  
Abstract: The relationship between exit and voice as responses to dissatisfaction 
with public policy and public services has been much discussed in academic 
literature and policy debates. These discussions have focused on the effect of exit 
options on the quantity of citizen voice and its effectiveness in influencing 
decisions. The epistemic quality of voice, on the other hand, has received much less 
attention. This paper uses rational choice theory to argue that public sector exit 
options can lead to more informed and less biased expressions of voice. Whereas 
the political knowledge required to make collective voice decisions is a public good 
which is underprovided by individuals, exit decisions provide sharper epistemic 
incentives. To the extent that the knowledge gathered as part of an exit decision is 
available to citizens for collective voice, exit will enhance the epistemic 
competence of citizens and, in the right institutional context, contribute to public 
sector performance.   
3.1. Introduction 
Since Albert Hirschman’s (1970) influential analysis in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, 
there has been a great deal of theoretical, empirical, and policy debate on the 
question of whether exit supports or undermines collective voice as an instrument 
for change in organisations, markets, and polities (Dowding et al., 2000). 
Hirschman’s central insight was that individuals with exit options may have little 
incentive to voice their concerns. Since the most vocal are often the first to leave 
when given the chance, exit options can reduce the quantity of voice and force 
those left behind to suffer in relative silence (Hirschman, 1970, Chapters 4–5).  On 
the other hand, exit options allow for credible threats and give individuals a 
stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis organisations. Consumers in a competitive 
market may not use voice very often, but producers have strong incentives to listen 
to what consumers want.  In this sense, exit options increase the effectiveness of 
voice (Gehlbach, 2006; Hirschman, 1970, pp. 82–86; Sørensen, 1997).Thus, we 
seem to have a tradeoff between the quantity and effectiveness of voice. Exit 
options may discourage individuals from voicing while encouraging organisations 
to listen. The net effect on service quality depends on a number of factors, 
including organisational incentives and the distribution of exit options.  
Democratic government is most commonly associated with collective voice in the 
form of voting, protest, and advocacy. Exit, however, is also a powerful factor in 
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the public sector. As Warren (2011) argues, democracies are necessarily monopoly 
providers of public services ostensibly disciplined by collective voice but in fact 
also relying on exit options to augment the power and mitigate the problems of 
voice, enabling more meaningful individual action and creating incentives for 
responsiveness. The relationship between exit and voice is important for liberal and 
democratic theory.  
Moreover, a number of practical policy debates depend on this question. The extent 
to which citizens are helped or harmed by market and quasi-market mechanisms, 
for example, depends on the power of exit to give citizen-consumers what they 
want (Dowding & John, 2009, 2011). Some worry that increasing choice in this 
way can disempower many citizens by allowing the rich to opt out public services 
and take no further interest in their quality (Barnes & Prior, 1995; Hirschman, 
1970, pp. 45–46; Labaree, 2000). Others insist that choice promotes democratic 
accountability and participatory decision making (Le Grand, 2007; Warren, 2011). 
Questions of federalism and subsidiarity also depend on the relationships between 
exit and voice. Some have argued that a decentralised system of competing 
jurisdictions gives governors the information and incentives required to promote 
citizens’ interests (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Tiebout, 1956). On the other 
hand, jurisdictional exit has been argued to circumvent democracy by preventing 
large-scale collective action (Cai & Treisman, 2004; H. Sinn, 2003).  
The focus of these debates has been on how exit options affect the quantity and the 
effectiveness of voice. We want citizens to voice their concerns and we want 
government agents to listen. For voice to drive improvement, however, those 
exercising it need to be at least minimally informed and rational about the 
shortcomings of the status quo and the possibilities for improvement. From an 
instrumental point of view, a high quantity of effective voice is only valuable 
insofar as it is of reasonable epistemic quality.  
The effect of exit options on the epistemic quality of voice has been seriously 
understudied, though there are a few notable exceptions. Hirschman considered 
voice a skill subject to deterioration if not used, arguing that substitutability of exit 
and voice meant that ‘[t]he presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to 
atrophy the development of the art of voice’ (Hirschman, 1970, p. 43 emphasis in 
original). More recently, advocates of school choice have argued that exit options 
encourage parents to engage deliberatively in their children’s education and force 
schools to provide venues for such deliberation (Mintrom, 2003).  Generally, exit 
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options lower the individual threshold for individual influence and encourages 
organisations to uncover and respond to individuals’ informed and rational 
preferences (Warren, 2011, pp. 692–694). Eichenberger (1994, p. 411) suggests in 
passing that jurisdictional exit options in a federal system will mitigate problems of 
rational ignorance by encouraging information acquisition. This paper generalises 
Eichenberger’s insight by arguing from a rational choice perspective that exit 
options more broadly can increase the epistemic quality of voice by providing 
stronger incentives for individuals to gather information and rationally update their 
beliefs.40  
The argument of this paper is based on a comparison of individual exit and 
collective voice. All actions are ultimately taken by individuals, but the distinction 
here is between situations in which individuals use exit to individually and 
decisively change their circumstances and those in which individuals use voice in 
an attempt to influence public policy or the general operating procedures of a 
public organisation. When a voter casts a ballot or a protestor raises a banner, they 
are using voice to contribute to a collective choice rather than making an 
individually decisive choice. Voters and protestors recognise that they are one 
voice among many and do not expect to be decisive (Dowding & John, 2012, p. 
46). Voice may also be exercised individually, as when the consumer of a public 
service expresses some specific grievance about how they have been treated or a 
citizen requests a pothole in front of their house be filled (Dowding & John, 2012, 
p. 45). Individual voice of this type is no doubt common, but it differs conceptually 
from collective voice and will be set aside for the purposes of this paper.    
The epistemic quality of collective voice is a public good which will tend to be 
underprovided on a voluntary basis. Individuals face the full costs of gathering and 
processing information but receive only a small portion of the benefits, which are 
shared by all members of society. From a social perspective, this is a problem. 
Each individual has an incentive to free ride on the knowledge of others, avoiding 
the costs of becoming informed while hoping that others will be more diligent. 
Since everyone faces the same incentive, political knowledge will be under-
                                                     
40
 Decentralisation of the type which normally increases exit options may improve the 
epistemic quality of voice through another mechanism as well. As the ‘yardstick 
competition’ literature has suggested, geographic decentralisation might provide 
performance measures which voters can use to hold representatives to account (Salmon, 
1987). More generally, economists of the Austrian school have emphasised the 
informational role of markets (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1973). Exit-enabling quasi-markets in 
public services could serve a similar informational role quite apart from the incentive 
effects discussed here.    
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produced relative to the socially optimal level. All members of society would be 
better off if they could credibly agree to make better collective decisions, but it is 
individually rational for each individual to free ride. The costs and benefits of exit 
decisions, on the other hand, fall primarily on those making the decisions. Without 
the gap between the social and private benefits of knowledge, individual choices 
will tend to be more well-informed and rational than collective choices, other 
things equal.    
If individuals gather information and rationally weigh up the options when making 
an individual exit decision, the knowledge they have acquired will be available for 
later choices. When there is overlap in the information required for individual 
rationality in exit and voice decisions, exit options will increase the epistemic 
quality of voice by providing individuals with a sounder set of background beliefs. 
If citizens are more informed and the agents of government are responsive to voice, 
exit options will increase the quality of governance as judged by individual 
citizens.  
3.2. Epistemic quality in institutional context 
In rational choice theory, decisions are a function of preferences, beliefs, and 
opportunities (Elster, 1986). Each individual has a preference function which ranks 
alternative states of the world from best to worst and a set of beliefs about how 
each available action will influence the actual state of the world. Given an 
individual’s preferences and beliefs, rational choice theory assumes that agents 
choose whichever option is expected to bring about the most desirable state of the 
world. On this reading, rational choice theory is about instrumental rationality – the 
relationship between means and ends. Epistemic rationality – the extent to which 
beliefs are responsive to the available evidence – is another matter. Those with 
wildly inaccurate beliefs may consistently act against their own best interests, but 
their behaviour is amenable to rational choice analysis as long as they are rational 
in an instrumental sense (Hindmoor, 2006, pp. 183–189).   
The primary dependent variable in my argument is the epistemic quality of 
collective voice decisions. Conceptually, the epistemic quality of any decision can 
be defined by the extent to which it is in accord with the decision an individual 
would have made given full epistemic rationality – that is, given perfect motivation 
and cognitive ability to gather, process, and integrate all information relevant to the 
decision. This definition takes preferences and instrumental rationality as given and 
considers only the ex ante accuracy of beliefs given the available information.  
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There is an important distinction here between the cognitive process of decision 
making and the substantive outcome of that process (Simon, 1955, 1978). The 
process of decision making involves the gathering of information, the updating of 
beliefs, and the evaluation of competing values.  In a mechanical sense, epistemic 
rationality is a feature of the cognitive process of decision making. Epistemic 
quality as I define it here, on the other hand, is a feature of choices as outcomes. I, 
like other rational choice theorists, am interested in the substantive rationality of 
decisions actually made rather than the procedural rationality of the decision 
making process, though the former is obviously causally reliant on the latter.  
Decisions made with a high degree of procedural rationality will tend to be of high 
epistemic quality. It should also be noted here that individual rationality – whether 
in a procedural or substantive sense – does not guarantee that individual action will 
be effective in accomplishing its goals. Given uncertainty or imperfect information, 
ex ante rational decisions may turn out to be suboptimal ex post. The influence or 
effect of a substantive choice needs to be kept conceptually distinct from its 
rationality.  
While procedural rationality is always imperfect in the real world, many actual 
decisions may be of perfect epistemic quality by the above definition. For discrete 
choices such as which candidate to vote for in an election, an imperfectly reliable 
decision making process may produce the correct answer as judged by the 
individual’s preferences. As long as the resulting decision is correct, we can say 
that it is of perfect epistemic quality. When decisions do deviate from perfection, 
they do so by degree. For continuous decisions such as what level of military 
spending to support, the answer may depart from epistemic perfection by a few 
percent or a few orders of magnitude, and we would say that decisions based on the 
former are of higher epistemic quality than those based on the latter. In discrete 
choice situations, choosing a close second is an epistemically better decision than 
choosing a distant fifth choice, though neither is perfect. 
Some individuals will tend to be more rational than others in particular domains of 
choice. A voter with an accurate model of the world or a sense of civic duty strong 
enough to encourage careful deliberation will have a high degree of dispositional 
procedural rationality and, in virtue of generally making high quality decisions, can 
be considered more epistemically competent in the domain of democratic choice. 
Epistemic competence in this sense depends on the background beliefs, individual 
motivation and competence, and various features of the institutional environment 
such as the availability of information and the material consequences of epistemic 
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failure.  Epistemic competence is not a constitutional attribute of individual people 
– though individual traits may have a large impact – but an attribute of a particular 
individual in a particular decision making context.  
Empirically measuring epistemic quality is difficult, but not impossible. One 
fruitful approach to measuring epistemic quality is the ‘enlightened preferences’ 
approach in political science. This approach attempts to adjust political preferences 
for epistemic quality by asking what voters or opinion poll respondents would 
choose if they had a higher level of political knowledge. Hypothetical ‘fully 
informed’ political preferences are assumed to depend on a finite set of 
fundamental social, economic, and demographic variables. Since individuals 
identical on the relevant dimensions should have the same political preferences, 
differences can be attributed to differences in political information. An individual’s 
expressed preferences can be compared against their enlightened preferences – the 
predicted preferences of an otherwise identical individual with perfect information 
– as a measure of epistemic quality (Althaus, 2003; Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996). While this empirical approach has its limitations and does not 
measure epistemic quality precisely as defined here, it shows that measurement of 
certain aspects of epistemic quality is possible and provides a useful proxy.  
Epistemic rationality is not an axiom of rational choice theory, but it is an 
important element of much applied work. If beliefs bear no relationship to reality 
whatsoever it will be very difficult to construct predictive models and choice will 
have no normative weight. Fortunately, there will often be strong incentives for 
individuals to be at least somewhat epistemically rational. False beliefs will tend to 
result in choices which do not satisfy the agent’s preferences. If individuals 
recognise that their beliefs are fallible and that mistaken beliefs can be costly in 
terms of preference satisfaction, there will be an incentive for individuals to update 
their beliefs by gathering information and rationally evaluating the evidence. 
Instrumentally rational actors will often try to be epistemically rational.  
No meaningful decision is ever made with complete information and 
comprehensive rational reflection, however. Gathering information takes time and 
effort which could be spent elsewhere, and the value of information needs to be 
weighed against these costs (Howard, 1966; Stigler, 1961). Likewise, it takes time 
and cognitive effort to rationally integrate new information into one’s belief 
system. These are real costs and it will often be instrumentally rational to rely on 
imperfect heuristics which economise on cognitive resources (Gigerenzer & 
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Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1955). In addition to the opportunity costs of information 
search and rational deliberation, people seem to find it intrinsically costly to 
change certain types of beliefs. The psychological literature shows that people will 
often engage in motivated reasoning in order to reach desirable conclusions. When 
people have a particular answer in mind, they may selectively expose themselves to  
information likely to support it (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Individuals 
may be biased in order to confirm existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998), affirm 
identity (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996), avoid perceived inconsistency (J. 
Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957), or indulge evolved biases (Caplan, 2007).  
Instrumentally rational agents will seek to update their beliefs when the expected 
benefits of greater rationality exceed the costs, and these benefits will depend on 
the importance of choices made on the basis of the belief at hand. Some ill-founded 
beliefs will be instrumentally ‘cheap’ to hold in the sense that they will have little 
or no effect on behaviour or preference satisfaction. A belief that there is a teapot 
orbiting the Sun between Earth and Mars will generally not influence any goal-
directed actions and there will be no incentive to rationally update this belief. A 
false belief that lower-tier investors in pyramid schemes can expect large returns, 
on the other hand, is potentially very costly and the incentives for information 
search and rational evaluation will be much stronger here. Other things equal, high-
stakes decisions will prompt a greater degree of information search and rational 
evaluation of the evidence than low-stakes decisions. 
The claim here is not that instrumentally rational agents never question their own 
beliefs unless there’s something in it for them. Truth may be valued for its own 
sake, but truth does not have lexical priority over other concerns. Since rationality 
is costly and resources are scare, beliefs of practical importance will be more 
accurate than those less relevant to our wellbeing, other things equal.  
Democratic decisions often have enormous consequences. The decision facing any 
particular citizen, however, is not a decisive choice among alternatives but a 
contribution to a collective choice. Consider the position of an individual voter. A 
single vote only matters in an electoral sense when it makes or breaks a tie, and this 
will be very unlikely in any real world election. Gelman et al (2009), for example, 
estimate that the average voter in the 2008 US Presidential election had a 1 in 60 
million chance of pivotality. In smaller elections the odds will be better, but the 
historical record shows that pivotal votes are rare even in small local elections 
(Mulligan & Hunter, 2003). A single vote might have other instrumental effects 
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such as marginally strengthening a political mandate or signalling the growth of a 
movement (Fowler & Smirnov, 2007; Mackie, 2010; Stigler, 1972), but such 
effects do not undermine the central logic of the collective action: individual voters 
and advocates capture only a small portion of benefits of informed voice while 
paying the full cost. The politically ignorant cannot be excluded from the public 
good of an informed electorate and will tend to free-ride on the political knowledge 
of others. Since everyone shares the incentive to free-ride, the public good of an 
informed electorate will be underprovided. 
As Downs (1957) argued, the insignificance of a single vote combined with the 
costliness of information will prompt voters to remain ‘rationally ignorant’ about 
the merits of competing policies and candidates. Moreover, the low-cost nature of 
democratic voice provides little incentive for careful and impartial evaluation of 
information. Even with a wealth of reliable information, rational voter choice 
would require that individuals update their beliefs in response to this information, 
which potentially gives rise to psychological and cognitive costs. Most obviously, 
rational deliberation requires cognitive effort and voters may rely on simple cues 
such as candidate ideology rather than carefully evaluating the pros and cons of 
competing platforms. Caplan (2007) argues that individuals have preferences over 
their own beliefs, with evolution equipping us with cognitive tendencies useful in 
our evolutionary history but misleading today. Individuals will cling to their biased 
beliefs unless given practical reason to seek the truth. Individual choices often 
provide such incentives, while the low stakes of democratic voice mean that biases 
can be fully indulged.  
While rational ignorance and motivated reasoning are potentially present in all 
decision making situations, there is reason to think the effect will be stronger for 
low-stakes decisions. A number studies in experimental economics have found that 
subjects behave more rationally when given a monetary incentive to do so. The 
introduction of performance-based monetary rewards into an otherwise 
hypothetical choice situation improves performance, and performance increases 
with the rate at which correct decisions are rewarded, though it should be noted 
that mistakes and biases often remain even in high stakes experiments. Relatively 
flat reward functions with a unique optimal choice are less effective at inducing 
instrumental rationality than those which strongly punish suboptimal choice 
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Smith & Walker, 1993a; Smith, 2008, pp. 173–181). 
There is also evidence that monetary payoffs reduce political biases. Partisan 
differences on factual survey questions are reduced by modest monetary incentives 
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to answer correctly (Bullock et al., 2013; Krupnikov et al., 2006; Prior & Lupia, 
2008).  
The strongest evidence that exit options are made on sounder epistemic ground 
than collective voice decisions comes research on school choice. A randomised 
field experiment in 1972-1977 randomly introduced decentralisation and voucher-
like choice mechanisms into California school districts, giving some parents exit 
options denied to an otherwise similar set of parents acting as a control group.  
Parents given exit options accumulated more accurate information over time 
relative to the control group, with knowledge quickly degrading as the voucher 
system came to an end (Bridge & Blackman, 1978, Chapter 3). A more recent 
study in Washington DC which randomly awarded voucher-like K-12 scholarships 
to around half of 1500 eligible low-income applicants found a similar pattern. 
Parents of the children who did receive the scholarship had more accurate 
information as measured by factual survey questions over the size of schools and 
classes compared to the parents of children not chosen by the lottery (Kisida & 
Wolf, 2010). Schneider et al’s (2000) non-experimental investigation provides a 
more detailed picture of when choice increases the accuracy of beliefs. While 
choice seemed to generally improve parents’ basic knowledge of their children’s 
education, such as the name of their principal, it improved the accuracy of more 
detailed knowledge only in some geographic areas. Of more practical importance is 
the finding by Hanushek et al (2007) that exit decisions were more strongly related 
to objective measures of school performance in charter school systems than in 
conventional public systems with weaker exit options.  
Parents without exit options in schooling are asked to participate in collective 
decisions by using their voice in the ballot box, the public square, and in the local 
mechanisms of educational accountability. Without individual exit options, though, 
the information on which such voice decisions are based is of lower epistemic 
quality than it otherwise would be. This, I claim, is a general problem of collective 
voice. If voters are ignorant of or systematically biased about the causes of 
economic and social problems, the desirability of policies, and the power of various 
offices to influence outcomes, public opinion will not converge on optimal policy 
solutions. If candidates seek election, they will be forced to pander to the 
misguided opinions of the electorate and democratic outcomes will not necessarily 
be in the best interests of citizens (Caplan, 2007; Somin, 2004). Other forms of 
collective voice such as protest and advocacy can also be expected to suffer from 
rational ignorance and rational irrationality, since they face the same collective 
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action problems as voting (Dowding et al., 2000, pp. 472–473; Dowding & John, 
2012, pp. 15–18). While altruism, a truth-seeking disposition, or a sense of duty 
might improve the epistemic quality of collective decisions to some extent, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the low-stakes nature of collective voice reduces 
epistemic quality below the level we would expect of otherwise identical individual 
decisions.  
The argument here is not based on a complaint that collective voice is undesirable, 
though that is certainly a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, but on the 
recognition that it could be improved by stronger epistemic incentives. If the 
monopolistic nature of mass democracy is a necessary part of collective action, 
individual exit cannot completely replace collective voice. Increasing the epistemic 
quality of voice would increase the desirability of democratic accountability and 
potentially improve the quality of public services.  
If an individual is dissatisfied with government in some way, their main alternative 
to voice is exit (Hirschman, 1970). Broadly speaking, an individual can exit a law, 
policy, or public-service in one of five ways. Private exit occurs when citizens opt 
out of a public service in favour of some private sector alternative (Dowding & 
John, 2012, pp. 39–40). Internal exit occurs when citizens choose among multiple 
public providers within the same jurisdiction or catchment area (Dowding & John, 
2012, pp. 38–39). Tiebout exit occurs when citizens are able to move among 
jurisdictions or catchment areas with different bundles of taxes, policies, and public 
services (Dowding & John, 2012, pp. 40–43). Complete exit occurs when citizens 
completely forgo the service in question without seeking a substitute (Dowding & 
John, 2012, pp. 37–38). Entrepreneurial exit occurs when an individual leaves a 
public provider but create their own alternative rather than seeking existing public 
or private sector alternatives (Gofen, 2012). 
In all five forms of exit, individuals or households are decisive over some change 
in the services they receive, the taxes they pay, or the rules which govern their 
behaviour. Compared to collective decisions in which choices are tied to outcomes 
only with some low probability, this provides stronger incentives and increases 
expected epistemic quality. It is important to note that actual exit is generally not 
required for exit options to increase political knowledge. Those with exit options 
will gather knowledge in order to make an informed choice, but the best choice 
may well be to remain with the current provider.  
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3.3. Exit options and the quality of voice  
I have argued that exit decisions tend to be epistemically sounder than collective 
voice decisions. The beliefs updated as part of an individual decision do not revert 
to their previous state once action has been taken, however. The cognitive 
environment of present decisions is partly determined by the institutional 
environment of past decisions. Since the personal costs of being wrong are much 
greater for exit than for collective voice decisions, beliefs are more likely to be 
updated during the former. This will make the exit decision itself procedurally 
more rational, and it will also increase the accuracy of the decision maker’s beliefs. 
Future collective voice decisions will continue to have low individual stakes, but 
more accurate beliefs increase procedural rationality in a dispositional sense and 
produce domain-specific improvements to epistemic competence, increasing the 
expected epistemic quality of decisions at any level of cost/benefit. Since collective 
voice decisions will often have low expected epistemic quality due to the free rider 
problem, there will be wide scope for exit options to improve the epistemic quality 
of such decisions. If the mechanisms of democratic communication and 
accountability are working effectively, this can be expected to increase the quality 
of public services as judged by citizen preferences.    
Consider a parent unsure about the appropriate ratio of teachers to students in 
public schools. The value of a marginal teacher relative to other educational inputs 
is far from clear, and forming an accurate belief on whether public schools should 
increase or decrease class sizes would be no trivial matter. The collective voice 
decision facing a voter or vocal parent provides weak epistemic incentives and 
procedural rationality will tend to be low. If the school system provided exit 
options in the form of educational vouchers or charter schools, however, the 
epistemic incentives would be stronger and beliefs about the effect of teacher-
student ratios on educational outcomes sounder. This sounder set of beliefs will 
influence not only the immediate exit decision, but also subsequent voice decisions 
as the parents transfers their experience in individual exit to collective voice 
decisions.  
This mechanism is potentially relevant wherever individual exit and collective 
voice co-exists. Patient choice in healthcare might encourage a more careful and 
impartial evaluation of the relative importance of various dimensions of service 
quality, quasi-markets in pensions or social insurance might reveal more reasoned 
and sincere preferences regarding risk and time preference, and private alternatives 
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to public broadcasting, transportation, or postal services might shift public opinion 
about the best way to provide such services. Moving across jurisdictional 
boundaries might also provide transferrable knowledge. The option of moving to a 
district which has privatised rubbish collection or a country which emphasises 
communitarian values over individual liberty might lead to more well-grounded 
views of the efficiency of privatisation and the value of community.   
My claim depends, of course, on the existence of beliefs relevant to both exit and 
voice decisions. Some might deny that such overlap exists to any significant extent. 
Consider the situation facing an individual concerned mostly with economic 
performance in their jurisdiction of residence. There are a number of institutional 
factors which influence economic performance, and an optimal collective voice 
decision will require careful consideration of numerous theoretical and empirical 
factors. When making a Tiebout exit decision, however, an individual can for the 
most part ignore the policies which contribute to economic performance and look 
to actual economic outcomes as measured by income per capita, unemployment, or 
whatever other factors they deem important. In this case, the informational 
requirements of a well-informed Tiebout choice are entirely distinct from those of a 
well-informed collective voice decision over precisely the same set of policies. 
This means that epistemically competent Tiebout foot-voters will remain 
incompetent in the voting booth. This problem is also relevant to internal and 
private exit choices. In schools, for example, there may be reliable measures of 
student outcomes which make any consideration of educational inputs such as class 
sizes and teacher compensation unnecessary. If parents adopt the rule of sending 
their children to high-performing schools without considering why those schools 
perform well, well-informed exit decisions in this area are unlikely to influence 
voting decisions on educational policy.  
For many policy decisions, however, inputs will be more visible and subject to 
evaluation than outputs. In some cases, it is the future path of outcomes which is 
important. There is a well-recognised problem with retirement policy, for example, 
which has yet to make itself fully felt. If different jurisdictions are dealing with this 
problem differently, a reasoned choice between the options requires prediction of 
the likely effects of such policies. This normally cannot be achieved by looking at 
current or past outcomes.  In other cases, the desired outcomes are not easily 
measurable and evaluation of inputs will be a more efficient means of determining 
the best option. The outcomes of allowing same-sex marriage, for example, are not 
easily distinguished from the policy decision. A thoughtful decision of whether one 
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wants to live in a society which allows same-sex marriage will require the same 
information in exit and voice decisions.  
Most policies and service inputs will produce a mix of desirable and undesirable 
effects which are not easily commensurable. Exit decisions will force trade-offs to 
be made explicit. If some economic policy is known to increase economic growth 
while also decreasing an individual’s short-term employment prospects, an 
epistemically rational choice will require an evaluation of the relative normative 
weight given to growth and employment, as well as consideration of risk and time 
preferences. The optimal decision cannot be deduced from outcomes, even if those 
outcomes are objectively measurable and more reliable than any evaluation of 
policy alternatives. The degree of informational overlap will depend entirely on the 
choices under consideration. The argument here is not that increasing exit options 
will always increase the soundness of some collective use of voice. Rather, it is that 
exit options provide strong incentives for knowledge generation and that 
knowledge so accumulated will in some cases improve the epistemic soundness of 
electoral decisions.  
The value of high quality voice also depends on its quantity and effectiveness – if 
voice is absent or ineffective, its quality is irrelevant. It may be that those with exit 
options make no effort to voice their concerns or that those running the exited 
organisation make no effort to consider the wishes of exiting individuals. This 
depends crucially on the institutional environment. If exit is institutionalised in a 
way which forces organisations to seek out the opinions of consumers and integrate 
this information into their decisions, high-quality voice will be a powerful force in 
improving service quality.  
Hirschman’s (1970, Chapter 4) study of Nigerian railways provides an example of 
exit reducing the quantity of voice and ultimately undermining service quality, the 
case of charter schools seems to represent a case in which exit increases the quality 
of voice without seriously reducing (and plausibly even increasing) the quantity 
and effectiveness of voice and improving service quality (Mintrom, 2003). The 
difference here seems to be one of institutions. Charter schools face plausible 
threats of reduced funding and even closure if they lose too many students; 
Nigerian railways did not. Without organisational incentives to curtail exit or 
actively seek high-quality voice, the epistemic quality of the individual decisions 
between road and rail was irrelevant to the performance of the railways.  
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When organisations have no incentive to respond to voice, individual consumers 
have no incentive to voice their concerns. Exit options in the right institutional 
environment might increase the quantity of voice by increasing its effectiveness 
and thus its expected value as a strategy (though it should be noted that collective 
action remains a problem), and by encouraging organisations to endogenously 
increase the individual incentives for collective voice in order to improve their 
ability to curtail exit. Organisations in competitive environments not only find 
ways of decreasing the cost of voice, but often materially reward feedback. The 
lesson here is that exit options must be considered in relation to institutional design 
more generally. Some institutional constellations encourage individuals to combine 
exit and voice as complements while others encourage substitution. ‘Noisy exit’ 
can be a powerful force, since it combines the communicative bandwidth of voice 
and the credible signal of exit (Barry, 1974; Dowding et al., 2000, pp. 473–475; 
Laver, 1976). For this to be effective, however, exit options must work in a way 
which incentivises organisational response (Warren, 2011).  
The epistemic quality of a decision depends not only on the potential benefits of 
rationality, but also the costs. If information is costly to gather, evaluate, and 
process, decisions may remain seriously suboptimal despite strong incentives. Exit 
options increase the demand for meaningful and accessible information, and the 
supply of such information will have important effects on the quality of both exit 
and voice decisions. If public service providers have incentives to attract or retain 
consumers and there are information asymmetries, competition potentially 
produces a situation in which poorly-performing organisations mislead consumers 
and choice is uninformed (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1977). This produces a (quasi-) 
market failure which could potentially be corrected by government intervention in 
the form of quality assurance or the public provision of information (Beales, 
Craswell, & Salop, 1981). The demand for useful and impartial information, 
however, creates incentives for its supply (Klein, 2002), and it is unclear a priori 
whether government intervention will be welfare-enhancing (Demsetz, 1969). 
Information asymmetries in competitive contexts can be mitigated by costly 
signalling (Spence, 1973), reputation (Klein, 1997), and information intermediaries 
(Rose, 1999).  
By providing stronger incentives, exit options increase the empirical quality of 
particular choices as well as the empirical competence of individuals as rational 
consumers and citizens. A more accurate view of the world is a general-purpose 
tool which can be expected to increase the quality of future decisions. With a 
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sounder set of beliefs and the right institutional environment, citizens will be more 
able to use voice to demand genuine improvements in service quality and hold 
government agents to account for failures. The political pressures facing political 
candidates and government agencies would more accurately represent the real 
interests of citizens and this can be expected to increase the quality of public 
services. Each exit decision will produce knowledge only applicable to a small 
subset of possible future voice decisions, but the collective effect of an institutional 
environment which routinely enables exit decisions might be large. 
3.4. Conclusion 
There has been much discussion of the potential effects of exit on the quantity and 
effectiveness of voice. Meanwhile, the potential effect of exit on the epistemic 
quality of voice has received by less attention. This relative neglect cannot be due 
to a lack of importance or relevance: the questions of how to increase voter 
competence (Bennett, 2006) and how much individual choice should be introduced 
into public policy (Dowding & John, 2009) have been prominent in recent 
academic and policy discussions. The question of whether, and under what 
conditions, exit options develop or atrophy the art of voice is an important one, yet 
despite a handful of notable individual contributions it has not been the object of 
sustained research and we are far from a compelling general answer. 
The epistemic competence of the electorate is a public good which tends to be 
underprovided when people act individually. While it is instrumentally rational at 
the individual level to neglect the strong epistemic requirements of an 
epistemically rational voting decision, such rational ignorance and irrationality 
have serious effects at the societal level. When individuals are given decisive 
choices over the laws which bind them, however, they have stronger incentives to 
update their beliefs and become more competent decision makers. As exit increases 
epistemic competence, it has positive spill-over effects for the epistemic quality of 
collective voice.  
The strength and scope of this connection between exit and voice has yet to be 
determined. If the informational overlap between exit and voice is small, the 
mechanism I propose may have little effect. More theoretical and empirical work is 
required, but there are a number of challenges. Epistemic competence is not easily 
measured in the wild. Real-world political issues are by definition contested and 
the researcher cannot simply posit their preferred option as the correct one. The 
enlightened preference approach is a promising avenue for field research, though 
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finding unbiased cases for comparison is difficult.  Experimental methods are 
another promising avenue, since they allow the researcher to tightly control the 
decision situation such that epistemic quality is easily defined and exit options can 
be exogenously varied. While field research will be essential in determining the 
real-world scope of the effect, experimental research would clarify the conditions 
required for exit to improve the quality of voice and suggest avenues for real-world 
investigation.   
In addition to the existence and generality of the mechanism I propose, it is 
important to consider the institutional requirements for exit to increase epistemic 
competence and drive improvement in public policy and public services. Effective 
democratic control, organisational incentives, and factors facilitating the 
production of information are all important here. Moreover, the institutional 
requirements for high quality voice are connected to the requirements of effective 
and high quantity voice in complex ways which require context-sensitive 
elaboration. With the right organisational incentives and capabilities, citizen exit 
options will force government agencies to provide venues for low-cost expressions 
of voice, to provide credible sources of information regarding service quality, and 
listen to the preferences of individuals. In cases like this, exit options would be 
beneficial for the quantity, quality, and effectiveness of voice. In other institutional 
environments, the agents of government may be unwilling or unable to seek or 
respond to high-quality voice. If citizens know this, they may make their exit 
decisions in silence even though their epistemic competence would lead to high 
quality act of voice. Here, exit options might increase the quality of voice while 
leaving effectiveness unchanged and reducing quantity.  
If exit options are indeed capable of increasing the epistemic quality of voice, the 
potential implications for public policy are enormous. Most obviously, the value of 
choice in public policy would be greater than previously recognised. Introducing 
exit options in public services would not only give citizens greater choice and 
potentially increase efficiency; it would also increase civic competence and 
democratic accountability. Moreover, it would mean that exit and voice should not 
be seen as alternatives so much as complements. Increasing exit options does not 
render voice irrelevant but augments its power as a tool of democratic 
communication and constraint.  
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4. Strategic and Expressive Voting 
Abstract: Critics of the expressive model of voter choice have pointed to the 
existence of strategic voting as evidence that voters are at least partially 
instrumentally motivated. This paper argues that strategic voting in the relevant 
sense is consistent with entirely expressive political motivation. Building on an 
earlier suggestion by Geoff Brennan, I model voters as expressively valuing 
ideology and cunning. This model predicts strategic voting without instrumental 
preferences entering the voter’s calculus at all. I also suggest that expressive 
preferences for strategic optimality can be usefully analysed in terms of 
dispositional choice.  
4.1. Introduction 
Expressive models of voter choice hold that people make voting choices partially 
or entirely on the basis of non-instrumental preferences (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 
2000, Chapter 8; G. Brennan & Lomasky, 1993; Hamlin & Jennings, 2011). Since 
an individual vote will almost certainly fail to prove decisive, voters will focus on 
the satisfaction derived from participating in the democratic process and supporting 
one candidate or party over the other rather than on the practical implications of 
electoral results. This drives a wedge between choice and preference which 
complicates the normative case for democracy and calls into question the 
soundness of many rational choice models of politics. 
Few would deny that voting does not have an expressive element, but what I will 
refer to as the expressive voting hypothesis is that instrumental concerns are 
entirely absent from democratic choice in large elections. This could be because 
the probability of pivotality is so small that voters treat it as if it is non-existent or 
because instrumental preferences are so small as to never prove decisive in the 
individual’s calculus. The expressive voting hypothesis stands in opposition to the 
instrumental voting hypothesis and the hybrid voting hypothesis, which hold 
respectively that voting decisions are made entirely on instrumental grounds or on 
a mix of expressive and instrumental grounds.   
A common objection to the expressive voting hypothesis is the existence of 
strategic voting (Christiano, 2004; Dowding, 2005; Mackie, 2011). If voters make 
choices based on their expressive preferences, the argument goes, they should 
always vote for their expressively most preferred candidate regardless of the 
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electoral context. An expressive voter in a plurality system should not be deterred 
from voting for a minor party due to a concern about wasting their vote. Expressive 
voters are not constrained by practical considerations and they should therefore 
express support for their preferred candidate regardless of how such a vote affects 
electoral outcomes.  
This paper will argue that such claims are mistaken. Taking a broader view of 
expressive preference which allows expressive preferences over substantive 
ideological issues as well as procedural approaches to democracy, I provide a 
rational actor account of strategic voting under which the individual does not 
consult their instrumental preferences at all. In this narrow sense the paper is a 
response to the claims of inconsistency cited above. This builds on and formalises 
the argument made by Brennan (2008) that voters have an expressive preference 
for treating politics as ‘serious business.’  
In a broader sense this paper has tried to expand the analytic scope of dispositional 
choice by connecting it to the idea of expressive voting. These ideas are central 
elements of the emerging ‘revisionist public choice theory’ being spearheaded by 
Brennan and Hamlin (2008). There are already important connections between 
these ideas (Hamlin, 2006, pp. 9–10), and this paper builds on these to provide an 
expressive account of political dispositional choice. Taking this approach provides 
a more subtle understanding of expressive political preferences.   
4.2. The strategic voting objection 
Strategic voting occurs when an individual votes for a candidate other than their 
sincere preference in order to increase the likelihood of some relatively desired 
electoral outcome. Strategic voting is predicted by rational choice models of voter 
choice and has generated a great deal of concern in the design of electoral systems 
(Cox, 1997; Riker, 1982, Chapter 6). The most obvious example of strategic voting 
is an aversion to third-parties in plurality systems. Individuals who sincerely prefer 
minor parties will recognise that such parties have little chance of success and may 
rationally choose to vote for whichever of the main parties they prefer. Since this 
form of strategic voting is so simple and widespread it will be the focus of this 
paper.   
Several critics of expressive voting theory have pointed to the existence of strategic 
voting as a decisive objection to the claim that instrumental concerns are an 
insignificant factor in electoral decision making. Dowding (2005, p. 453) claims 
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that voting cannot be entirely expressive, since ‘if all one wanted was to express a 
preference then there would be no room for tactical voting and there is evidence 
that some vote strategically.’ Christiano (2004, pp. 138–139) sees the absence of 
strategic voting as a central prediction of expressive voting theory and considers 
this empirically implausible. Mackie (2011, pp. 24–26) points to empirical 
evidence that voters are responsive to opportunity costs in their strategic decisions 
as inconsistent with expressive voting and claims that ‘failure to explain strategic 
voting is a decisive test of the expressive theory’ (Mackie, 2011, p. 25).   
Brennan (2008, pp. 483–484) attempts to briefly address the challenge of strategic 
voting to expressive theory. Brennan claims that people see voting as ‘serious 
business,’ though this business is expressive rather than instrumental. The best way 
to express oneself politically may not be to support one’s first choice. If there is a 
salient battle between the major centre left and centre right parties, a voter whose 
first choice is a minor far-right party might wish to express himself by throwing his 
support behind the centre-right party. A voter may see this as a more effective way 
of cheering for broadly right wing ideals or booing the left.41  Moreover, we might 
expect such a result to be more likely in plurality systems, since the distinction 
between two major parties is more salient here than in proportional systems. 
Expressive voting might undermine Duverger’s law, but we cannot claim that 
expressive theory implies this without making strong assumptions about prevailing 
expressive preferences.  
Mackie responds that voters expressing seriousness will behave like instrumental 
voters and the behavioural predictions of expressive theory will need to be 
withdrawn. At the very least then, the existence of strategic voting makes 
expressive theory empirically meaningless (Mackie, 2011, p. 26). Mackie 
overstates his point here. For one thing, the veil of insignificance argument for 
non-instrumental benevolence in the voting booth is entirely consistent with 
politics as serious business but has empirical predictions different from those of 
instrumental voting theory. Nevertheless, he does have a point: if expressive 
preferences prompt people to vote as if they instrumentally motivated in many 
respects, the empirical and normative relevance of expressive theory is reduced.  
The claim that expressive voters behave as if instrumentally motivated is, however, 
too general and misleading when taken at face value. We need to ask in what 
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 Glazer (2008, p. 253) makes a similar point, noting that strategic-like voting may be the 
most effective way of pleasing or angering the relevant others.  
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respects politics as serious business prompts pseudo-instrumental behaviour. If 
expressive preferences only alter some forms of political behaviour, we need to ask 
how empirically and normatively important such forms of behaviour are.  
This paper will argue that politics as serious business does make the expressive and 
instrumental accounts of voting indistinguishable when it comes to certain patterns 
of democratic choice while leaving vast areas potentially influenced by expressive 
concerns in empirically and normatively meaningful ways.  A consideration of 
political behaviour from a dispositional perspective provides a framework for 
explaining the co-existence of expressive and instrumental concerns and resolving 
the apparent conflict between expressive theory and strategic voting.  
4.3. The expressive value of cunning    
Assume a one-dimensional spatial model of policy space, with possible party 
positions on X ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 1 (extreme right). An individual has 
an instrumentally ideal point in policy space given by Xi and an expressively ideal 
point in policy space given by Yi, with instrumental and expressive preference 
functions being single-peaked and linearly decreasing with distance from the ideal 
point. In the ‘unsophisticated’ mixed model of voting, individual i’s expected 
utility from voting for party P is given by equation 4.1.  
(4.1)  = 1 − |
 − 
| + 1 − | − 
|	  
k is the subjective probability of pivotality, α and β are exogenous parameters 
determining the strength of instrumental and expressive preferences over policy 
space respectively, and XP is party P’s position in policy space. If voting is entirely 
expressive because k=0 or so close to it that indivisibilities in policy space always 
make instrumental preferences inframarginal, the first term of the above equation is 
rendered irrelevant and the expected value of a vote is given simply by the distance 
between the party and the voter’s expressively ideal point. On this interpretation 
the voter would always vote for whichever party is closest to them ideologically, 
and the existence of strategic voting would indeed decisively show that voting is at 
least partially instrumental.  
There is, however, another interpretation of an entirely expressive utility function 
which considers the possibility of an expressive preference for voting in 
sophisticated ways. Suppose that there are expressive benefits of playing the game 
of politics strategically. Casting votes on the basis of their expected effect on 
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policy outcomes may make one feel like a practical person, a canny political actor, 
or one who takes politics to be serious business. Analytically, we may suppose 
there is an expressive payoff to voting such that one’s vote makes the largest 
subjectively defined contribution to minimising the ideological distance between 
the expressively ideal and actual policy. To recognise this expressive preference, 
we need to add a third term to the equation above.  
(4.2)  = 1 − |
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 − 
| 
Here γ is an exogenous parameter defining the strength of the expressive preference 
for strategy and CP is a subjectively defined measure of the contribution of a single 
vote to party P. This is, of course, related to the pivotality variable k, but it is 
distinct in that it is not a precise measure of probability but a rough estimation of 
how much the party needs votes. When there are real instrumental costs on the line 
people will make decisions based on probability estimates such as k; when only 
expressive preferences are at stake some broad consideration of electoral prospects 
will likely suffice if we want to know whether our vote is wasted in some 
imprecise sense.42 The crucial distinction here is that the instrumental benefits are 
only secured if party P is elected while the expressive benefits of voting 
strategically are realised by the act of choice.43 Instrumental voters would be 
interested only in the expected effect their vote has on electoral outcomes. 
Expressive voters are interested instead in the strategic optimality of the choice 
they make and need not consider the probability of pivotality per se.  
This opens the possibility of quasi-strategic voting without instrumental 
preferences (i.e. Xi) coming into play at all. If we set k to zero and thus ignore the 
first term, there is a tradeoff between the direct and unsophisticated expressive 
preference for voting our expressive preferences and also a sophisticated 
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 Another way of thinking about CP would be as a transformation of k, with the 
transformation being motivated by an expressive preference for thinking of oneself as 
politically efficacious. If k is small but positive, the voter may recognise that their vote has 
virtually zero chance of being decisive but when making expressive choices treat the 
probability as much higher. I prefer the first interpretation of CP as a mathematically 
distinct variable, since the common idea that voters are contributing to a collective decision 
even though they know none will be decisive does not intuitively seem like an exaggerated 
probability. Yet another possibility would be to replace CP with k but insist that voters only 
care about which option has the highest expected value (i.e. which is the best choice) and 
do not discount the strategic superiority of the choice by the insignificance of the 
individual. On this interpretation, people see politics as a game and want to make the 
optimal moves. I find this intuitively appealing but I will stick with CP for reasons of 
analytic clarity and simplicity.    
43
 Individuals likely receive psychic payoffs from having their preferred political party win, 
but voting in order to increase the probability of these payoffs would be instrumental rather 
than expressive.  
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expressive preference for voting shrewdly. The inclusion of CP makes a vote for a 
viable candidate more valuable than an obviously wasted one and if we define it in 
terms of instrumental effects on electoral outcomes it also raises the possibility of 
more complex forms of strategic voting.  
Since my aim here is simply to show that voting can be strategic even when 
instrumental concerns are absent, a simple numerical example will suffice. Suppose 
voter 1 is a radical leftist on expressive grounds (Y1=0) and there are three parties, 
one radically left-wing (XA=0), one moderately left-wing (XB=.2) and one 
moderately right wing (XC=.8). Suppose further that k=0 and thus the first term of 
equations 4.1 and 4.2 is zero. On the unsophisticated expressive voting model of 
equation 1, there would be no room for strategic voting and voter 1 would vote for 
party A without any consideration of electoral prospects. On the sophisticated 
expressive model of equation 4.2, however, the voter needs to consider the 
perceived strategic value of voting for party A or B.  
If, as is common in real world cases of extreme and moderate parties, party A has 
no realistic chance of gaining power but B and C are fairly evenly poised, the 
voter’s subjectively-defined measure of CA will be much lower than CB. Suppose 
that CA=.001 and CB=.5.  Further set β to 1 and γ to 2, meaning that the individual 
places greater weight on the expressive preference for strategy. Plugging these 
values into equation 4.2 (and ignoring the first term) we get  = 11 − 0 +
2


 = 1.002	and  = 11 − 0.2 + 2.

 = 1.6	. The individual will 
vote strategically for party B even though she is ideologically closer to party A and 
instrumental preferences have been entirely ignored.  
4.4. Ideologies as dispositions 
The account of electoral choice presented above will no doubt strike many as 
implausible at a psychological level. The first and best response to such criticisms 
is always, in my view, to point out that models are meant to capture relevant causal 
mechanism rather than accurately describe psychological or social processes. I 
believe the expressive preference for cunning become more plausible when we 
consider it in dispositional terms, however.  
Dispositions as understood by Brennan and Hamlin (1995, 2000, Chapters 3–4, 6; 
Hamlin, 2006) are durable traits or commitments which influence but do not 
necessarily determine choice. A person of altruistic disposition will tend to help 
people. A person of an analytic disposition will tend to think carefully and 
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objectively about questions of fact. Dispositions can encourage particular types of 
action and also particular modes of thought; they may be domain specific or 
general; and they may be more or less binding.  
Dispositions shape future choices and they can to some extent be voluntarily 
chosen (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2000, pp. 45–48). Such choice is not costless, of 
course, but with sustained effort and intentional environmental changes good habits 
can be developed and modes of thought and action which once seemed alien can 
become natural.44 If dispositions can at some cost be rationally chosen, rational 
actors will seek to adopt dispositions which maximise their welfare in the long-run. 
A demonstrable commitment to honouring one’s debts, for example, will make 
possible trades which would otherwise be undermined by the threat of ex post 
opportunism. A moral disposition in this case will give individuals a higher payoff 
than would case-by-case rational calculation (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2000, Chapter 
2).  
Brennan and Hamlin (2000, pp. 48–49) suggest that moral dispositions will be 
important in politics due to the difficulty of overcoming agency problems in 
democracy, and Hamlin (2006, pp. 9–10) further argues that acting in accordance 
with one’s disposition will be cheaper in collective choices. The argument here 
builds on those insights, suggesting that the adoption of a political disposition may 
itself be aimed at securing expressive, rather than instrumental, benefits. Just as we 
intrinsically value the performance of specific actions, we also intrinsically value 
the adoption of ideological dispositions. The standard argument for the dominance 
of expressive preferences in political choice also applies to the choice of political 
dispositions: For dispositions which condition behaviour generally or specifically 
in non-political contexts, instrumental preferences will tend to dominate.  If our 
political dispositions have little effect on our material wellbeing, however, 
instrumental concerns can be discounted and only expressive preferences remain.  
It is important to distinguish between two aspects of a political disposition, which I 
will call the ideological and the electoral. Ideological dispositions are composed of 
an individual’s basic normative commitments about the role of the state and criteria 
for evaluating policy arguments. A socialist disposition will commit one to valuing 
equality of wealth very highly and might prompt a blanket rejection of neoclassical 
economic arguments as the ideological weapons of the capitalist class. In the model 
of electoral choice presented above, ideological dispositions will determine the 
                                                     
44
 See Gauthier (1986) for an earlier rational choice account of dispositional choice.  
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expressively ideal point in policy space and the shape of the expressive preference 
function.  
An ideological disposition can be combined with a variety of electoral dispositions 
which, taking the ideal point and ranking of alternatives as given, influence the 
way an individual will alter their voting behaviour based on electoral conditions. 
An idealist disposition will make individuals relatively unwilling to sacrifice their 
beliefs in order to support the lesser of two evils, while a strategic disposition will 
encourage strategic voting. In equation 4.2 above, electoral dispositions will 
determine the relative magnitude of β and γ and thus influence the relative 
expressive payoffs of sticking to one’s ideological guns or voting strategically. 
Electoral dispositions are, compared to ideological ones, relatively free of content 
and instead focused on encouraging one mode of thought rather than another. They 
are for the most part what Hamlin (2006, p. 6) calls modal dispositions.  
In any political culture, individuals will be faced with a menu of ideological 
choices. Americans have the choice of becoming a liberal or a conservative, though 
if they squint and read the fine print they may see one or two further options. 
Dispositional choice is not unconstrained, of course: we adopt dispositions in the 
context of other dispositions, beliefs, and preferences. Political beliefs are highly 
heritable (Settle, Dawes, & Fowler, 2009), suggesting that our parents have an 
important influence on our dispositional constitution through some combination of 
socialisation and genetics. Yet people do have patrial control over their own 
political dispositions: Teenagers rebel and views adapt over time. As long as we 
assume that people have some say over their own ideological commitments and 
respond to psychological and social incentives, the rational actor model is 
applicable.  
When adopting a political disposition, rational actors will consider the long-term 
payoffs of the available alternatives. As suggested above, I want to distinguish 
between two dimensions of dispositional choice in politics, ideological and 
electoral. As before individuals have instrumental and expressive preferences, but 
now rather than voting on a single issue they are choosing a disposition to adopt 
based on the expected payoff from a long run of future political decisions.  
A political disposition can be defined as a rule for evaluating electoral alternatives. 
The ideological component is given by the ideal point; the electoral component is 
given by the relative weight given to various factors. A partially or fully 
instrumental disposition is a possibility, but we are here interested in only 
82 
 
expressive dispositions.  Following the notation above, a perfectly idealistic 
disposition under which the individual votes for whatever party is ideologically 
closest to them, choosing whichever P maximises	 = 1 − | − 
|. A 
perfectly strategic voter will take full account of the electoral prospects in making a 
voting choice, maximising  = 1 − | − 
|.Between these two extremes 
various weights can be given to expressing sincere and sophisticated voting 
preferences, with the general method of evaluating alternatives given by a reduced 
version of equation 4.2 above, equation 4.3.  
(4.3)  = 1 − | − 
| + 1 − | − 
| 
Individuals will adopt a disposition which varies the relative magnitude of β and γ 
based on the expressive value of idealism and cunning. Those with a relatively 
large γ will often vote strategically while those with lower values of γ will seldom 
do so.  In choosing between idealistic and strategic dispositions individuals will 
consider the expected value of a series of expressive payoffs resulting from the 
future decisions made under each disposition.  The expressive payoffs resulting 
from strategic voting are, of course, subjective and likely to vary by individual. 
There may also be interactions with ideological dispositions. A dispositional 
idealist defined as someone who values their ideal point very highly relative to the 
next best alternatives (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2004) may find expressive 
complementarities between this substantive view and a high value of β.  
If we consider political dispositions as influencing not simply voting choices but a 
range of political activity from conversations at the pub to the signing of petitions 
to the wearing of campaign badges, a strategic disposition appears more attractive. 
Individuals have many avenues for expressing their ideological preferences – their 
expressively ideal point – and if we think standard economic logic applies here the 
existence of such substitutes for sincere ideological voting will decrease the 
quantity demanded. In the dispositional terms above, the existence of other outlets 
would decrease the value of β. Strategic voters could express idealism in the pub 
by proclaiming the rightness of the extreme view while expressing seriousness and 
practicality in the voting booth by voting for the lesser of two evils, and this might 
be expected to create higher aggregate expressive payoff.    
It is not my intention here to show that any significant proportion of voters do in 
fact adopt such an expressively strategic disposition, but it seems awfully plausible 
that they do. Politics is seen by the median citizen as serious business worthy of 
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some attention, yet the attention paid to political questions is often of a rather 
peculiar kind, focusing on political strategy rather than issues (Iyengar, Norpoth, & 
Hahn, 2004). When substantive issues are discussed debates do not seem to be 
aimed at truth. Voters seek new and other information which confirm rather than 
challenge their ideological preferences (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Taber et al., 2001; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006) and seem to have systematically biased beliefs as a result 
(Caplan, 2002, 2007). Disagreement over matters of fact is a fundamental part of 
political discourse, despite its questionable rationality (Aumann, 1976; Cowen & 
Hanson, 2004; Hanson, 2006).  These findings are at odds with the instrumental 
account of voting.  
Politics may be serious business, but the constraints of instrumental rationality 
seem to be stronger at the strategic level taking policy preferences as given, with 
policy positions themselves subjected to very little or plausibly even no 
instrumental deliberation. Politics is perhaps best seen as a game of strategy 
everyone agrees to play. To enjoy a game of chess we need to agree on rules, 
victory conditions, and norms of fair play. We act strategically within these 
constraints but at no point do we question why we are trying to force checkmate or 
why the black player dislikes the white pieces so strongly. The goals of players in a 
game of chess are taken as given and strategies are formulated within those non-
instrumental constraints, and I suggest that this is often so with politics. People 
may often think strategically about how to advance socialist or libertarian or social 
democratic policy goals without subjecting the validity of those goals to 
instrumental scrutiny.  
This defuses much of the apparent tension between expressive and strategic voting 
and suggests that expressive theory retains a great deal of empirical and normative 
import even if politics is taken as serious business. Voting choice could be 
motivated entirely by expressive concerns at both levels, but be empirically 
consistent with instrumental motivation only at the electoral level. This would 
indeed reduce the potential empirical implications of expressive theory, and many 
of the results of conventional rational choice theory might be upheld.  
The demands of politics as serious business are more exacting at the electoral than 
the ideological level. The demonstration that third-party votes are ‘wasted’ in a 
plurality election is trivial and readily accepted by all reasonable people.45 If we 
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 Note, however, that votes wasted in a short term and strictly electoral sense might be 
valuable if victory margins affect government behaviour via a mandate effect or influence a 
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take ideological preferences as given, the demands of seriousness in a 
consequentialist sense are quite exacting here. If a person wants to express a 
serious consequentialist commitment to their ideological preferences, insincere 
voting will often be very obviously the only reasonable choice.  More complex 
forms of strategic voting may take more complex chains of reasoning, but there are 
objective answers to how we should vote if we take party preferences as given. 
Ideological preferences, on the other hand, are not disciplined nearly as tightly. 
Inconsistent views can be objectively criticised, but in the absence of consensus on 
what the good life requires, the scope of plausibly serious ideological preferences 
is very wide indeed. Ideologies are webs of beliefs capable of accommodating 
uncomfortable evidence with only slight revisions (Quine, 1951).  Dogmatists of 
all political persuasions are quite capable of appearing like doctrinaire fruitcakes to 
opponents and paragons of rationality to allies. Whether or not one believes there 
are objective grounds for answering moral and political questions, it is clear that no 
such grounds are currently effective in adjudicating ideological disputes.  
The potential trade-offs between our expressive preferences over the seriousness 
and content of our choices, then, are likely to be less apparent at the ideological 
level than the electoral level of choice. Politics is serious business at both levels, 
but seriousness only seriously constrains electoral choice. This means that electoral 
choices will tend to be consistent with instrumental rationality when policy 
preferences are taken as given. Those preferences, however, might be formed on 
the basis of substantive expressive preferences untouched by the demands of 
politics as serious business.   
This approach is capable of explaining strategic voting without recourse to 
instrumental preferences and can also account for the finding that the closeness of 
an election increases turnout (Blais, 2006, p. 119), since closeness will increase the 
value CP for the major parties and thus increase the expressive value of a strategic 
vote.46 The possibility of dispositional heterogeneity (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2000, 
pp. 61–63) provides a rational choice explanation of widespread and persistent 
disagreement over factual matters in the political sphere.  
                                                                                                                                       
party’s prospects in future elections (Fowler & Smirnov, 2007; Mackie, 2010; Stigler, 
1972).   
46
 It should also be noted that closeness may increase the salience of the election and thus 
increase the unsophisticated expressive value of voting.  
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4.5. Conclusion  
This paper has provided a rational actor account of voting choice which predicts 
strategic voting while remaining entirely expressive. This shows that Christiano, 
Dowding, and Mackie are mistaken in claiming that the existence of strategic 
voting is decisive proof that voting choices are motivated at least in part by 
instrumental factors. I have argued that an expressive preference for political 
cunning is capable of altering the expressive calculus of electoral decisions without 
in any way affecting the expressively-chosen ideological dispositions.  
I have also tried to show that this account of expressive voting is empirically and 
normatively quite distinct from instrumental theory. Mackie’s objection that saving 
expressive theory by positing a quasi-instrumental preference for treating politics 
as serious business renders it empirically meaningless can be rejected. There is an 
important respect in which the introduction of expressive preferences for strategy 
does bring the theory more in line with conventional rational choice predictions. If 
people are motivated by perceived strategic optimality of their choice expressive 
theory will follow instrumental theory in predicting electoral regularities such as 
Duverger’s law.   
The action for expressive theory is at the ideological level. Where instrumental 
accounts will predict that basic policy preferences will change in response to 
material conditions or new information, the expressive account continues to stress 
less transparent factors deriving from culture and psychology. If voting is entirely 
expressive, changes in material conditions will only affect voting behaviour via 
their effect on expressive preferences. Disentangling the effects is difficult in the 
real world, but the empirical predictions of the expressive model differ from 
instrumental or hybrid account even when we introduce expressive strategic 
preferences.  
We have reasonable evidence from the field and the lab that expressive concerns 
do play a larger role in collective than individual choice (Cummings et al., 1997; 
Fischer, 1996; Hamlin & Jennings, 2011; Kan & Yang, 2001; Roback, 1986; Shayo 
& Harel, 2012; Sobel & Wagner, 2004). On the question of whether instrumental 
preferences are entirely ignored by voters in large real-world elections, however, 
there is simply no evidence one way or the other. Experimental work may be the 
most promising way forward empirically, since it allows tighter control of 
instrumental and expressive factors. Even more promising are experimental studies 
which use neural imaging to peek inside the heads of those making collective 
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choices. Neuroscientists can empirically distinguish between instrumental and 
emotional activity, and this could potentially provide an objective test of Brennan 
and Hamlin’s (1998, p. 150) claim that voting is ‘much more like cheering at a 
football match than it is like purchasing an asset portfolio.’47 Such a test would be 
complicated by the existence of expressive strategic preferences, but a focus on 
what I have here called ideological choice should provide scope for unbiased 
testing of the expressive voting hypothesis.  
The normative implications of the expressive theory are largely untouched by the 
introduction of an expressive preference for cunning. Ideological preferences over 
policy space – even if well behaved in a formal sense and strategically pursued by 
voters – may be seriously at odds  with individuals’ interests as defined by their 
‘true’ preferences defined in terms of choices which would be made under 
conditions of individual decisiveness. This opens the possibility that unanimously 
chosen policies would be universally rejected by decisive decision makers (G. 
Brennan & Lomasky, 1984), that voters will use the ballot box to indulge spiteful 
or bigoted preferences (G. Brennan & Lomasky, 1989) and anger others (Glazer, 
2008).  On the other hand, expressive voting might encourage a more impartial 
view by allowing people to vote in line with their moral preferences (G. Brennan & 
Lomasky, 1985; Goodin & Roberts, 1975; Kliemt, 1986). The all-things-
considered implication of expressive voting theory for our evaluation of democratic 
efficiency and the relative desirability of exit and voice are far from clear, but it is 
very clear that the theory has important normative implications. Adding a strategic 
element to the preference functions of the bigot, the altruist, or the fool does little 
to modify the normative importance of the existence of such characters for the 
evaluation of democracy.  
  
                                                     
47
 A notable study which does not directly tackle the issue at stake here but has some 
interesting implications and suggests an empirical approach is Farrell et al (2012), which 
asks people to make hypothetical and consequential decisions while in a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine. The introduction of incentives to an 
otherwise hypothetical affect-laden choice situation increased activity in regions of the 
brain associated with rational deliberation and improved task performance (defined 
instrumentally) in cases where affect and self-interest pushed in opposite directions.     
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5. Children’s Rights with Endogenous 
Fertility  
Abstract:  This paper considers the value of children’s rights laws as a means of 
protecting children from a hypothetical contractarian perspective. Laws protecting 
children from their parents have the unintended but predictable consequence of 
making child-rearing less desirable for some parents and probabilistically 
reducing the number of children born. Such laws therefore produce a trade-off 
between the expected wellbeing of actual and possible persons. I show that a 
possible child behind an appropriate veil of ignorance may rationally oppose laws 
which benefit some and harm no actual children.  
5.1. Introduction 
Parents have a great deal of power over their children, and this fact poses serious 
problems for liberal political theory and policy making in liberal democracies. 
Parents are given fairly wide scope to raise their children as they see fit, but liberal 
states routinely place limits on parental sovereignty in the name of children’s rights 
(Archard, 2004). In many cases, concern for the welfare and autonomy of children 
conflicts with the values of non-liberal cultural groups. Christian scientists refusing 
life-saving medical treatment for their children (Hickey & Lyckholm, 2004), Old 
Order Amish refusing to educate their children beyond the eighth grade (Galston, 
1995; Mazie, 2005), and Islamic cultures engaging in female circumcision 
(Nussbaum, 1999, Chapter 4) are examples of this conflict. In each of these cases, 
parents’ religious beliefs are at odds with broadly-held liberal views of how 
children should be treated and debates have centred on the conflict between the 
tolerance of diversity and the protection of individual autonomy. 
In a nonideal world, the appropriate distribution of rights depends not only on 
moral considerations narrowly construed, but also on the normatively-relevant 
second-order effects of such distributions.48 This paper considers one such second-
order effect of laws which restrict parental authority: reduced fertility. Parents not 
only decide how to treat their children, but also whether to have those children at 
all. These choices are not independent, and this complicates liberal justifications 
for children’s rights laws. Parents – especially those belonging to illiberal cultural 
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 On feasibility see Brennan and Hamlin (2009) and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012). 
On non-ideal theory see Schmidtz (2011). On feasibility in the context of children’s rights 
law, though of a different type than that discussed here, see Cowden (2011). 
88 
 
groups – have strong preferences over how their children are raised. Rational 
choice theories of fertility suggest that limiting parental sovereignty makes some 
parents less willing to have children. If children raised in illiberal communities 
have lives worth living and additional worthwhile lives are considered valuable, 
this is something liberal theorists and policymakers ought to consider.  
Contractarianism provides a means of impartially considering the conflicting 
interests of many individuals. By asking what rational individuals would choose 
under epistemically and motivationally idealised conditions, contrarianism 
provides a simulation of impartial moral judgment beginning from individual self-
interest (Buchanan & Lomasky, 1984; Harsanyi, 1953, 1955; Narveson, 2013; 
Rawls, 1971). This paper adopts a version of hypothetical contractarianism which 
considers hypothetical choice of a rational possible person behind a veil of 
ignorance. Following Harsanyi (1953, 1955) I assume Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions and assume that hypothetical contractors have perfect knowledge 
of how alternative options influence the welfare of individuals but complete 
uncertainty as to which individual they will be. Following Kavka (1975) I include 
possible persons whose existence depends on the choice at hand in the original 
position.  
This approach allows us to consider the hypothetical exit behaviour of those 
children who in reality have neither exit options nor voice. A hypothetical possible 
child considering whether to support legislation designed to protect them from their 
parents will be influenced not simply by the value of such protections given that 
they do exist, but also the effect on their likelihood of being actualised. Such a 
perspective reveals that children’s rights legislation, even if perfectly effective in 
making actual children better off, can be seen as bad for children in an abstract but 
normatively powerful sense.  
I consider only the interests of potential children and ignore the preferences of 
parents. Though parents no doubt have moral standing here, I do this in order to 
focus on the central claim by children’s rights advocates which I wish to question: 
that protective laws are good for children. In questioning this claim I make an 
argument which applies a fortiori to more comprehensive axiological analyses 
which consider the interests of parents as well as children.  
While the argument here is strictly axiological and does not preclude overriding 
deontological considerations, I suggest that the previously neglected costs of 
children’s rights I identify here are normatively relevant - i.e. they ought to be 
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given some consideration in policy debates over the appropriate level of parental 
sovereignty. Such debates might reasonably conclude that the benefits of some 
piece of children’s rights law outweigh the costs or that there are deontological 
considerations which trump the interests of possible persons. My point is simply to 
show that some children’s rights protections are less desirable than we would think 
if fertility were exogenous. It should also be noted that I take the moral 
significance of possible persons and the appropriateness of contractarianism for the 
question at hand as assumptions of this paper. While I find each of these 
assumptions reasonable and will have a few words to say in their support, I do not 
offer a rigorous defines of either proposition, since this would take far more space 
than is available here.49  
5.2. Axiological possibilism  
Whenever we make a choice at time t among n meaningful and feasible options, we 
are destined to bring about one of n possible worlds at time t+1.50 The outcome of 
some choices will affect the identity and number of persons who come to exist. If a 
person’s existence depends on our choice we may call them a contingent person. A 
contingent person is one who exists in one or more, but not all, possible worlds. 
That is, a normal person whose existence is contingent rather than some invisible 
ghostly entity whose personhood is contingent. After our choice has been made and 
the consequences played out, some of these contingent persons will have been 
actualised. An actual person is one who exists in this (i.e. ‘the real’) world; a 
nonactual possible person is one who could have existed but does not.  A 
necessary person is one who exists in all possible worlds, and along with 
contingent persons they form the group of possible persons. While the language of 
possible persons and possible worlds is sometimes interpreted as requiring strong 
and counterintuitive metaphysical assumptions, I here use these concepts simply as 
a means of counterfactual reasoning (Broome, 2004, pp. 14–15; Holtug, 2001, pp. 
366–379).   
Ordinary ethical behaviour requires that we ignore the interests of nonactual 
persons – there is little point in making tea for a person who might have existed but 
does not, and they do not mind when we step on their hypothetical toes. When we 
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 On axiological possibilism, see Hare (2007) and Holtug (1999, 2001, 2012, Chapter 5). 
On contractarianism in general see Narveson (2013). On contractarianism with possible 
persons, see Kavka (1975). 
50
 Of course, we cannot know precisely how our actions will play out and the choices of 
others will interact with others in bringing about the actual world. I here ignore such 
complications by making a strong ceteris paribus assumption.  
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make a choice which affects the number and identity of those who will come to 
exist, on the other hand, the distinction between actual and nonactual persons 
cannot in principle be made. At t there is simply no fact of the matter as to who 
exists at t+1, since the answer is contingent on the choice we make now. Facing 
this open future, impartiality requires that we consider the interests of all parties 
affected by our choice.  
Many axiological systems subscribe to the person-affecting restriction, which holds 
that states of affairs can only be good or bad (or better or worse) insofar as they 
good or bad for one or more individuals. A person whose existence depends on our 
choice is in an obvious intuitive sense affected by it, though many insist that a 
welfare comparison of existence and non-existence is meaningless. When I 
consider whether to kick actual Alice in the shin, I am making a cross-world 
welfare comparison. If I choose to kick her, a possible world in which she has a 
sore shin, and perhaps a general sense of distrust, becomes actual. If I choose to 
contain my violent tendencies, an alternative possible world in which Alice 
remains pain-free and trusting is actualised. Most reasonable person-affecting 
axiologies will have no problem recognising that Alice is better off in the latter 
possible world – since her mental states are more pleasant, her preferences more 
satisfied, or her basic interests better advanced – and no especial logical difficulties 
arise.  
When I make a choice which determines whether some possible future person 
exists, however, it is no longer so obvious that cross-world welfare comparisons 
make sense. If a person does not exist, they have no actual preferences, 
experiences, or interests. When asked to value non-existence against lives 
containing a mix of joy and frustration, one obvious response is to assign good 
things a positive value, bad things a negative value, and non-existence the neutral 
value of zero. Some have disputed the validity of this approach. Heyd claims that 
‘there is no way to compare the amount of suffering of states of actual people and 
the state of non-existence of these people. We should resist the temptation of 
assigning a zero-value to non-existence, thus making it quantitatively 
commensurable with either the positive or the negative net value of the lives of 
actual people’ (Heyd, 1992, p. 113). Non-existent lives clearly have no value, but 
the claim that they have zero value is to inappropriately assign a definite value to 
something which cannot be evaluated, since there is no standard of evaluation 
without preferences or interests.  
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As Holtug (2001, pp. 364–383) shows, a response to the claim that non-existence 
cannot be evaluated without preferences or interests in the relevant world will 
depend somewhat on the axiological position adopted. If we hold an objective list 
or hedonic view of (person-affecting) value, there is no logical problem. Even if 
outcomes can only be evaluated insofar as they affect persons, the standard of 
evaluation (happiness, flourishing, etc.) is independent of any person’s preference. 
That there is nobody to long for our existence in worlds from which we are absent 
presents no particular logical problem compared to ontological counterfactual 
statements. Similarly, if we take an object version of preferentialism – that 
individual preferences give external states of affairs such as pleasant mental states 
inherent value – we can similarly take a person’s preference in a world in which 
they do exist as a standard of evaluation for worlds in which they do not. Heyd’s 
objection is most plausible when interpreted on a preference-satisfaction theory of 
value. On this account, it is the coincidence of some preferred state of affairs and a 
preference regarding that state of affairs which creates value. So, in a world where 
Bob does not exist, the claim that existence would be good for Bob is parsed as 
‘Bob prefers that he would have existed, but that preference is not satisfied.’ This 
clearly makes no sense, since there is no preference in that world to remain 
unsatisfied.  
This interpretation of preference satisfaction is, I think, a mistaken one. We need 
not claim there is a preference in a world which remains unsatisfied to say that 
there is zero preference satisfaction in that world in a comparatively meaningful 
sense. We have an absence of a good thing, which is neutral. If in a world in which 
Bob exists and has a surplus of preference satisfactions, there is more preference 
satisfaction in this world than another world in which Bob does not exist, despite 
Bob having no preferences in the latter. A world in which a person has good things 
is better for that person than a world in which they do not, whether they are there to 
realise it or not. Only a preference-frustration account of value seems capable of 
grounding Heyd’s objection. This is not only implausible, but also inconsistent 
with Heyd’s general argument insofar as it implies that bringing a person into 
existence is practically always a bad thing, since everybody can expect some of 
their preferences to be frustrated (Holtug, 2001, pp. 380–383).51  
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 It should be noted that some, most notably Benatar (2006), are willing to bite this bullet 
and claim that bringing people into existence is always blameworthy. 
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When we claim that a possible future person Bob would be benefitted (or harmed) 
by existence, we are claiming that it is better (or worse) for him that he exist than 
not.  We need not assign any intrinsic value to life itself here. Rather, existence 
benefits a person insofar as it allows good things to accrue to them. Thus, existence 
benefits a person who thereafter lives a life worth living all things considered. By 
‘lives worth living’ I mean lives in which good things outweigh bad things in the 
relevant sense, with worthiness defined by whatever axiology one holds (Parfit, 
1984, pp. 257–258). The extent of the benefit or harm of existence depends on the 
balance of good or bad things.  
Though the argument of this paper does not depend on the claim that non-existence 
has precisely zero value to a person, I do require that it is quantitatively 
commensurable with existence at various levels of welfare. Accepting non-
existence as a natural zero point would allow us to construct a ratio scale of 
welfare. This is not necessary for our purposes, since we are interested in 
comparing only the difference in utility across possible worlds. The interval scale 
of Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility is therefore sufficient. We can arbitrarily 
assign non-existence the baseline value of zero, some possible life worth living the 
arbitrary value of one, and define the utility of other possible lives in terms of 
preference between uncertain prospects. If we set option x at zero and y at one, an 
individual indifferent between y with certainty and x or z with equal probability 
reveals herself to value z at 2 units of utility (Alchian, 1953; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1964). In this paper I will treat non-existence as having zero value, 
but it should be noted that this number has meaning only in comparison with the 
utility of other possible lives. 
A possible person’s wellbeing is determined by the sum of positive and negative 
utilities accruing to them throughout their existence. A nonactual person, of course, 
does not exist at all and thus accrues no positive or negative utilities – their welfare 
is zero in the very simple sense that nothing good or bad can happen to them. An 
actual person living a miserable life will have negative net utility and would be 
better off not having existing (i.e. is harmed by existence), while an actual person 
living a happy life will have positive net utility and would be worse off not having 
existed (i.e. is benefitted by existence). It makes no practical sense to claim that a 
nonactual person has been harmed or benefitted by non-existence once the actual 
persons have been sorted from the nonactual, but there is nothing logically 
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incoherent about such a claim when we consider benefits and harms as betterness 
relations between the relevant alternatives and assign non-existence the neutral 
welfare value of zero (Holtug, 2001, pp. 370–377). Moreover, such judgments are 
an essential component of practical hypothetical reasoning conducted before the 
relevant choice is made, since no distinction can be made between actual and 
nonactual persons at this point. When our choice determines which possible 
persons will become actual, there is no obvious basis for privileging one set of 
possible persons over another.  
Axiologies which insist that only actual persons matter morally cannot guide action 
in a practical sense when the actualised population of persons is at stake. The 
alternative I adopt in this paper is to extend moral status to all possible persons, 
though there are other possibilities which it is worth briefly considering in order to 
see how axiological possibilism stacks up.52 Although the idea that only actual 
people matter is intuitively appealing, many seem to have a stronger intuitive 
commitment to what McMahan (1981, 2009) calls ‘the asymmetry.’ Many want to 
claim that (1) we have moral reason not to bring about miserable lives (i.e. lives 
not worth living), and (2) we have no moral reason to bring about happy lives (i.e. 
lives worth living). McMahan recognises the intuitive appeal of these propositions 
but argues that they are difficult to maintain while holding a consistent version of 
the person-affecting restriction and retaining an action-guiding approach to moral 
theory. The claim that it is bad to bring a predictably miserable individual into 
existence requires that we admit impersonal or non-comparative value as 
normatively-relevant, while the claim that it is not good (or bad) to bring a 
predictably happy individual into existence is premised on the idea that impersonal 
and non-comparative value is non-existent or normatively-irrelevant. Treating costs 
and benefits asymmetrically does not solve this problem, since the desirable 
aspects of a normal happy life are required to ‘cancel’ the undesirable aspects and 
avoid the conclusion that it is bad to create any life which has any undesirable 
aspect. If we cannot distinguish between the gain of being born into a happy life 
and the loss of being born into a miserable one, a possible response is to reluctantly 
accept that the former is praiseworthy in order to say that the latter is blameworthy 
(Broome, 2004, 2005; Singer, 1993, pp. 103–105).  
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 There are further possibilities I do not consider here, but as has been adequately 
established elsewhere these positions produce highly counterintuitive and sometimes 
inconsistent conclusions. Hare (2007) and Roberts (2010, pp. 60–69) show that ‘actualist’ 
approaches are unable to guide action, and Broome (2005) shows that acceptance of the 
claim that adding new and happy lives is morally neutral is inconsistent with the Pareto 
principle. 
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Roberts (2010, 2011) attempts to resolve the apparent contradiction of the 
asymmetry by arguing that although all possible persons matter morally and are 
capable of suffering loss, but only losses which are suffered in worlds in which 
individuals exist are morally significant. All possible persons matter, but they 
matter variably depending on the modal relationship between harm and existence. 
Loss is here defined in terms of a comparative betterness relation: ‘to say that a 
person p incurs a loss at a given world w as a result of a given act a is to say that 
there was still another world w′ accessible to agents at the critical time such that 
their performance of an alternate act a′ at w′ is better for p than their performance 
of a at w is’ (Roberts, 2011, p. 337). Since Roberts accepts, as do I, that the non-
existence can meaningfully be compared against happy or unhappy lives in terms 
of welfare, she finds claims such as ‘Alice was benefitted by being born into a 
happy life’ and ‘Bob was harmed by being born into a miserable life’ quite 
coherent. However, by restricting her normative attention to losses and claiming 
that losses are only morally relevant when incurred in worlds in which the 
individual exists, she is able to treat Alice’s benefit as morally neutral and Bob’s 
harm as morally bad. Alice would have suffered a loss had she not come into 
existence, but since she fails exist in the world where such a loss is incurred this 
loss does not matter. Bob’s loss occurs in a world in which he does exist, however, 
and this means that his suffering has full moral status even though he does not exist 
in the world which is better for him.  
Roberts’s variabilist account is, it seems to me, by far the most plausible way of 
grounding the asymmetry. I grant that she has established the conclusion that 
‘Variabilism nicely grounds both halves of the Asymmetry and avoids the 
consistency and other conceptual problems that plague its competitors’ (Roberts, 
2011, p. 336). But this is not an argument for variabilism over possibilism unless 
we feel compelled to endorse the asymmetry. The motivation for the symmetry, it 
seems, is simple intuition. When Roberts does attempt to argue for variabilism over 
possibilism, the brute nature of her belief that making happy people must be 
morally neutral is clear: 
The one distinction that Inclusion [i.e. possibilism] insists 
we set aside is always going to seem to us one that no 
sound moral analysis can conceivably set aside: that one 
act imposes a loss on a real, live, flesh and blood, 
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sentient being and the other a loss on, well, nothing that 
does or will ever exist at all. There just is an important 
moral distinction to be made between “making people 
happy” and “making happy people.” In a way that can 
only be described as axiomatic, your actual dog must 
come before your merely possible cat.  (Roberts, 2010, p. 
45 emphasis in original) 
According to Roberts (2010, p. 75), the fact that inclusivism provides answers to 
moral problems involving possible persons we find counterintuitive shows that it 
‘is surely false.’ This clearly begs the question.  While Roberts shows that it is 
possible to sharpen the intuition behind the asymmetry in order to avoid patent 
absurdities, she gives us no reason beyond her own insistence to accept variabilism 
over possibilism. In response, I have nothing to say to Roberts other than ‘I don’t 
share your intuitions on this matter.’ Although I share the view that a moral 
obligation to make happy people whenever possible would be quite unreasonable, 
it does seem to me intuitively that making happy people is supererogatory. I am 
happy to have been born, and, intuitively, this happiness should count as a point in 
favour of my parents’ decision to bring me into the world. Since carrying and 
raising an unwanted child would be severely burdensome we generally do not 
consider voluntarily childlessness blameworthy (or abortion impermissible), but 
this does not preclude the possibility that we benefit individuals by bringing them 
into a happy existence. Similarly (but with the exception of Singer (1972)), we do 
not generally consider it blameworthy to refrain from donating a large portion of 
our income to poverty alleviation efforts but have no problem praising those who 
do. On most liberal accounts of morality, charity is supererogatory, and my 
intuitions suggest the same is true of making happy people. Roberts and others are 
free to disagree, but I here take axiological possibilism as an assumption of my 
argument.53   
5.3. Possibilist contractarianism 
In order to consider the interests of possible persons in collective decision-making 
contexts, I use a version of hypothetical contractarianism. Broadly speaking, this 
approach is most closely associated with Rawls (1971), but my approach here owes 
more to Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977, 1978). The contractarian method simulates 
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 Though I may well be outnumbered on intuitions regarding the praiseworthiness of 
making happy people, I am far from alone (e.g. C. Hare, 2007; R. M. Hare, 1975; Holtug, 
2001; Nagel, 1970, p. 78; Parfit, 1984, pp. 487–490; Rachels, 1998).  
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disinterested moral reflection by asking what principles, institutions, or rules 
rational and self-interested individuals would choose when denied knowledge of 
their place in society. To borrow a couple of Rawlsian terms, the ‘original position’ 
consists of some population of contractors behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ which 
denies them knowledge of their own place in society.  The population of 
contractors, the nature of the veil, and the decision rules used by contractors vary 
between contractarian theories. In terms of the nature of the veil and the decision 
rule adopted, I follow Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977, 1978). Contractors are perfectly 
informed about the preferences of all members of society and how the relevant 
alternatives will impact resource allocations. At the same time they are denied 
knowledge of their place in society. Each contractor has an equal chance of taking 
the place of any member of the relevant population, with their combination of 
resource allocations and preferences determined by random chance. In thinking 
about the choice between alternative rules, then, the contractor approaches the 
choice as one between quantifiably uncertain prospects. In asking which alternative 
maximises expected utility, the contractor is forced to consider the interests of all 
affected parties impartially.54 The uncertainty of this original position forces its 
hypothetical inhabitants to abandon their idiosyncratic preferences and to 
impartially balance the competing interests of all relevant parties, since each could 
end up being any of these parties.  
While accepting Harsanyi’s version of the veil of ignorance and the decision rule 
motivating contractors, I depart from his definition of the relevant population of 
instead follow Kavka (1975, p. 240), who points out that the standard veil of 
ignorance fails to obscure one potentially very important fact: that one exists. Since 
each individual in the original position knows that they will in fact exist, their 
choices may not be as impartial as we might like. Parfit provides an example of a 
contractor choosing between two possible worlds: 
In Hell One, the last generation consists of ten innocent 
people, who each suffer great agony for fifty years. The 
lives of these people are much worse than nothing. They 
would all kill themselves if they could. In Hell Two, the 
last generation consists not of ten but of ten million 
innocent people, who each suffer agony just as great for 
fifty years minus a day (Parfit, 1984, p. 393). 
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 Rawls’s setup differs in positing unquantifiable uncertainty rather than risk and the 
maximin strategy of making worst-case outcomes as desirable as possible.      
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If given the knowledge that they will certainly exist, a selfishly rational individual 
will prefer Hell Two, since it saves them from a day of agony. Intuitively, though, 
Hell Two looks much worse than Hell One. The standard hypothetical 
contractarian method completely ignores the number of those suffering, which is 
surely a morally relevant fact. The natural response to such problems is to populate 
the original position with possible rather than actual persons. Each possible person 
is asked to evaluate the rules of a society which they will live in if they happen to 
come into existence at all. Rules affect the number of individuals in society as well 
as the welfare of those who are actually born, and a hypothetical contractarian 
approach I adopt here provides the conditions for an impartial consideration of both 
factors.  
The use of hypothetical contractarianism is motivated by the need to impartially 
consider the interests of all affected parties and reflects the general distinction 
made by constitutional political economists between choice among rules and 
choice within rules (Brennan & Buchanan, 2000; Hamlin, 2014). When it comes to 
in-period political choice, deliberation and voting on particular children’s rights 
laws would be biased by each individual’s idiosyncratic preferences and position. 
The constitutionalist’s response to this problem is to push debate up a level of 
generality and seek agreement on the rules by which children’s rights laws can be 
enacted.  If the rules under consideration are sufficiently general and durable, 
individuals will be forced by a ‘veil of uncertainty’ to consider the matter 
impartially, since any unfairness cannot reasonably be predicted to be to one’s 
advantage in the long run. Here, though, the certainty that one has been born (and if 
we restrict suffrage to adults, that one has reached the age of majority) renders the 
impartiality of constitutional deliberation questionable. No matter the generality 
and durability of constitutional rules, the actual will always be able to stack the 
deck in favour of themselves and against the possible. Hypothetical 
contractarianism offers a conceptual solution to the problem of balancing the 
interests of current and future generations if we include all those who exist today 
and all those who will ever exist. When the existence of some individuals is 
endogenous to the choice at hand, however, the affected parties whose interests we 
should consider include those who might never come to exist.    
To make use of the original position as an analytic device in this context, we need 
to define the relevant population of possible persons. If we are considering the 
choice between two rules q and r, the possible persons we should consider are 
those existing in either or both of the two possible worlds (wq and wr respectively) 
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realised by our choice. Let Q equal the set of individuals existing in wq and R the 
set of individuals existing in wr. The relevant set of possible persons will be the 
union of these two sets. The original position will thus be populated by n = n(Q ∪ 
R) individuals uncertain of their identity. Each contractor seeks to maximise their 
personal utility, which depends both on their probability of being actualised and on 
their utility contingent upon actualisation. Let E(x) represent the expected utility of 
individuals contingent on existing in world wx. Each contractor will prefer 
whichever rule x maximises	  !
 
. Other things equal, contractors prefer rules 
which give them a greater chance of existing and greater utility in the event that 
they do exist. When these two factors conflict, contractors need to weigh a greater 
chance of being actualised against a lower expected utility contingent upon 
actualisation.  
Some have denied that hypothetical contractarianism can meaningfully be modified 
in this way. Parfit states that ‘we cannot assume that, in the actual history of the 
world, it might be true that we never exist. We therefore cannot ask what, on this 
assumption, it would be rational to choose’ (Parfit, 1984, p. 392). This, he says, 
means that the contractual method ‘is not impartial unless we imagine something 
that we cannot possibly imagine.’ It is unclear why Parfit thinks we cannot ponder 
the uncertainty of our own existence. Is it just that our own non-existence is hard to 
imagine? True, but we do not need a very thick description to do moral philosophy. 
Kavka’s paper imagines a hypothetical choice, and the existence of such a paper 
seems to show that at least one human has sufficient imaginative power. Parfit 
might instead mean that we as actual people know that the status quo set of 
institutions has produced a world in which we exist. Our existence supervenes on 
the actual history of the world, and so we have some information that existing 
institutions are good for us, and this adulterates the neutrality of our moral 
reasoning. This may be true, but it applies more broadly and does not preclude the 
possibility of at least attempting to abstract from this bias in order to impartially 
evaluate principles, institutions, or rules.  
Cowen offers a more substantive criticism, arguing that since hypothetical 
contractarianism assumes that those in the original position are self-interested, too 
much weight is given to actualising possible persons. To illustrate his objection, 
Cowen (1989, pp. 39–40) uses the example of ‘Hurka’s Gamble.’55 We are to 
imagine that some omnipotent being offers us a gamble. With probability 0.51 the 
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 Cowen borrows the example from Hurka (1983). 
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current and future population doubles with the average level of utility remaining 
the same; with probability 0.49 the human race is extinguished. In a world of 100 
people each enjoying a payoff of 10, the relevant population of potential persons is 
200. Rejecting the gamble would maintain the status quo, giving each potential 
person a 0.5 probability of earning a payoff of 10 and a 0.5 probability of not 
existing and earning a payoff of 0.   Accepting the Gamble would yield a 0.51 
probability of existing (payoff 10) and a 0.49 probability of not existing (payoff 0). 
Accepting the gamble gives a higher expected payoff (5.1 versus 5), is less risky, 
and does not alter the payoff contingent on existence. As such, it is clearly optimal 
to accept the gamble. Further, it will be rational to accept the gamble however 
many times it is offered. As the number of completed gambles increases, the 
probability of the human race surviving approaches zero. Hypothetical 
contractarianism with possible persons should be rejected, according to Cowen, 
since by giving each potential life equal weight and accepting Hurka’s gamble it 
‘does not [capture] the notion that increasing numbers of individuals do not always 
yield a proportionately better solution’ (Cowen, 1989, p. 40).  
To answer Cowen’s criticism, we need to ask what ‘self-interested’ means in the 
context of the contractarianism. Each potential individual is interested in 
maximising the utility they can expect to enjoy, but this does not imply selfishness 
in the sense of indifference to the welfare of others or to other considerations. If 
individuals have a preference that the human race exists in some form or that as 
many individuals as possible exist independently of their preference for their own 
existence, the payoffs involved in Hurka’s Gamble alter. This would involve a 
departure from selfishness, but not from self-interest in the sense of optimising on 
one’s own preference function. No hypothetical contractor knows their place in 
society, but if the individuals they have a chance of becoming have altruistic or 
non-instrumental preferences, this is a relevant consideration from a self-interested 
point of view. Suppose that each potential individual has a preference of intensity 1 
that the human race exists.56 Since we are engaged in a comparative exercise, the 
preferences of potential individuals are relevant whether or not those individuals 
are actualised. Thus, in a the no-gamble situation, each contractor has a 0.5 
probability of existing and having the human race existing (payoff 11) and a 0.5 
probability of not existing but having the human race remain (payoff 1). The 
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 That is, any person who comes to exist in any world will have this preference. In the 
present case, this means that each of the 100 inhabitants of the no-gamble world receive a 
payoff of 1 from knowing of the existence of the human race. If the gamble is taken and 
won, each of the 200 inhabitants will have a similar preference.   
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Gamble involves a .51 probability of existing and having the human race existing 
(payoff 11) and a .49 probability of not existing and having the human race end 
(payoff 0). The choice is no longer so clear. With payoffs as arbitrarily defined 
here, rejecting the gamble yields a higher expected payoff with lower variance and 
would therefore be preferred by most reasonable decision rules. The contractarian 
method is designed to remove bias by focusing on the preferences which 
individuals actually have. If people are self-interested in a narrow sense, 
contractarianism will produce conclusions many of us consider undesirable.  
As Hurka’s Gamble shows, the results of hypothetical contractarianism are 
vulnerable to misspecified preferences. If we make the wrong assumptions about 
what individuals would choose under ideal circumstances, we will get the wrong 
answer.  This is true of contractarianism generally, and indeed all normative 
approaches which take preferences or interests as evaluative standards. Like formal 
modelling in the social sciences, the contractarian method in normative political 
theory does not guarantee reasonable assumptions, but it does make assumptions 
transparent. In addition to making assumptions more easily evaluable, this enables 
a form of sensitivity analysis as assumptions can be altered and the robustness of 
conclusions across alternative specifications observed.   
5.4. Children’s rights and parents’ incentives  
Parents care deeply about the type of lives their children will live. While most 
parents surely have a good deal of disinterested altruistic concern for their children 
– they simply want them to live a life as valuable as possible – parents also derive 
utility from their children in ways which are not in the child’s best interests. This is 
particularly true of the cases children’s rights laws are designed to deal with. The 
fact that many parents are willing to deny their children medical treatment or 
education despite strong opposition from mainstream society suggests that their 
cultural preferences are strong and deeply-held. In many cases, the welfare of 
children and the preferences of parents seem to be at odds. If, as many liberals 
hold, Christian scientists have mistaken theological views and harm their children 
by denying them life-saving medical treatment, we have a prima facie case for a 
liberal state to step in to protect children, at least on certain interpretations of 
liberalism.57  
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 On interpretations of liberalism which would not make such an assumption, see generally 
Galston (1995), Kukathas (2003), and Levy (2003). 
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Such cases can be usefully considered in light of the economic approach to fertility 
developed by Gary Becker (1960, 1991).58 In this rational choice framework, 
parents are assumed to maximise some preference function, which is positively 
related to services produced by the child as well as other forms of consumption.  A 
child is both consumption good and production good as far as parents are 
concerned. In their capacity as consumption goods, children produce enjoyment, 
pride, or are otherwise directly valued by their parents. In their capacity as 
production goods, children contribute to the production of other goods by working 
within the household or on the labour market. We need not assume here that 
parents are selfish, but that they maximise a utility function which does not 
perfectly reflect the best interests of the child. In some cases such conflict will be 
due to selfishness; in others, to misguided altruism or commitment to some 
impersonal moral creed.  
The unusual relationship between parent and child raises special problems for 
liberal theory. The parent not only has unparalleled power to harm or benefit the 
child, but also controls the very existence of the child. While easy access to birth 
control, abortion, and reproductive technologies have dramatically increased the 
control of fertility in the developed world today, people at all times and places have 
had some control over the number of children, through such mechanisms as 
abstinence, coitus interruptus, and extended breast-feeding. Fertility choices are 
influenced by all sorts of factors (Hondroyiannis, 2010, pp. 34–35). Among these 
factors, I contend, is the extent to which parents can shape the development of their 
children in line with their own preferences. If institutional factors influence the 
very existence of some children, the liberal or utilitarian justifications for 
children’s rights laws become much more complicated.  
Raising children is costly, and parents respond to incentives when making fertility 
decisions. Factors such as income, opportunity costs, and fiscal policies will 
influence the number of children people choose to have. So too will the expected 
quality of children defined in terms of the degree to which the child produces 
tangible and intangible services valued by parents. Children’s rights laws which 
restrict parental sovereignty, if they are to alter the behaviour of targeted parents 
and ruling out strict indifference, necessarily reduce the quality of children in this 
sense. Under a rational choice framework, the fact that parents are choosing to treat 
their children in certain ways reveals that they prefer the state of affairs in which 
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they so treat their children. By passing laws which prevent such treatment, we 
tighten their budget constraint and lower their welfare. More importantly, we 
change the relative price of child services. Assuming that the costs of raising 
children remain the same, children’s rights laws will make it more expensive to 
produce a unit of child service.  
If we assume continuous demand for children, and barring the possibility that child 
services are Giffen goods, this will straightforwardly reduce the quantity of child 
services demanded, as shown in figure 5.1. The vertical axis represents the quantity 
of child services C, and the horizontal axis represents the quantity of all other 
goods, X. The budget constraint BC1 shows the possible combinations of child 
services and other goods the parent could produce given the resources they have 
available in a world without child protection laws. Given the parents’ preferences 
as represented by the indifference curves I1 and I2, the parent will demand child 
services in quantity Q1. With the introduction of a children’s rights law, the 
production function which transforms child-rearing inputs into child services 
becomes less technologically efficient, and this increases the price of children, thus 
pushing the budget constraint inwards to BC2 and increasing the relative price of 
child services, as reflected in the altered slope of the budget constraint. This will 
reduce the quantity of child services demanded from Q1 to Q2.   
Figure 5.1: Children's rights and the demand for children 
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A recognition of the fact that child services are not entirely continuous – that is, the 
parent is not able to produce at any point value but is rather constrained to a set of 
discrete options – complicates the analysis somewhat and means that children’s 
rights laws would probabilistically reduce the quantity of child services demanded. 
Given sufficiently many parents with varying budget constraints and indifference 
curves, however, the discrete case would approximate the continuous case 
described above. 
Of course, child services are not the same thing as children. Economic theorists of 
fertility have long recognised that there is a trade-off between the quantity and 
quality of children (Becker & Lewis, 1973). That is, a parent may have many 
children and derive a little satisfaction from each or may invest heavily in one or 
two children in order to derive greater per-child satisfaction. Fertility decline in the 
developed world seems to reflect a shift from quantity to quality in this sense.  
Thus, it is possible for the situation in figure 5.1 to be realised without a decrease 
in the number of children born. Rather, the parent invests less in each child. This is 
likely true for some parents and some types of legal protections, but it seems a 
priori likely that in some cases a reduction in the demand for child services will be 
accompanied by a reduction in the number of children produced. Indeed, there are 
some empirical cases where legal restrictions do seem to have had an effect on 
fertility.  
One such case is the prohibition of child labour. Child labour is not necessarily bad 
for children, since some households are so poor that child labour is necessary for 
survival. Under such conditions, even purely altruistic parents would send their 
children to work and restrictions on their ability to do so would be bad for children 
(Basu & Van, 1998). The analysis here is concerned with cases in which there is a 
genuine conflict of interest – i.e. the child would be better off not working. Formal 
theoretic models have generally concluded that restrictions on child labour will 
tend to reduce fertility (Dessy, 2000; Doepke, 2004). While there has been little 
rigorous empirical investigation of this question, that evidence which does exist 
supports this conclusion. This evidence is indirect in the sense that it suggests that 
child labour market conditions which alter the economic value of children to 
parents, rather than regulation per se, have an effect on fertility. It should be 
obvious that certain labour-market restrictions will reduce the economic value to 
parents of children. If we can know empirically that lower value tends to depress 
fertility, it is reasonable to conclude that certain types of regulation will reduce 
fertility. Early studies showed that child participation in the labour market tend to 
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coincide with high birth rates (Schultz, 1970). This tells us very little, however, 
since high birth rates could easily be causally responsible for high rates of child 
labour.  Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) show that high child wage rates in India 
are correlated with high levels of fertility and take this as evidence that parents 
respond to economic opportunities by having more children. Levy (1985) finds 
similar evidence in Egypt. While correlational studies of this sort can never rule out 
omitted variable bias, there is no obvious alternative explanation. If a law is 
implemented which prevents parents from sending their children to work, fertility 
will be affected, at least in a probabilistic sense. Children in poor countries are a 
productive asset for households, and anything which reduces their productivity will 
increase the relative price of child services and potentially reduce fertility.  
Another case is the prohibition of gamete donor anonymity. A number of theorists 
have argued that children have a right to knowledge of their genetic heritage and 
that the anonymous donation of sperm or ova violates this right (Cowden, 2012; 
Frith, 2001). Without knowledge of who their biological parents are, it is argued, 
children are unable to form a coherent sense of identity. If we accept this argument 
and given that many donors wish to remain anonymous, prohibition of anonymous 
donation is a protection of children against the preference of their donor parents.59 
Such prohibitions harm some donors and benefit some children in a justifiable way. 
In recent years, many countries have used this logic to justify prohibitions of 
anonymous donation (Turkmendag, Dingwall, & Murphy, 2008, pp. 283–284). It 
has been pointed out that prohibition might reduce donation rates, since prospective 
donors might worry about being identified and contacted by donor-conceived 
offspring. Since there is already a perceived shortage of suitable gamete donors, 
prohibiting anonymous donation makes it more difficult for recipient parents to 
have children (Pennings, 2001). This is normally framed as a normative problem 
insofar as it is bad for potential recipient parents, but under the framework I am 
adopting here we can also see it as affecting potential children by making their 
realisation less likely. 
In UK survey research, the potential for identification by and contact from 
offspring were the most-cited concern among semen donors. Forty-six percent 
stated concern that law changes would allow offspring to identify them once they 
reached adulthood, and thirty-seven percent expressed concern about being 
contacted by offspring. These reasons were also highly cited by non-donors, 
                                                     
59
 Things get more complicated when we consider the interests of the social parents. I 
ignore these complications here since they do not affect the general thrust of the example.  
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though they were not so dominant. Sixty-eight percent of donors stated that they 
would not be willing to donate if the law changed to allow their name to be 
revealed to offspring once they reached eighteen years of age (Cook & Golombok, 
1995). Other studies have shown more modest effects, but all existing survey 
research suggests that a significant proportion of donors would rather not donate in 
the absence of anonymity.60   
Survey research has its limitations when used to predict behaviour, of course, but 
other forms of empirical evidence seem to point in the same direction. Political 
debates and eventual law changes prohibiting anonymous semen donation in the 
UK and the Netherlands have coincided with sharp reductions in donation rates 
(Janssens, Simons, Van Kooij, Blokzijl, & Dunselman, 2006; Paul, Harbottle, & 
Stewart, 2006). More convincingly, many prospective parents are willing to travel 
internationally in order to undergo assisted reproduction in jurisdictions without 
donor anonymity prohibitions (Pennings, 2010). As the Dutch law came into effect, 
for example, clinics in Belgium, and particularly those near the Dutch border, saw 
a large increase in Dutch patients (Ombelet, 2007; Pennings et al., 2009). 
These two cases are suggestive that laws designed to protect children from bad 
parents can sometimes reduce the number of children born. Theoretically, we 
should expect this effect to apply more broadly. Laws designed to protect children 
from their parents lower the value of children to their parents, and the economic 
analysis of fertility outlined above suggests that this will sometimes prompt 
prospective parents to have otherwise desired children. In many cases the effect 
will be minor, but in some it could be quite significant. The purpose of this paper is 
not to show that any particular piece of children’s rights legislation is undesirable 
due to its antinatalist effects, but to show theoretically that there is normatively-
relevant issue which needs to be considered across a range of cases.    
One argument in the utility function of many parents will be the cultural 
development of the child in particular directions. Other things equal, limits on 
parental sovereignty will shift the parent’s cost-benefit analysis away from having 
a child. While this effect will surely be inframarginal for most fertility decisions, it 
will just as surely tip the analysis in some cases and reduce the number of children 
born to illiberal parents. 
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donation, see Brett et al (2008).  
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The lives of children subject to illiberal practices, we shall suppose, are worse than 
they would have been could they have avoided those practices. If 
those lives would have been worth living, however, we face a normative trade
between more and better lives. I am here interested in the set of rules which are 
best for the relevant population of children, and so ignore the welfare of pare
and any positive or negative externalities population imposes on third parties. The 
next section, in order to evaluate this trade
outlined in section 5.3.
Before conside
consider a baseline model in which a child, knowing she will actually exist, 
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R gives Child payoff b and parent payoff y. In situations such as this, it is clear that 
Child should choose P. Child can earn a by choosing P. Since the parent’s 
dominant strategy is R, playing P gives the child a higher payoff and we can 
confidently conclude that in such situations children’s rights laws are good for 
children.61  
The hypothetical child needs also to consider the effect of institutions on Parent’s 
willingness to have children. After the child has chosen whether or not to legislate 
Parent chooses whether to have a child (C) or not (¬C). If Child chooses to protect 
at stage one, Parent has control over their fertility but not the decision of whether to 
restrict. For (¬P, C), Parent chooses whether to restrict (R) or not (¬R). Parent 
heterogeneity is important here. My suggestion is that some parents will choose to 
have children if and only if there is no law restricting parental autonomy. That is, 
for some parent i: ui(¬P, C)> ui(¬P, ¬C)˄ui(P,C)< ui(P, ¬C), where ui(X,Y) 
represents the payoff to i of the solution (X,Y). There are five possible parental 
types, illustrated in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Parental types 
 P ¬P 
Weakly illiberal C (C,R) 
Strongly illiberal ¬C (C,R) 
Liberal C (C,¬R)   
Nervous liberal  C ¬C 
Non-breeder ¬C ¬C 
 
Children’s rights law is designed to change the behaviour of the weakly illiberal 
and strongly illiberal parents, and indeed the behaviour of these types is changed 
by introduction of a law: the weakly illiberal have children but do not restrict their 
autonomy and the strongly illiberal choose not to have children at all. The choices 
of liberal and non-breeding parents are not affected by the law, with liberals always 
having children and giving them autonomy and non-breeders never having 
children. Another possibility is a ‘nervous liberal’ – one who has children if and 
only if children’s rights laws are enacted. This could be because the parent prefers 
                                                     
61
 Parent’s payoff here includes any independent preference that Child receives a high 
payoff.  
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not to bring children into a society with illiberal practices or because they worry 
about dying before the child is raised and having their new guardian restrict their 
autonomy. Protective laws would thus operate as a type of insurance.  
With respect to the choice between P and ¬P, the children of liberal and weakly 
illiberal parents are necessary persons, the children of non-breeders are impossible 
persons, and the children of strongly illiberal and nervous liberal parents are 
contingent persons. Contingent persons are clearly affected by the choice between 
P and ¬P, and so too are the children of weakly illiberal parents. Though they are 
necessary persons, their welfare varies across alternatives. The groups affected by 
the decision at hand are the children of strongly illiberal (S), weakly illiberal (W) 
and nervous liberal parents (L), meaning that we can ignore the other groups.  The 
entire population of relevant possible persons, N, is the union of these sets and has 
cardinality n.  
To model this, we assume that a hypothetical child chooses between P and ¬P, 
knowing that nature will then assign them a parental type (S, W, or L) based on the 
(exogenous) relative number of parental types in the population. Once parental type 
has been determined, parent will choose between C and ¬C. If child chooses ¬P 
and parent chooses C, parent will then choose between R and ¬R. Child earns a 
payoff of a for an autonomous existence, b for a nonautonomous existence, and c 
for non-existence, with a≻b≻c.62 Parents of type S have the payoff ranking d≻e≻f; 
W: g≻h≻i; and L: j≻k≻l≻m. All illiberal parents (S and W) most prefer to have a 
child and restrict their autonomy (payoffs d and g). Weakly illiberal parents prefer 
an autonomous child (h) to none at all (i), while strongly illiberal parents prefer to 
                                                     
62
 Some types of non-autonomous existence may be worse than not existing, in which case 
Child’s preference ordering would be a ≻ c ≻ b. When discussing the right of parents to 
severely abuse their children such an ordering might be relevant and would remove the 
trade-off between more and better lives (since marginal lives would have negative value). 
In most cases where children’s rights laws are up for debate, however, a non-autonomous 
existence is on average better than nothing. Few would deny that women generally live 
worthwhile lives despite clitoridectomy, though they might be significantly less worthwhile 
than they otherwise would have been. In this paper I am concerned with laws for which the 
proscribed activity would reduce the victim’s welfare but not by so much that their life is 
not worth living. An interesting extension of my argument would be to consider cases in 
which mild restriction reduced welfare but did not reverse the ranking of life and non-
existence while extreme restrictions did make life worse than nothing. If some parents 
would engage in extreme restrictions and others mild restrictions and if a law could prohibit 
extreme restriction only by also prohibiting mild restriction, we would have another trade-
off to consider. The sets S and W could each be divided into two sets, those who would 
engage in mild and extreme restriction respectively. This would increase the desirability of 
legislation, and the strength of this effect would depend on relative number of extremely 
and mildly restrictive parents. Since I think the politically relevant case overwhelmingly 
involve cases in which restriction almost always leaves the child with a life worth living I 
do not incorporate this possibility into the analysis.          
 remain childless (
Nervous liberal parents prefer to have a child under P (
but prefer to be childless under 
autonomy (
illiberal others (
first). 
Figure 
 
Once Child has chosen between 
and 
parents will play (
plays
other hand, will play 
b≻
Since nature’s choice is determined by the relative populations of 
parents and each has a dominant response to any choice between 
simplify the choice problem faced by Child. 
togethe
n(W) + n(L) = n)
L)/n
autonomous with 
below. 
 
L
c). When nature plays 
 
 
5.
, each parental type has a dominant strategy. If Child plays 
 S, Parent will play 
r exhaust the population of possible parents (i.e.  
and fails to exist with probability 
 
3: Chil
m) or not themselves restricting but worrying about the influence of 
l
dren's right with endogenous fertility
e) rather than have a child and not restrict its autonomy (
). This situation is represented in figure 
C,R
.  Under 
n(S 
), and 
C
∪
. When nature plays 
W
 W)/n
¬C
 or 
P, child exists and is autonomous with probability 
 
L 
 and child will never exist. 
L
and fails to exist with 
P
parents will play 
, Child is better off playing 
¬P
 and 
 to having children and restricting their 
¬P
n(S)/n
 
S
and nature has chosen between 
, Child is better off playing 
. Under ¬P, child exists and is non
S, 
¬C
W, and 
n(L)/n
j
 
. If Child
) to not having a child (
W
n(S 
. This is shown figure 
5.
 and 
P (since 
L are disjoint sets and 
3 (Child’s payoff is 
 play 
P 
∪ W 
L parents, on the 
a
and 
∪
¬P
P 
≻
S
 L) = n(S) + 
, S
and nature 
¬P
b and
, W
¬P
 and 
 (since 
 
, and 
, we can 
n(W 
109
S, W
a≻
5.
 
f). 
k), 
, 
W 
c). 
L 
∪ 
-
4 
 
110
 
Figure 
Protective legislation 
children, but it is possible that the number of children born will be greater under 
than 
depends straightforwardly on whether there are more stro
liberal parents.  If n
viewpoint of a hypothetical child behind the veil of ignorance constructed here. In 
this case they will be at least as likely to exist and as u
hi
population will be larger under 
trade
being born. 
What would a rational possible child choose in this situation? Setting aside risk 
preference, the answer depends on two factors: the size of 
and the intensity of preference for an autonomous existence o
autonomous one relative to the intensity of preference for a non
existence over non
L 
be
from 
existence and 
proportion of 
for 
 
gher payoff if they are actuali
that matters, but the magnitude of the difference between 
tween 
L
5.
¬P
-off between the probability of being born and their payoff 
P 
.  
4: A decision
. Since the children of 
S 
to 
 
and 
¬P
W
 moves 
L children from an autonomous existence to non
W 
-existence. It is not simply sign of the difference between 
. Children of 
and 
P
(L) 
L
-theoretic simplification
 is Pareto superior to 
≥ n(S),
W
 parent
 children from an autonomous to a non
 
W
s makes 
W
protective legislation is clearly desirable from the 
sed. If 
¬P
 and 
 parents exist in either case, this possibility 
. This means that the potential child faces a 
L
n(S) > n(L), 
 parents are worse off under 
P more desirable, and the effect is stronger 
¬P
 
 when we consider on
on the other hand, the reali
ngly illiberal or nervous 
nder 
S in relation to 
S 
¬P
and 
-existence. A higher 
 and will enjoy a 
L 
¬P
ly actuali
conditional on 
ver a non
-autonomous 
as well as that 
.  Switching 
-autonomous 
W and 
s
s
S and 
ed 
P 
ed 
L, 
-
 
111 
 
Preference intensity also matters. If a-b is small relative to b-c, the low marginal 
benefit of autonomy will make a choice of ¬P more likely. In other words, strong 
preferences for existence and approximate indifference between types of existence 
make whichever option maximises actualised population more attractive, and when 
n(S) > n(L) this will be ¬P.  Another factor is risk preference. For n(S) > n(L), 
¬P’s payoffs will have lower variance and risk-averse decision-makers will tend to 
prefer it. Assuming risk neutrality, a rational hypothetical child behind the 
thickened veil of ignorance used here will prefer not to enact protective legislation 
whenever (b-c)(n(S ∪ W )/n) > (a-c)(n(W ∪ L)/n). This will be so even when the 
child knows full well that, if they come to exist, their choice will allow parents to 
abuse their authority in ways which make their life significantly worse.  
For any concrete policy choice, we cannot reach a firm normative conclusion 
without precisely specifying many things which cannot be precisely specified in 
practice: the relative value of an autonomous and nonautonomous existence, risk 
preference in the absence of particularised interests, and the number of strongly 
illiberal parents will affect the decision calculus of the possible person in this 
situation. What we can do, based on reasonable assumptions, is conclude that there 
is a potentially normatively-relevant issue which has thus far been ignored. While 
it may be that fertility will be higher with children’s rights laws or that the 
autonomy produced by such laws outweigh the forgone lives, we cannot be sure of 
this and it should not easily be assumed if we place normative weight on those 
‘voices from another world’ (C. Hare, 2007) whose existence some otherwise 
desirable policies might thwart.  
We can also reach some conclusions about when children’s rights laws might be 
less desirable with respect to the antinatalist effects described above. Generally, a 
hypothetical child will be more willing to enact children’s rights laws when the 
probability of being born to weakly illiberal or nervous liberal parents is higher, 
and when the relative advantage of autonomy is greater. While the latter conclusion 
is unsurprising, the former is worth emphasising. Intuition suggests that children’s 
rights legislation would be more desirable when parents are very illiberal. The 
argument here suggests that the existence of many parents so illiberal that they 
would only be willing to have children if allowed to restrict their autonomy is a 
reason not to legislate for children’s rights.  
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5.6 Conclusion 
Even if we restrict moral standing to children, there are important trade-offs when 
considering the desirability of legislation designed to protect children from their 
parents. Parents have great control over the welfare and development of their 
children, and when interests diverge there seems to be a prima facie case for state 
intervention. At the same time, parent’s ultimate control over the very existence of 
children provides reason for caution. If the contractarian method adopted here is 
accepted as a way of simulating impartial evaluation of competing values, laws 
which are good for some actual children and bad for none might still be considered 
harmful for children generally in an abstract but important sense.  
The situation here is an instance of a broader phenomenon familiar to political 
economists. Many policies have unintended consequences which are predictable 
but impossible to specify or observe empirically. Frédéric Bastiat (1995) 
distinguished between the seen and the unseen effects of policies, arguing that the 
task of the economist is to look beyond the immediate and visible effects of a 
policy and consider the invisible but analytically foreseeable consequences. Those 
children protected from parental mistreatment are visible and (imperfectly) 
specifiable. Those children never born as a result of regulation are invisible and 
nonspecific. This paper has argued that such invisibility should not diminish their 
moral standing. More generally, we should subject normative theory to positive 
analysis in order to uncover the unseen effects of proposals which seem clearly 
desirable at first glance. Such feasibility analysis is an indispensable component of 
any normative theorising which seeks to inform real-world choices (Brennan & 
Hamlin, 2009). 
Rules never tell people precisely how to behave. Rather, rules cut off certain 
options but leave others open. If rules are made in the hope of preventing one type 
of harmful action but leave more harmful alternatives on the table, desirability is 
far from assured. The situation here is closely analogous to that of minimum wage 
laws in logical structure. While these laws are intended to protect vulnerable 
workers from unfair treatment by employers, they do not mandate that vulnerable 
workers are hired and receive decent wages. Rather, they mandate reasonable 
wages conditional on employment, and this will prompt employers to hire fewer 
low-productivity (i.e. vulnerable) workers. Minimum wage laws will increase the 
wages of some relatively vulnerable workers but will tend to push the most 
vulnerable out of work altogether (Gorman, 2002). Just as the existence of many 
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highly vulnerable workers on low wages shows us that there is a problem but also 
indicates that the most obvious policy solution might do more harm than good, the 
existence of many parents strongly committed to raising their children in ways 
which hamper the development of autonomy does not necessarily provide an 
argument for prohibition on welfarist grounds.  
This is not to say that such abuses of parental authority should be ignored, 
however. While rational possible children may prefer a regime of parental 
sovereignty to one characterised by broad negative sanctions, there may be other 
incentive schemes which encourage liberal treatment without depressing fertility. 
Interestingly, imperfect enforcement of children’s rights laws could be beneficial 
here. I have assumed above that legislation is absolutely binding. If we relax this 
assumption and admit that some people will break the law and accept punishment 
with some probability, we can see a legal prohibition as imposing an additional 
cost on undesirable actions. Those with a weak preference for the prohibited 
activity will be unwilling to pay this cost, while those with very strong preferences 
will. Thus, imperfectly enforced prohibitions might encourage liberal treatment 
while allowing the strongly illiberal to have children and (unlawfully) raise them in 
accordance with their preferences. This would not completely resolve the trade-off 
between rights protection and fertility, since the cost of breaking the law will be a 
decisive factor in some fertility choices. It may be the case, however, that weakly 
enforced laws with various loopholes are preferable to stronger laws in some cases.   
Moreover, laws interact with preferences and norms in various ways (Cooter, 1998; 
Sunstein, 1996). An obvious possibility arises when we consider the model above 
dynamically, with today’s children becoming tomorrow’s parents. If parental type 
is heritable via upbringing, the distribution of parental types will be endogenous to 
the choice between P and ¬P in previous periods. Children’s rights protections 
would put the strongly illiberal at a reproductive disadvantage. Though the 
normative position adopted here would see these missing generations as 
regrettable, it is plausible that under some conditions other groups would increase 
their fertility to compensate. If that were the case the normative analysis would 
need to be much more complicated than that presented above.  
Another possibility is that the preferences of particular parents are endogenous to 
institutions. This could happen directly via a psychological reaction to policy. 
Parents might respond to legislation by internalising the liberal norms embodied 
therein. On the other hand, unpopular laws might provoke backlash from parents 
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and reinforcement of illiberal attitudes. Social factors suggest that law might affect 
preferences indirectly. It may be, as Mackie (1996) argues, that certain cultural 
practices such as female genital mutilation are instead the result of a suboptimal 
cultural norm which parents prefer to follow only when such norms are 
widespread, suggesting that legislation might facilitate escape from a suboptimal 
equilibrium.63 These issues need to be weighed up on a case-by-case basis. In some 
cases the protective benefits of children’s rights laws will outweigh the costs. In 
others, the apparent trade-off may be illusory in the long term. The argument 
presented here, however, shows that the mere existence of vulnerable children and 
bad parents does not necessarily justify protective intervention.  
  
                                                     
63
 Mackie suggests that wide-spread foot-binding and female genital mutilation result from 
suboptimal equilibria maintained by expectations in the marriage market. While everyone, 
or at least all victims of the practices, would be better off if they could simultaneously agree 
that the practices end, this is usually prevented by coordination problems.  
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6. Analytic Radicalism  
Abstract: Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional 
conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk 
aversion. This note modifies this argument for ‘analytic conservatism’ by allowing 
jurisdictional exit in response to institutional decline. By providing a welfare floor 
which limits the cost of failure, exit reverses the normative implications of Brennan 
and Hamlin’s argument, making risk-neutral agents quasi-risk seeking and 
justifying a radical disposition to reform under some circumstances.  
6.1. Introduction 
Conservatives argue that the complexity of the social world and the limits of 
human foresight make a systematic bias towards the status quo desirable. Brennan 
and Hamlin (2004, 2006) have sought to analytically define this conservative 
disposition and to argue for its general desirability from the normative perspective 
of modern economics.64 This paper examines the reach of this argument by 
showing that exit options are capable of inverting the normative implications of the 
analytic conservatism model. Thus, we have an argument for ‘analytic radicalism’ 
given certain conditions to parallel Brennan and Hamlin’s argument for ‘analytic 
conservatism.’ 
6.2. Analytic conservatism 
Conservatives such as Burke (1790) and Oakeshott (1947, 1962) have based their 
position in part on the limits of human foresight and planning. While received 
institutions are always imperfect and could potentially be improved through 
reform, such reform always carries some risk of failure. If implementation fails or 
the policy gives rise to unintended consequences, reform may prove undesirable ex 
post. A reform is always a gamble, and the conservative position is that such 
gambles are generally undesirable. Conservatism in this sense is not a fully-
specified political ideology, but rather a disposition which can be combined with 
other substantive ideological commitments such as a concern for liberty, equality, 
or efficiency.65  
                                                     
64
 For other rational choice discussions of institutional conservatism, see Congleton (2011) 
and Kuran (1988).  
65
 On political dispositions, see generally Hamlin  (2006).  
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Brennan and Hamlin (2004, 2006) attempt to ground the conservative disposition 
in the standard normative framework of economics by showing that risk neutral 
agents will often behave as if they are risk averse.66 This argument rests on the 
convexity of preferences67 and resulting concavity of value functions, which imply 
that deviations from ideal conditions will produce increasingly large reductions in 
utility. This creates an asymmetry between gains and losses relative to any status 
quo point  (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2004, pp. 684–690).  
This asymmetry can be seen in Figure 6.1. The vertical axis represents value, 
which depends on institutional quality. Suppose that the status quo level of 
institutional quality is Qs, which produces value of Vs. A reform is proposed which 
will increase or decrease institutional quality by the same amount – to Ql and Qw 
respectively – with equal probability. A decision maker risk-neutral with respect to 
institutional quality would have no basis for choosing between reform and inaction, 
since expected institutional quality is the same in either case. The concavity of the 
value function, however, means that the gain in utility of moving from Qs to Qw is 
less than the loss of moving from Qs to Ql, and a risk-neutral value maximiser 
would choose to maintain the status quo. Indeed, many bets with significantly 
positive expected returns in terms of institutional quality would be refused by a 
risk-neutral agent.   
Figure 6.1: Concave value and analytic conservatism  
 
                                                     
66
 Brennan and Buchanan’s (1981, 1983, 2000, pp. 54–59) earlier arguments for 
systematically pessimistic assumptions regarding human nature for comparative 
institutional analysis are logically similar to Brennan and Hamlin’s argument for analytic 
radicalism. My use of the term ‘quasi-risk aversion’ comes from Brennan and Buchanan 
(2000, p. 54).   
67
 An agent has convex preferences over some set of goods if averages are preferred to 
extremes. More precisely, preferences are convex in case any bundle which is a weighted 
average of two bundles on the same indifference curve is at least at valued as either of the 
original bundles.   
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6.3. Analytic radicalism 
That a risk-neutral decision maker will be ‘quasi-risk averse’ with respect to 
institutions provides a general reason for adopting a conservative disposition. 
While some proposed reforms will remain desirable, analytic conservatism 
suggests that the burden of proof lies with the reformer. Simply showing that the 
expected change in institutional quality is positive is not enough; we also need to 
consider the shape of the function relating institutional quality to social welfare. 
Like ‘conservatism,’ the term ‘radicalism’ has taken on substantive connotations 
regarding the type of institutions which should govern society. We can, however, 
consider radicalism in dispositional terms as a tendency to boldly seek reform, 
whatever one’s substantive ideological commitments are.68 Moreover, the radical 
disposition can be justified as appropriate to certain circumstances using the same 
analytic and normative framework Brennan and Hamlin use to justify 
conservatism.  
Preference convexity and the resulting concavity of value functions are common 
assumptions in economic analysis, since they are intuitively appealing and seem to 
be generally true as an empirical claim about humans. Decreasing marginal value is 
not an immutable feature of the universe, however, and there are real-world cases 
in which marginal utility is increasing over some ranges.69 If preferences are 
concave and thus value functions convex, the normative implications of Brennan 
and Hamlin’s argument for analytic conservatism are reversed. Consider Figure 
6.2. Here, the convexity of the value function means that a fair gamble in terms of 
institutional quality will produce an increase in expected value. Since the potential 
gains exceed the potential losses, a decision maker risk-neutral regarding value 
would be biased towards experimentation rather than conservatism. Thus, in such 
situations we have a welfarist justification for analytic radicalism to parallel 
Brennan and Hamlin’s justification for analytic conservatism.  
 
                                                     
68
 Brennan and Hamlin contrast conservatism with ‘idealism.’ I avoid that term here 
because their conceptualisation of idealism is focused very much on a desire to reach some 
ideal point rather than on institutional change generally. An acceptable alternative to 
‘radicalism’ for my purposes would be ‘progressivism.’   
69
 For example, indivisibilities in consumption can produce increasing marginal utility of 
income over certain ranges where a continuous function would produce uniform 
diminishing returns. This might explain the allegedly irrational practice of simultaneously 
buying lottery tickets and insurance (M. Friedman & Savage, 1948; Kwang, 1965).  
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Figure 6.2: Convex value and analytic radicalism  
 
While the range of situations in which analytic radicalism applies may be narrow, 
there is at least one context in which the argument presented above is relevant: 
environments with high levels of interjurisdictional mobility. When institutional 
quality degrades, citizens may respond by leaving the jurisdiction and settling 
elsewhere (Hirschman, 1970). If there are many jurisdictions among which citizens 
can move at low cost, people will vote with their feet for the institutions which best 
match their preferences (Tiebout, 1956).70 The existence of such outside options 
changes the risk profile of institutional reform, since downside risks are limited to 
the value of the next-best option. 
In a frictionless Tiebout world of costless mobility and sufficiently many 
jurisdictions that every individual is indifferent between staying put and moving to 
some other jurisdiction (i.e. there are perfect substitutes to their current 
jurisdiction), reform would carry no downside welfare risk at all. If some reform 
fails in a particular jurisdiction, each citizen would avoid the cost by exiting and 
enjoying precisely the same level of welfare as the status quo in which there is no 
reform and they stay put. The potential benefits of reform remain, however, as 
citizens reap the benefits of improved institutional quality. We thus have a very 
asymmetric gamble: gains can be enjoyed but losses can be avoided at no cost.   
If we relax the assumptions of the Tiebout model to admit mobility costs and only 
imperfect substitute jurisdictions, the central conclusion that outside options limit 
downside risk remains. Figure 6.3 shows the effect of this on the risk profile of 
reform. Here, the institutional value function (the solid curve) incorporates the 
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 People move for many reasons, but institutional factors do seem to be a factor in 
locational decisions. See Dowding et al (1994) for an overview of the empirical evidence.   
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possibility of exit by being flat at levels of Q with value less than the next-best 
alternative, Vl. The exit option is not as attractive as the status quo of Vs, but the 
existence of a welfare floor at Vl makes the institutional value function convex on 
some ranges of Q. Potential gains outweigh potential losses, and a risk-neutral 
decision maker will be risk-seeking with respect to such institutional gambles.71   
Figure 6.3: Exit and analytic radicalism 
 
When there are sufficiently strong outside options, citizens will often be quasi-risk 
seeking with respect to institutional quality, and a radical disposition to 
policymaking will be preferable to conservatism or risk-neutrality under these 
conditions: the potential benefits of reform should be weighed more heavily than 
the potential costs of failure, thereby creating a systematic bias towards reform.  
6.4. Conclusion 
The argument for analytic radicalism suggests that a decentralised system of 
competing governments is capable of robustly generating citizen welfare without 
relying on the stability of a relatively static set of institutions. This enables 
institutional experimentation without the risks such experimentation would 
normally entail. Successful reforms are obviously desirable for those within the 
reforming jurisdiction, but institutional experimentation also provides positive 
informational externalities which benefit outsiders. When one jurisdiction enacts a 
policy with uncertain consequences, the eventual outcome becomes public 
knowledge and could potentially inform reform efforts elsewhere, producing 
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 Becker and Posner (2005) use similar logic to explain apparently risk-seeking behaviour 
on the part of the extremely poor and unhappy, with the option of suicide providing a 
welfare floor.  
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innovation analogous to that seen in competitive economic markets (Vanberg & 
Kerber, 1994; Vihanto, 1992).  
Tiebout competition characterises one set of circumstances in which analytic 
conservatism must give way to analytic radicalism, and there may be others. An 
interesting possibility is the situation facing seriously misgoverned societies today. 
Oakeshott (1962, p. 169) sees the conservatism as ‘a disposition appropriate to a 
man who is acutely aware of having something to lose which he has learned to care 
for.’ Downside risks exist only to the extent that things can get worse. ‘If the 
present is arid, offering little or nothing to be used or enjoyed, then this 
[conservative] inclination will be weak or absent’ (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 169). It may 
be that Oakeshott’s insight that conservatism is a disposition suited for the well-off 
applies at a societal, as well as an individual, level. If there is a certain level of 
institutional quality – the Hobbesian jungle or an extremely predatory state – below 
which it is impossible to fall, we have a welfare floor similar to that created by exit 
options. Given that dictatorial governments seem to exhibit higher variance in 
governance quality than democracies, such an argument could provide an 
efficiency justification for the apparently reckless political preferences of those in 
poor countries.72 While the claim that a radical disposition is appropriate to such 
societies would require some serious empirical and theoretical justification, it is far 
from obvious that Brennan and Hamlin’s argument for a conservative disposition is 
appropriate here and a radical disposition seems to be a plausible contender.  
Radicals recognise that political institutions could be much better than they 
actually are; conservatives recognise that they could be much worse. Each side of 
this dispositional divide has a point, and there is always a conflict between the 
possibility of progress and the risk of decline. Brennan and Hamlin provide sound 
reasons for a risk-neutral agent to adopt a conservative disposition in many 
circumstances. This paper has described conditions under which a similarly-
motivated agent should instead throw caution to the wind and boldly seek 
institutional improvement. While such conditions might be rare, it is important to 
mark the boundaries of the normative argument for analytic conservatism and to 
consider its alternatives.    
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 It’s important to note that such preferences are massively over-determined and that an 
efficiency justification is not necessarily a causal explanation.  
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7. Entry Barriers and Tiebout Competition 
(co-authored with Patri Friedman) 
Abstract: Existing analyses of Tiebout competition have treated the free movement 
of people among many jurisdictions as necessary and sufficient conditions for 
meaningful competition. This paper argues for the importance of entrepreneurial 
entry – i.e. the creation of new jurisdictions – to the governance market and 
suggests that barriers to entry should be seen as the primary impediment to robust 
and effective competition among governments. Innovation requires that 
entrepreneurs can implement new ideas at low cost, and this entrepreneurship is 
the only meaningful protection against the threats of centralisation, collusion, rent-
seeking, and inertia.   
7.1. Introduction 
The existing literature on Tiebout competition has seen individual mobility and the 
number of jurisdictions as the defining features of meaningful competition among 
governments. If individuals are free to move among multiple jurisdictions, threats 
of exit will limit the power of governments and promote institutional innovation 
(G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; S. Sinn, 1992; Tiebout, 1956; Vihanto, 1992). We 
argue that the costs of creating autonomous new jurisdictions – i.e. barriers to 
entering the market for governance – are an important and neglected requirement 
for effective and robust competition. As Israel Kirzner (1973, 1997) and other 
Austrian economists have argued, the level of competition in a given market does 
not depend on the number of size of competing firms, but the extent to which the 
entrepreneurs can enter.   
Barriers to entry have been defined variously in terms of pricing behavior (Bain, 
1968, p. 252) or cost asymmetries between incumbents and potential entrants 
(Stigler, 1968, p. 63). These definitions are problematic insofar as they define entry 
barriers in terms of their supposed effects or exclude some important barriers 
(Demsetz, 1982; R. J. Gilbert, 1989, pp. 476–478).  We here follow Gilbert (1989, 
p. 478) in defining an entry barrier as ‘a rent that is derived from incumbency.’ 
This definition is agnostic on the concrete features which block entry, but captures 
the essential point that incumbents often have an exploitable advantage which 
discourages newcomers from entering the market.  
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This is a wider definition of entry barriers than many will be willing to accept, 
since it includes rents deriving from scarcity or asset specificity (McAfee, Mialon, 
& Williams, 2004). While we agree that such rents are often policy-irrelevant, we 
hope to show that they are an important positive and normative consideration when 
it comes to Tiebout competition. One cannot understand the incumbency advantage 
of existing nation states without considering the scarcity rents deriving from 
sovereignty over land. A narrow definition which excludes such rents is simply not 
appropriate here. Our broad definition of entry barriers precludes the possibility of 
their complete absence – industry-specific capital requirements and scarcity rents 
are unavoidable features of economic life – but this does not rule out the concept of 
free entry being used as an analytic device and normative standard.  
In the case of government, entry entails the creation of a new jurisdiction.73 New 
jurisdictions may be formed through the colonisation of an inhabited or 
uninhabited area, the centralised creation of subnational governmental units, 
secession, or the collapse of an existing jurisdiction and subsequent state-
formation. A barrier to entry in the governance market is thus any rent accruing to 
existing jurisdictions deriving from the fact that they are established entities. Such 
barriers are currently extremely high. We argue that lowering entry barriers in this 
sense is the fundamental challenge for those wishing to promote effective 
competition among governments. Our definition of entry barriers encompasses the 
limits of citizen mobility, since immobile citizens provide a captive rent which 
discourages entry by reducing potential market share (R. J. Gilbert, 1989, pp. 506–
508). Entry may also be constrained by institutional barriers, the irrecoverable 
capital costs of setting up a new jurisdiction, and the perceived legitimacy of 
existing jurisdictions. Effective competition will be enhanced by the reduction of 
these barriers to entrepreneurial entry. Many of the problems of monopoly are able 
to withstand high mobility and decentralisation, but not free entrepreneurial entry.   
While our normative assumption is that effective competition is desirable, the 
positive analysis of this paper is in no way reliant on this assumption. The policy 
implications of Tiebout competition as a politico-economic phenomenon depend 
on the answers to a number of auxiliary questions as well as one’s normative 
commitments (Dowding & Hindmoor, 1997, p. 457). Competitive systems of 
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 Wohlgemuth (1999, 2008) conceptualises the costs of implementing new rules – that is, 
reforming existing jurisdictions - as barriers to entry. Such barriers are lower in 
decentralised systems, since there are more opportunities for reform, but this does not 
require entry in the sense we use it here. Entry requires that entrepreneurs ‘start their own 
country’ (Strauss, 1984). 
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governance involve tradeoffs and some see Tiebout competitions as being seriously 
harmful on balance (Self, 1993; H. Sinn, 2004). The argument here is the positive 
one that persistent market-like competition among governments requires low 
barriers to entry.  We see the analysis as providing reasons to lower barriers to 
entry; others may see it as providing reasons to maintain or heighten them. 
7.2. Barriers to entry and Tiebout competition 
There has been much work in public choice and public finance on competition 
among governments (Mueller, 2003, Chapter 9). The classic work in the industrial 
organisation of the market for governance is Tiebout (1956). Tiebout’s paper was a 
response to the concerns of Musgrave (1939) and Samuelson (1954) that without 
price signals there is no way for bureaucrats to know what level of public goods to 
produce. The mechanisms of democracy provided some indication of what people 
wanted, but the adjustment of government taxation and expenditure to individual 
preferences was of a very crude nature when compared to the market.  
Tiebout turned the conventional approach on its head. It is true that central planners 
lacked the information to adjust fiscal policy to anything close to efficiency, but 
many government decisions are made by local, rather than central, governments. 
While central governments were destined to search for efficiency with only the 
very unreliable compass of public opinion, the relationship between individuals 
and local government was very different. Rather than adapting policy to voter 
preferences, local governments can keep policy constant and allow consumer-
citizens to adopt whichever bundle of services best matches their preferences. If 
consumers can vote with their feet, local government planners do not face the same 
information deficit as central government planners. In the limiting case with an 
infinite number of jurisdictions and completely costless movement among them, 
everyone would get exactly the bundle of policies and public services they most 
preferred. 
In the real world, of course, there can only be a finite number of jurisdictions and 
there will remain some cost of switching. As the number of jurisdictions rises and 
the cost of switching falls, though, we come ever closer to the unattainable ideal of 
complete economic efficiency in governance. All markets have friction caused by 
distance,74 imperfect information, and other factors. Still, compared to the central 
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 Tiebout (1956, p. 422) suggests that the need to make shopping trips constrains the 
perfect satisfaction of consumer preferences in the same way costs of moving jurisdiction 
constrains the satisfaction of political preferences. 
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planner groping in the dark, Tiebout sorting is likely to produce something much 
closer to the optimum.  
The Tiebout model is focused on the sorting of individuals into communities which 
best suit their needs and does not consider the response of governments. More 
recent work has extended the model by considering the ways in which citizen exit 
might limit government power (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; de Figueiredo & 
Weingast, 2005; S. Sinn, 1992) and promote institutional innovation (Stansel, 
2012; Vanberg & Kerber, 1994; Vihanto, 1992). On this understanding, the market 
for governance is somewhat more than a metaphor. Citizens choose among 
alternative providers of governance, and these providers compete by limiting 
taxation and efficiently producing the local public goods citizens demand 
(Buchanan, 1965).  
While some of this work has stressed that Tiebout competition is a dynamic 
process of entrepreneurial discovery, existing analyses have explicitly or implicitly 
taken the necessary conditions for meaningful competition to be static – a large 
number of competitors and free movement between them. In practical terms, this 
would mean that those wishing to foster competition should attempt to 
geographically decentralise government (Osterfeld, 1989; Tullock, 1994) or 
increase or protect mobility (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008; Frey & Eichenberger, 
1999). Decentralisation and mobility are no doubt important, but, as we argue 
below, they are not able to deal with a number of serious problems. The more 
fundamental issue which needs to be addressed if we want meaningful and robust 
competition – that is, competition which limits predation and promotes innovation 
in the long run – is the freedom of entrepreneurs to create new jurisdictions.  
7.2.1. Collusion 
Most analyses of competition among government stress the avoidance of 
monopoly. While monopoly is certainly one uncompetitive market structure, it is 
not the only one. Competition is a prisoner's dilemma among competitors: all firms 
would be better off if they could raise prices and act as a joint monopolist, but each 
could increase profit by charging a slightly lower price. Without enforceable 
agreements, such a price-fixing arrangement will unravel and an oligopolistic 
market will behave much like a perfectly competitive one (Tirole, 1988, pp. 209–
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211).75 When a small number of firms repeatedly interact, however, the prisoner’s 
dilemma is iterated, and we know from theory (M. Taylor, 1976), simulation 
(Axelrod, 1984), and the field (Ostrom, 1990)  that cooperation is common in such 
situations. While cooperation is desirable for members of the cooperating group, it 
can be harmful more generally (Cowen & Sutter, 1999) and in the case of market 
competition, collusion produces inefficiently high prices and low production levels 
(Feuerstein, 2005; Tirole, 1988, Chapter 6).  
Collusion can happen either explicitly, as in a cartel arrangement, or tacitly as each 
firm seeks to avoid triggering a price war. In either case, firms can maintain a 
collusive arrangement if and only if they are able to cooperate. There are many 
factors which facilitate cooperation (Feuerstein, 2005; Levenstein & Suslow, 2006, 
2011), one of which is the existence of entry barriers. While the presence of 
multiple equilibria means that game theory makes no precise predictions about the 
sustainability of collusion in the face of entry (Shapiro, 1989, p. 379), there are 
compelling theoretical arguments which suggests that entry prevents collusion in a 
probabilistic sense.  
Collusion allows incumbent firms to earn above-normal profits, and this will attract 
entrants. If entry is possible, new firms will need to be either brought within the 
collusive arrangement lest they set competitive prices. While accommodation is 
sometimes achieved, this is not always the case. Entry barriers are not entirely 
exogenous, of course. Incumbents may consciously attempt to increase entry 
barriers by committing themselves to harsh punishment of entrants or by lobbying 
for restrictions on entry (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006, pp. 74–75).  Again, such 
deterrence is possible but costly and not guaranteed.  The empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that barriers to entry are an important determinant of cartel 
success.  Levenstein and Suslow (2006) review a number of empirical studies and 
conclude that entry is among the most important problems which cartels need to 
overcome, with a significant proportion of cartels being unravelled by entry.   
The governance market exhibits a number of features which suggest that collusion 
is likely.76 Cartels are most durable when the number of firms is small (Levenstein 
& Suslow, 2006, pp. 58–61), when there are industry organisations able to 
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 This conclusion is based on the Bertrand model of competition. Other models reach 
different conclusions (Tirole, 1988, Chapter 5). 
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 It is important to note here that collusion does not require profit-maximising governments 
or any other concrete set of motivational assumptions. As long as policymakers have 
preferences which differ from those of citizens in some respect, collusion is a valid concern 
(G. Brennan & Buchanan, 2000, pp. 40–42). 
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coordinate firm behaviour (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006, pp. 67–75), and when the 
cartel is able to detect and punish competitive behaviour by firms (Levenstein & 
Suslow, 2006, pp. 69–72). This describes the governance industry fairly well. 
There are relatively few countries, coordination mechanisms in the form of 
supranational organisations such as the OECD and World Trade Organisation, 
observable policy decisions, and established means of punishment. Recent moves 
towards tax compliance and tax harmonisation can easily be seen as price-fixing 
arrangements (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008), with defecting countries dubbed ‘tax 
havens,’ blacklisted, and threatened with formal sanctions (Sharman, 2006, 2012; 
Watt, Elliot, Borger, & Black, 2009). 
Even if we saw a one-off decentralisation of power and a dramatic decrease in 
interjurisdictional mobility, barriers to entry would remain as a potential threat to 
competition. Any fixed population of jurisdictions could potentially solve the 
problem of collusion. If it were possible for new jurisdictions to enter the 
governance market, collusion would be much more difficult. Existing states would 
need not only to reach an enforceable agreement, but also to find some way of 
bringing new entrants into the agreement without undermining profitability.  
7.2.2. Centralisation  
One way competing firms can thwart competition is through merger. Horizontal 
integration can be expected when it increases profitability after accounting for the 
costs of merger. One factor enhancing profitability is market power, and thus 
merger can reduce the level of competition in an industry (Viscusi, Harrington, & 
Vernon, 2005, Chapter 7). Merger in the governance market involves political 
centralisation, either through the literal merging of formerly separate jurisdictions 
(like the European Union) or the transfer of powers from lower to higher levels of 
government. Such anticompetitive centralisation would not be surprising from a 
public choice perspective, since local governors are able to increase market power 
through centralisation (Blankart, 2000; Eichenberger, 1994; Vaubel, 1994).  
Centralisation might also happen more innocently. There are many public goods 
which are most efficiently produced at a large scale, and joint production is often 
achieved via some sort of federation. Even when such a federation is desirable, it 
carries the risk of excessive centralisation. The creation of a robust federation – 
that is, one which neither disintegrates due to internal disagreement nor centralises 
due to the ambitions of federal bureaucrats or strong member states – is not a trivial 
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task, and requires careful constitutional craftsmanship (Bednar, 2009; de 
Figueiredo & Weingast, 2005; Volden, 2005). 
The most notable example of an innocently-created federation which later 
centralised is the United States of America. The Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution were significantly motivated by the need to protect against external 
military threats, and this required a federation responsible for national defence. As 
the Federalist Papers show, however, the framers of the Constitution were aware 
of the risks of over-centralisation and thought the republic they envisioned gave 
states sufficient rights to protect against encroachment.77 While it seems that 
competition among American states has remained in some areas of business law 
(Romano, 1985), decision making power has incrementally shifted towards the 
federal government, especially since the New Deal, and this has undermined 
Tiebout competition (Greve, 2012; Zimmerman, 2008).  
There are potentially large benefits from cooperation among local governments in 
producing large-scale public goods such as national defence, but creating super-
jurisdictional institutions to produce or coordinate the production of such goods 
carries the risk of over-centralisation.  The possibility of entrepreneurial entry 
mitigates this problem by providing a mechanism for people to opt out of the 
federation. This is especially important when federation members are not allowed 
free exit. Assuming that newly formed states have the autonomy to refuse to join 
the union, centralisation could be reversed.  This allows for the benefits of 
federation while limiting the risks of over-centralisation by providing a fallback 
option. 
7.2.3. Rent-seeking 
Another impediment to competition is internal rent-seeking. Members of every 
organisation have some incentive to manipulate decision making procedures for 
their own benefit (Milgrom & Roberts, 1988, 1990; Milgrom, 1988), greater 
heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of organising for collective action make 
rent-seeking a particularly salient problem in government. Since the costs of 
collective action increase with group size, small groups with strong common 
interests will have a disproportionate influence on policy outcomes (Olson, 1965).  
Citizen mobility reduces the scope for rent-seeking to some extent, since transfers 
become more costly as the outside options of the exploited group increase. Without 
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entry, however, rent-seeking will remain profitable unless the exit costs of the vast 
majority of the population are very low. Distributional coalitions exploit their 
smaller size and greater organisational capacity relative to the exploited public. As 
more mobile citizens leave, the disparities which allow for rent-seeking will 
reduce, but moderate switching costs for a large proportion of the public will leave 
large rents for the seeking.  
Olson (1982) argues that organising for collective action is difficult and only 
happens under the right conditions, but that once formed, distributional coalitions 
are quite robust. This means that distributional coalitions will gradually proliferate 
in politically stable societies. These groups will produce market distortions, retard 
economic growth, and prevent the reforms which would be required to reduce rent-
seeking. The power of entrenched interests is particularly important when it comes 
to decision making rules, since those with the power to make choices have this 
power by virtue of current arrangements.78  
Olson argues that interest groups are generally only displaced in periods of political 
instability. When regimes are overthrown, interest groups are thrown out with 
them. The new regime which emerges will initially be relatively free of interest 
groups and may grow rapidly. Olson points to the post-war economic success of 
Germany and Japan as an example. The problem with relying on instability to 
reduce rent-seeking, of course, is that the collapse of regimes is normally 
accompanied by violence and uncertainty. Low barriers to entry in the governance 
market would allow for the peaceful creation of new regimes free of distributional 
coalitions. This allows people to escape special interest groups without existing 
systems being overthrown by force. This produces a ‘bloodless instability’ in 
which distributional coalitions are destabilised by entrepreneurial entry rather than 
revolution (Chamberlain, 2009), much like disruptive innovation already happens 
in traditional industries.  
7.2.4. Policy innovation 
While the disciplinary power of Tiebout competition is no doubt important, 
constraint is not the only effect of competition. Schumpeter (1934, 1942) has 
pointed out that competition spurs innovation, and Hayek (1948) sees competition 
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 Congleton (2004) shows that the median voter is benefitted by current degree of suffrage 
and will not want it expanded absent exogenous change, and Dunleavy and Margetts (2001, 
p. 295) suggest that stability in voting rules can be explained by the fact that they ‘often 
exclude from political power those with most cause to change them.’  
129 
 
as a discovery mechanism which sorts good ideas from bad. The world is 
inherently imperfect, but proposed means of improvement are always uncertain. 
Profit-seeking entrepreneurs make conjectures which are testing against the 
realities of technological feasibility and consumer demand. Seen in this light, the 
market is not primarily a mechanism which provides incentives for efficient 
behaviour and maintains equilibrium; rather, the market is a ‘creative process’ 
which generates knowledge. This open-ended process allows producers to discover 
new products and processes and consumers to discover the consumption bundles 
which best satisfy their preferences (Buchanan & Vanberg, 1991; Potts, 2001). 
Numerous small discoveries compound over time to produce technological 
innovation and economic growth (Baumol, 2002; Mokyr, 1992).   
Such conceptions of competition have recently been applied to the Tiebout 
framework (Vanberg & Kerber, 1994; Vihanto, 1992; Wohlgemuth, 2008). In the 
governance market, new ideas are introduced by policy entrepreneurs and their 
value is revealed by citizens voting with their feet. As in markets, this could 
potentially produce new knowledge – that is new ideas and data about feasibility 
and desirability – about policy and institutions. As new ideas are produced by 
entrepreneurs, tested by competition, and emulated by other jurisdictions, we will 
see increasingly better institutions as judged by individual preference.  
Those arguing that Tiebout competition has dynamic effects have revealed an 
important phenomenon, but there has been little theoretical or empirical 
investigation of the conditions under which competition produces policy or 
constitutional innovation. Standard microeconomics takes a representative agent 
view of firms, and existing dynamic theories of competition among governments 
have largely followed in treating jurisdictions as homogeneous. Like firms in 
ordinary markets, (R. R. Nelson, 1991), polities differ, and their differences affect 
their reaction to competitive pressures.  
Firms establish decision making routines in order to economise on decision costs 
(Cyert & March, 1963; R. R. Nelson & Winter, 1982). These routines are learned 
from prior experience and are thus well-suited to the environment the firm faced in 
the past. In stable environments, this allows the firm to operate efficiently, but in 
rapidly changing environments such routines can prevent desirable organisational 
change. Routines are maintained by the behavioural norms and values of the 
individuals who constitute the organisation. Routines evolve slowly and 
cumulatively as the organisation learns from past experience and cannot be 
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changed easily (R. R. Nelson & Winter, 1982). As the firm matures and grows 
larger, inertial forces will become stronger (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, pp. 157–
162). This inertia can be exacerbated by ‘competency traps’: as an organisation 
gains experience in using a particular routine, its competency with that routine will 
increase, and short-sighted learning from often-reliable feedback mechanism will 
lock in suboptimal routines (Levinthal & March, 1993; B. Levitt & March, 1988; 
March, 1981).   
One effect of such routines is that established firms will be relatively unable to 
seize on the opportunities presented by a changing technological environment. 
Large established firms do seem to be able to produce ‘competency-enhancing’ 
innovations (i.e. those which increase the value of a firm’s existing resources), but 
not ‘competency-destroying’ innovations (i.e. those which decrease the value of a 
firm’s existing resources), which come primarily from new entrants (Christensen, 
1997; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). The point here is not that new firms are more innovative than incumbents, 
but rather that new firms and incumbents innovate differently, responding to 
different incentives and behaving differently depending on the technological 
environment (Acs & Audretsch, 1987, 1990; Winter, 1984). Incumbents can often 
devote large R&D budgets to research on well-defined problems but will be less 
effective at producing breakthrough ideas which open new markets. This suggests 
that high barriers to entry will reduce product innovation at an industry level, and 
the empirical record seems to suggest that this is in fact the case: high rates of entry 
in an industry are correlated with innovation and increases in productive efficiency 
(Caves, 1998, pp. 1971–1975; Geroski, 1995, p. 431). Start-ups are a major 
contributor to innovation, and this makes barriers to entry an important factor in 
industry performance.79  
The evolution of routines described above will also limit the ability of an 
organisation to remake its formal organisational structure, and other factors add to 
this difficulty. Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that most organisational change 
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 Some might argue with Schumpeter (1942) that barriers to entry will reduce the incentive 
to innovate by decreasing the rents available to successful innovators. This argument that 
entry reduces the benefit of innovation needs to be balanced against the counterargument 
that entry also reduces the cost of innovation. In ordinary markets, the empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and 
competition at the firm level – that is, firms in moderately competitive industries are the 
most innovative. At the industry level, though, more competition seems to reliably produce 
more innovation (R. J. Gilbert, 2006). Even if there were a ‘sweet spot’ between too much 
and too little entry as far as innovation is concerned, it seems certain that there is currently 
too little competition in the market for governance as far as innovation is concerned.  
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comes from the establishment of new organisations rather than the reorientation of 
existing ones. Firms in modern economies face selection pressures to reliably and 
predictably produce goods of a certain quality, and must demonstrate 
accountability to investors and customers. To achieve the goals of reliability and 
accountability, routines will be highly standardised and rigid. As in the arguments 
with respect to product innovation described above, this will produce efficient 
performance in stable environments, but will not allow for much organisational 
innovation. Organisational change, they argue, happens primarily at the population 
level as new firms replace old. While some firms are able to successfully remake 
their organisational structure (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994), the empirical 
evidence suggests that younger firms are more likely to successfully undergo 
organisational change (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Delacroix & 
Swaminathan, 1991; Halliday, Powell, & Granfors, 1993; Miller & Chen, 1994).  
It is important to note that the relative inability of established firms to engage in 
product and organisational innovation is not necessarily undesirable. Tightly-
constrained routines enable firms to operate more efficiently in stable 
environments, and predictability and reliability are valuable. Moreover, reform is 
risky and may only be desirable given extremely low exit costs (G. Brennan & 
Hamlin, 2004; B. Taylor, 2013). Small new companies and large established ones 
are complementary: when we combine the inflexible efficiency and reliability of 
the latter with the high-risk dynamism of the former within a single industry, the 
performance of the industry as a whole will be greater than if only one type of 
organisation existed. 
These arguments hold a fortiori to government. Barriers to product (i.e. policy) and 
organisational (i.e. constitutional) innovation are much higher in established 
governments than they are in established firms in traditional industries. Like other 
organisations, governments as producers of policy establish routines which can 
lead to inertia. In democracies, there are many such inertial forces which tend to 
make the implementation of bold ideas unlikely: tight agenda-control (Tullock, 
1981), party platforms shifting to match the preferences of the median voter, and 
various institutional barriers which dampen and delay the influence of public 
opinion on public policy (Riker, 1982) all work to thwart the generation of novel 
governance experiments.  Further, the life-cycle dynamics of organisations 
described above mean that inertia will increase over time. This becomes 
particularly obvious when we consider the fact that policy-making and 
implementation is heavily influenced by the bureaucracy. Downs (1965, 1967) 
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looks at the incentives facing bureaucrats and concludes that the establishment of 
routines which give rise to inertia is a rational response to pervasive knowledge 
problems and the difficulty of reforming large hierarchical organisations.  
The problems of changing constitutional structure in place are even more serious. 
In addition to the inertia all organisations share in terms of their fundamental 
organising principles, constitutions are designed as enduring barriers which limit 
the rule-making power of governments (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 2000). As such, 
they are normally protected from change by institutional features such as 
supermajority requirements. While constitutions are subject to implicit change and 
can be undermined in various circumstances (Ackerman, 1991; Higgs, 1988; Voigt, 
1999), the basic constitutional structure of the United States has not changed since 
1787. Again, this stability may be desirable given the current competitive 
environment, but this should not blind us to the costs of such stability. The world 
has change a great deal since the constitution was drafted, and it is implausible that 
the optimal constitutional structure has remained unchanged given massive 
reductions in communication costs, serious demographic change, several 
generations of political theory, and a wealth of new empirical data on the effect of 
constitutions.  
With free entry, the problems of organisational inertia are effectively sidestepped. 
Rather than struggling against the status quo, institutional entrepreneurs could 
found start-up jurisdictions in order to test ideas at a smaller scale than would be 
possible even in a very competitive governance market with a fixed population of 
established jurisdictions. Such an experimental economy of governance would be 
more conducive to innovation, which is surely a significant benefit of competition.  
7.3. Relevance and implications 
The notion of entrepreneurs starting their own jurisdictions is often considered 
outlandish, and this may explain the neglect of entry barriers among political 
economists.80 If we are stuck with a more-or-less fixed population of jurisdictions, 
any talk of the implication of low barriers to entry is hypothetical and irrelevant to 
any serious political discussions. While such a stance is understandable in light of 
the geopolitical status quo, we maintain that it is mistaken and speculate that it 
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 It should also be noted that Tiebout effects in general are sometimes dismissed as a ‘fairy 
tale’ (Newton, 1997). Such critiques, as far as we can tell, are based on serious 
misunderstandings the Tiebout model and the ambitions of analytic social science in 
general (Dowding & John, 1997).   
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results from an excessive focus on the short term. The current geopolitical system 
of nation states is a relatively recent development, and a number of alternatives 
have existed at various points in history (Spruyt, 1994). It is far from obvious that 
the current system is stable in the long term. In this section we show that we have 
seen high rates of state formation in the past and suggest that we may do so in the 
future.  
7.3.1. History 
There have been a number of historical contexts with low entry barriers judged by 
today’s standards. Frontiers provide a space for new entrants in the governance 
market, and have played a major role in institutional development. People 
generally settle frontiers to exploit economic opportunities. The absence of pre-
existing political arrangements, though, creates the need and opportunity for 
institutional innovation at the same time. And so throughout history, we have seen 
new frontiers, with their abundant space and lack of entrenched interests, giving 
rise to new forms of political organisation.  
The European settlement of North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries shows this dynamic at work. The open space of this frontier allowed 
many new jurisdictions to be formed. Colonies, some of which were explicitly for-
profit enterprises, had a great deal of independence and varied in their approach to 
governance. With an abundance of land and a shortage of people, colonies needed 
to attract residents to survive and grow. Settlers were comparatively mobile and 
good rules would give a colony an advantage in the competitive struggle for 
citizens. Moreover, it was possible to start a new colony, as those sick of religious 
persecution in the Massachusetts Bay colony did in founding Rhode Island in 1636. 
We thus saw comparatively low barriers to entry and low switching costs in this 
market (Billias, 1965; Doherty, 1999; Greene, 1994; Hughes, 1965, Chapter 2; 
Osgood, 1904). In addition to the colonies, many towns had de facto autonomy. 
Many of these were founded as for-profit enterprises and similarly competed for 
mobile settlers (J. Martin, 1991). Churches and various culturally-specific 
governance providers added to the diversity (Auerbach, 1983, Chapter 1), and the 
result was many new entrants into the governance market competing for citizens.   
As the space on the East coast became scarce, the frontier shifted west. Those 
settling the Old West became institutional entrepreneurs and devised a number of 
ingenious ways of solving collective action problems. Some new institutions were 
entirely voluntary and decentralised, while others began to resemble states 
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(Anderson & Hill, 2004). As the American frontier closed and power slowly 
centralised, the forms of government that resulted from this innovative period 
turned out to be a significant improvement over their European predecessors. The 
compound republic of the United States was a unique combination of features from 
other past and contemporary political systems, and its constitution has served as a 
model for new and reforming nations since that time (Blaustein, 1987; W. J. J. 
Brennan, 1991).  
Another suggestive example is the Greek city state culture, which consisted at any 
one time of around 100 self-governing (though not always entirely independent) 
poleis scattered around the Mediterranean and Black seas. During the fourth 
century BC, the total population of these poleis was probably at least 7.5 million 
(Hansen, 2006, pp. 31–38). New cities were formed via colonisation. Upon 
settlement, each colony would be an independent polis with its own laws and 
constitution. While settlement was often directed by existing poleis, this was not 
always the case. Some colonisation efforts were undertaken by groups of 
individuals without any formal sanction. There were two significant waves of 
colonisation: from 750-500 BC, many colonies were founded in the Mediterranean 
and Pontic regions, and from 331-200 BC, as many Greek colonies were founded 
in the former Persian Empire following the victory of Alexander the Great over 
Darius III (Graham, 1964; Hansen, 2006, Chapter 5; Tsetskhladze, 2008).  
During this time, entry barriers were low and we saw a great deal of state 
formation. As our theoretical argument would predict, Greek city states were 
highly competitive and innovative. Due to cultural and linguistic similarity, among 
other factors, the Greeks were ‘unbelievably mobile and unbelievably easy-going 
about letting strangers settle in their cities’ (Hansen, 2006, p. 34). Each polis faced 
a genuine risk of being eliminated through desertion or conquest and were forced 
to compete in various ways, including the attraction and retention of citizens (Ober, 
2008, pp. 80–84).   
The result was a robust system of competition and cooperation which limited 
government power and produced a number of institutional innovations. As Ober 
(2008) argues, Athenian democracy was, relative to alternative systems at the time, 
a very effective system of making wise collective decisions and anticipated many 
modern findings in the social sciences. Democracy in general was at the time often 
maligned as leaving governance to the incompetent masses. In this respect, the 
practice of democracy downplayed the role of experts and sought to aggregate the 
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dispersed knowledge of many individuals, the importance of which would later be 
described by Hayek (1945) and others (Ober, 2008, Chapter 1). The selection of 
representatives by lottery anticipated the argument of Mueller et al (1972) that 
randomly selecting representatives does a better job than current democratic 
practice of aggregating preferences by avoiding the problem of rational ignorance. 
The structure Athenian political institutions such as the Council of 500 anticipated 
findings in modern network theory, creating bridging ties between otherwise 
isolated groups to facilitate the flow of information (Ober, 2008, pp. 142–151).  
Further, the Greek system allowed for a large degree of federalist cooperation and 
coordination without endogenously centralising or resulting in collusion. The most 
important institution facilitating this cooperation was the koinon – a federation of 
city states. Koina served a number of economic and political purposes. They 
facilitated trade by increasing intra-koinon mobility and issuing standardised coins, 
cooperated militarily by producing regional public goods such as garrisons and 
sanctuaries, and obliged other poleis to help in times of crisis (Mackil, 2013). 
While this cooperation produced political institutions and organisations above that 
of the poleis, and the koinon has been characterised as a ‘federal state’ (Larsen, 
1968), Greek federalism was bottom-up rather than top-down, and cooperation did 
not lead to centralisation or collusion.  
While these examples are by no means conclusive, the fact that two of the most 
robustly competitive and institutionally creative governance environments in 
history were characterised by low barriers to entry is suggestive. We admit that 
more careful empirical investigation is needed, but at the very least the coexistence 
of entry and competition in these examples provides reasonably strong evidence in 
a Bayesian sense.81  
7.3.2. Future 
Given that the frontier has closed and political borders (at least in the developed 
world) are relatively stable, our argument may seem pessimistic: we have 
benefitted from the innovations of the past, but perhaps we are now in an eternal 
period of institutional stagnation. We suggest otherwise. Secession is always a 
possibility (Buchanan & Faith, 1987; Gordon, 2002; Sorens, 2011), and there are a 
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 i.e. the observation that the two most celebrated systems of competitive government were 
characterised by low barriers to entry is more likely to occur if our hypothesis is correct, 
and thus a rational truth-seeker confronted with this evidence should increase their 
estimated probability of the hypothesis being correct.   
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number of unorthodox proposals for reform which would allow for the regular 
formation of new polities.82  
Sub-local forms of governance such as neighbourhood associations and private 
subdivisions are already common (Boudreaux & Holcombe, 1989; Foldvary, 1994; 
MacCallum, 1970; R. H. Nelson, 2005). While these private communities currently 
enjoy only limited rule-making autonomy, various proposals have been made to 
combine decentralisation with institutionalised secession rights (Foldvary, 2002; 
Kling, 2009, Chapter 3; R. H. Nelson, 2005, Chapter 20). Rules which allowed 
local groups or entrepreneurs to opt out of existing rules and create their own 
communities would drastically reduce entry barriers to the governance market, 
though the political feasibility of this approach presents its advocates with a serious 
challenge (P. Friedman & Taylor, 2012, pp. 219–222).   
Another approach is based on expanding the scope of existing special economic 
zones to create entrepreneurial ‘start-up cities’ (Caceres, 2013; Strong & Himber, 
2009) or ‘charter cities’ (Romer, 2010). Charter cities would export the legal 
systems of developed nations to uninhabited areas of undeveloped ones. Start-up 
cities would involve for-profit entrepreneurs contractually creating a new 
subnational jurisdiction with significant authority within the borders of some other 
states. Each of these approaches posits a plausible means through which a legal 
framework which would allow for the creation of new jurisdictions.  
A third approach – and the one we generally prefer – is ‘seasteading’ (P. Friedman 
& Taylor, 2012).83 Seasteading is the creation of politically autonomous 
communities on the ocean, on ships or, in the long term, larger and more stable 
structures perhaps modelled on oil rigs. By relocating 12 nautical miles from land, 
entrepreneurs can effectively start their own country. While the freedom of the seas 
is far from absolute or inviolable, the current regime of maritime law provides for a 
significant degree of internal autonomy which could be used to create settlements 
with innovative governance structures.  
Additionally, under the flagging system of admiralty law, a vessel essentially 
franchises the sovereignty of an existing state via the annual, virtual, commercial 
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 On the contractual nature of such enterprises in general, see Bell (2012).  
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 ‘Seasteading’ is a portmanteau of ‘sea’ and ‘homesteading,’ the idea being that the ocean 
is a vast area of unclaimed space ripe for settlement (and possibly initial acquisition in a 
Lockean sense, though this is in no way a necessary aspect of seasteading). See generally 
the Seasteading Institute’s website at http://seasteading.org.   
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relationship of registering with their ship registry. This allows jurisdictional 
competition without the physical costs of relocation, since the vessel can change 
policy bundles via a new flagging agreement without the citizens needing to 
physically relocate. It also makes it easy to form dynamic federations where entry 
and exit are guaranteed under current international law. 
Cruise ships and oil rigs show that life at sea is feasible given a sufficiently strong 
economic incentive, and pirate radio and gambling ships show that such an 
incentive can come from the costs of regulation on land. As commercial operations 
on the ocean drive innovation in seafaring technology and increase the legal and 
political knowledge required to co-exist with incumbent states, barriers to entering 
the governance market decrease.  
The future of governance has yet to be written. Some predict – either with dread or 
jubilation – the emergence of a single world government or a centralisation of 
power in large regional states (Marchetti, 2008; Wendt, 2003). At the other end of 
the scale of possible futures is a decentralised system of many thousands of 
autonomous competing governments (Barber, 2013; P. Friedman & Taylor, 2012; 
MacCallum, 2003; R. H. Nelson, 2005). The default assumptions that the number 
of nations or the height of entry barriers will remain roughly the same are not well 
supported by theory or history, and so it behoves us to understand how these 
changes will affect political rent-seeking and institutional evolution. 
7.4. Conclusion 
A number of political economists have argued that giving citizens more freedom to 
vote with their feet would improve political outcomes by disciplining governors 
and allowing for institutional innovation. We share this judgment, but the argument 
presented above suggests that bringing about a more competitive system of 
government may not be as simple as has commonly been supposed. It is not 
enough to simply give citizens greater freedom of movement; entrepreneurs must 
also be given the freedom to enter the governance market. Competition can be 
undermined by collusion, centralisation, special-interest capture, and inertia. Entry 
mitigates each of these problems and would produce a robustly more competitive 
system of governance.  
We have offered some anecdotal evidence for our claim, but more rigorous 
empirical work is required before our hypothesis can be fully accepted. We have 
strong evidence that entry promotes and protects competition in other markets, but 
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the peculiarities of the market for governance should not be underplayed. Still, the 
theory and evidence we do have points us towards the conclusion that entry 
barriers do matter for Tiebout competition. The absence of serious investigation of 
entry, while understandable, means that there is a large gap in our empirical and 
theoretical knowledge of Tiebout competition.  
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8. Seasteading: Competitive Governments on 
the Ocean (co-authored with Patri 
Friedman) 
Abstract: Those advocating reform to increase competition among governments 
are caught in a catch-22: they recognise that competition is needed to improve 
rules, but seek to increase competition by changing the rules. Reforms emerge from 
the strategic interaction of political actors, and the only way to robustly alter the 
institutional equilibrium is to alter the non-institutional factors which structure the 
game. Developing the technology to enable seasteading – the establishment of 
permanent, autonomous communities on the ocean – strikes at the root of 
uncompetitive government and sidesteps the problem of reform.  
8.1. Introduction  
A number of political economists and activists have seen the potential to improve 
government performance by subjecting governments to competition for mobile 
residents. Giving citizens greater choice of governance providers would allow for 
the sorting of individuals into jurisdictions by demand for public goods (Oates, 
1972; Tiebout, 1956) and social policy preference (Francis & Francis, 2011; 
Janeba, 2006; King, 2005), force governors to give citizens the policies and public 
goods they want at reasonable tax rates (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; S. Sinn, 
1992), and enable innovation through decentralised experimentation (P. Friedman 
& Taylor, 2011; Vanberg & Kerber, 1994; Vihanto, 1992; Wohlgemuth, 2008). 
A number of reforms which would increase competition have been suggested, 
including the devolution of power to lower levels of government (Buchanan, 1995; 
Osterfeld, 1989; Tullock, 1994), the creation of private residential communities 
with greater autonomy (Foldvary, 1994; MacCallum, 1970; R. H. Nelson, 2005), 
the unbundling of governance services to allow greater choice and competition 
(Eichenberger & Frey, 2002; Frey & Eichenberger, 1996, 1999; Kling, 2009,  
Chapter 3), and the creation of ‘free zones’ (Strong & Himber, 2009; Strong, 2009) 
or ‘charter cities’ (Romer, 2010) on unoccupied land within existing jurisdictions. 
The problem with these proposals is that they all rely on the reform of existing 
institutions or the consent of existing governments. In a competitive market for 
governance, we should expect governments to make such concessions; in the 
current uncompetitive system, we should not. This produces a classic catch-22 
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situation: we need to increase competition in order to improve policy, but we also 
need to improve policy in order increase competition.  
Escaping the current monopolistic equilibrium requires us to focus on the non-
political determinants of competition: the geographic and technological 
environment in which governments are embedded. To robustly improve 
governance, we need to intervene at this bare-metal layer rather than attempt to 
directly reform existing policies or institutions. We propose an unorthodox form of 
intervention which we argue would achieve this goal – developing the technology 
to create permanent, autonomous settlements on the ocean. Settling the ocean – 
seasteading – would open a new frontier. The freedom of international waters 
allows for the introduction of new competitors into the governance market without 
reforming the old system, and the fluidity of the ocean – which allows large objects 
to be moved cheaply – would make for a more competitive market in the long run.  
In section 8.2 we develop a three-level understanding of politics, with each level 
being shaped by the one above. We draw out the implications for policy and 
constitutional reform, arguing that the most effective and robust point of 
intervention is at the environmental level. Section 8.3 outlines how seasteading 
would work, describes the challenges involves, and argues that these are not 
insurmountable. Section 8.4 concludes. 
8.2. Rules as emergent phenomena 
Politics is a spontaneous order, with lower-level outcomes shaped by higher-level 
incentives. Public choice theorists have recognised that policy choice is structured 
by constitutional rules but have largely ignored the higher-level incentives which 
shape constitutional choice. Advocates of competitive government have recognised 
the incentives which shape institutional development but have paid insufficient 
attention to the non-institutional factors which limit competition. In this section, we 
consider politics as existing at three levels – rules, meta-rules, and the competitive 
environment – with each level being influenced by those above.  This 
understanding of politics suggests that robust improvements in policy are most 
likely to come from changes in the competitive environment.  
8.2.1. Three levels of politics 
Policy-focused economists rightly see economic outcomes as emerging from the 
interaction of many individuals acting under constraints. This imposes limits on the 
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extent to which policy-makers can intervene to alter outcomes. Thus, economists 
will tend to see price controls as foolish: prices emerge from supply and demand 
and any attempt to centrally direct this emergent process is doomed to failure. 
What policy advocates are forgetting is that the same problems which prevent 
certain policies from working as intended also prevent worthwhile reforms. The 
political system comes with its own incentives which stymie the efforts of well-
meaning reformers. Just as a failure to appreciate the lessons of economics leads 
some to think that prices can be changed at will, a failure to appreciate the lessons 
of public choice theory leads some to think that policies can be changed at will. 
Thus, an understanding of public choice theory makes economics ‘a discipline 
which both conceptualises improvements in politics but simultaneously shows why 
such improvements must remain unrealised’ (Wegner, 2004, pp. 339–340).  
Public choice theorists stress the need to distinguish between two levels of politics 
(G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). At the first level is 
the workaday politics in which rules for governing human behaviour are created, 
altered, and repealed. Shaping this level, though, are the meta-rules which exist at 
the constitutional level. Democracies and autocracies each provide different 
incentives for the creation of rules. Within the broad classification of democracy, 
various specific meta-rules on how representatives are elected, how decision 
making power is distributed, and how branches of government interact each have a 
significant impact on the rules which are eventually created.84  
While lobbying representatives, campaigning for political candidates, or 
influencing voter preferences may have some effect at the margin, changing 
constitutional meta-rules has the potential to more effectively and robustly improve 
policy outcomes (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 2000; Buchanan, 1975b). If we are 
worried about the civil liberties of minorities, for example, giving minority views a 
greater weight in collective decision making is likely to be a more effective way of 
protecting them than advocating particular non-discriminatory policies.   
Buchanan (1984) describes public choice theory’s rejection of the benevolent 
despot model of government as ‘politics without romance.’ However, public 
choice-inspired constitutionalism is not completely free of romance, since 
constitutional meta-rules are generally considered as above ordinary politics. A 
central move in constitutional political economy is to posit a ‘veil of uncertainty’ 
similar to Rawls's (1971) veil of ignorance but with the slight advantage of being 
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 See Mueller (2003) for an extensive and rigorous survey of public choice theory.    
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real: since constitutional rules are general and long-lasting, individuals will not 
know which rules will suit them best. The position of would-be constitution-
makers is similar to that of players in a card game. Before the cards are dealt, 
nobody knows which particular rules will be to their advantage, and they will 
rationally agree to rules which maximise aggregate wellbeing (G. Brennan & 
Buchanan, 2000, Chapter 2; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962, pp. 77-80).   
Constitutionalists are correct that intervention at the constitutional level provides 
greater leverage than at the policy level. The constitutional level of choice, 
however, is not above the problems of politics. Constitutional rules require 
enforcement and can be broken or circumvented through liberal interpretation (De 
Jasay, 1989; Farrant, 2004; Tullock, 1987; Voigt, 1999), special interests can 
influence constitutional choice (R. McGuire & Ohsfeldt, 1986, 1989; R. McGuire, 
1988; Parham, 2010), and problems caused by expressive political behaviour can 
be exacerbated at the constitutional level (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2002; Crampton 
& Farrant, 2004). Public choice theory makes the reason that we have bad rules 
clear: we have bad meta-rules which are resistant to change. That merely shifts the 
question one level higher, however: why do we have bad meta-rules? This question 
has received much less attention by public choice theorists.85 
Government, whether we are thinking in terms of rules or meta-rules, is not some 
unitary social actor but rather a spontaneous order emergent from the interaction of 
various political actors constrained by their environment and each other (Wagner, 
1993). Focusing analysis and intervention at the constitutional level is a big 
improvement over policy analysis and activism, but it still misses the more 
fundamental incentives driving outcomes. Constitutional reformers are asking the 
same decision making rules which they have just argued tend to produce bad policy 
to produce good meta-policy (Wegner, 2004; Witt, 1992). The persistence of bad 
constitutional rules despite the advice of public choice theorists is a strong 
indication that all is not well at the constitutional level of choice. Rather than being 
at the very top, guided by enlightened self-interest, constitutional rules emerge 
from human interaction and change only according to the incentives of the 
environment.  
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 A notable exception is the work of Lowenberg and Yu (1990, 1992; Lowenberg, 1992), 
which considers the environment in which constitutions are made and concludes that exit is 
crucial in ensuring that good meta-rules are chosen. Competition acts as a substitute for the 
insufficiently-thick veil of uncertainty. 
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An important aspect of the meta-constitutional environment is the level of 
jurisdictional competition. If citizens have a choice of governance providers, they 
will tend to move to those which best meet their needs. This would allow people 
with similar policy preferences to group together, constrain governors, and 
encourage innovation; improving policy both directly and indirectly by improving 
constitutional rules.86   
What we really care about in any market is the range, quality, and price of 
products. In the market for governance, we care about the range, quality, and price 
of policy bundles. We would think it rather unhelpful if someone suggested that we 
could get better customer service in an industry if firm representatives were 
friendlier and more informed.  Surely the firms know this, and their customer 
service is constrained by other factors - the wages they are able to offer 
representatives, the marginal value to customers of better service, the 
competitiveness of the industry, the length of the customer relationship and ease of 
switching, and so forth. Yet when an economist advocates for a better policy, they 
are essentially doing the same thing - ignoring the true constraints that produce 
existing policies. Constitutional reformers such as Buchanan give a better answer - 
in our metaphor, they are suggesting changes to the organisation of the firm that 
should lead to better customer service.  While this reflects a deeper level of 
understanding, it is still missing the bigger picture: what competitive pressures 
exist to encourage firms in this industry to optimise their organisation? By thinking 
of governance as a product, we can see the limitations of constitutional analysis - 
namely the lack of incentives the industry has to innovate constitutionally. 
Competitive industries have good products because they have good firms. They 
have good firms because of the discipline imposed and experimentation enabled by 
competition, which is the root cause of the end result of product quality.  The same 
logic suggests the opposite outcome for government, as it is an 
industry characterised by a series of geographical monopolies with high barriers to 
entry for producers and high switching costs for consumers. The lack of 
competition leads to little pressure to evolve good meta-rules, and the flawed meta-
rules lead to flawed policies. 
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 The case for competition among governments has been made sufficiently well elsewhere, 
and we will not rehearse that argument here. See generally S. Sinn (1992), Breton (1996), 
and Frey and Eichenberger (1996). On specific benefits see the sources cited in the 
introduction above.  
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8.2.2. The catch-22 of reform 
There are a number of reasons for thinking that existing governments are unlikely 
to implement changes in order to increase competition. First, established 
organisations – particularly large and long-established ones like typical national 
governments – are generally resistant to change (P. Friedman & Taylor, 2011).  All 
organisations establish routines to lower decision making costs and increase 
certainty, and these will tend to reduce innovation and structural change (Cyert & 
March, 1963). More importantly for institutional change, special interests wishing 
to maintain the status quo and the power to block proposed changes will 
accumulate over time. Olson (1982) argues that organised distributional coalitions 
form only rarely, but are very resilient once established. Organised interest groups 
will tend to make political equilibria quite stable (Munger, 1998, pp. 135–138). 
Interest groups tend to have an interest in maintaining the status quo, since it is the 
status quo which has given them their current level of power. Mokyr (1994) 
describes the way in which technological regimes produce interest groups with an 
incentive to block technological innovation and institutional change, and electoral 
rules are very stable since they ‘often exclude from political power those with most 
cause to change them’ (Dunleavy & Margetts, 2001, p. 295). The governing party 
and median voter have existing electoral institutions to thank for their privileged 
position, and will generally not be in favour of reform (Congleton, 2004). 
Institutions tend to be very resilient when they provide benefits to those with the 
power to decide their fate.  
This makes institutional reform to encourage competition among governments 
particularly unlikely, since this would involve governments acting to reduce their 
own market power. Elites will enact reforms which reduce their own power when 
forced to do so by circumstance. Autocratic rulers, for example, might extend 
voting rights to subjects when threatened with violence (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2000) or exit (Congleton, 2011; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005).87 Electoral 
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 Strong (2009) suggests that dictators could be given equity in free zones, thus 
incentivising them to allow for institutional competition to promote economic growth. 
While this idea has much merit and similar incentives have undoubtedly driven the past 
creation of special economic zones, the extent to which this will encourage competition is 
limited to the extent that it reduces the dictator’s monopoly power. A rational dictator will 
maximise the discounted value of resources extracted from subjects. Security in extraction 
will prompt the dictator to expend some resources in promoting production, but such 
investment will remain well below the socially optimal level (M. McGuire & Olson, 1996; 
Olson, 1993). Indeed, dictators already have these incentives to increase production and one 
strategy they use is the creation of special economic zones. The incentive Strong identifies 
is already part of the equilibrium. 
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competition could potentially produce a similar outcome: if voters demand reform 
to encourage jurisdictional competition, vote-seeking politicians would be forced to 
supply it (Wittman, 1995). While we cannot review the arguments against such 
democratic efficiency here,88 we would point out that the argument for 
interjurisdictional competition presupposes that electoral competition is not up to 
the task of disciplining governors.  That is, the case for this desirable institutional 
reform is based on the idea that many desirable institutional reforms are unlikely 
given current conditions. If we could expect current governments to make wise 
decisions, we would not need them to change their decision making procedures. 
Thus, beneficial institutional change is likely if and only if it is not required.89 
While governments do sometimes devolve power, the general trend seems to be 
towards political centralisation and the restriction of jurisdictional competition, 
despite some mild decentralisation since the 1970s (Oates, 1999, p. 1145; Sorens, 
2009; Tilly, 1990, pp. 45–47; Vaubel, 1994, pp. 151–153). Such centralisation is to 
be expected from a public choice perspective, since local governments can increase 
their monopoly power through such measures (Blankart, 2000; Eichenberger, 1994; 
Vaubel, 1994). There are also other means through which governments can restrict 
competition. Cartels are apt to form when there are a few major players and high 
barriers to entry. This describes the governance industry fairly well, and 
supranational organisations such as the United Nations and World Trade 
Organisation can act as coordination mechanisms to enforce cartel agreements. 
Recent moves towards tax harmonisation can easily be seen as a price-fixing 
arrangement (Edwards & Mitchell, 2008). 
The incentives of the current political ecosystem evidently do not favour the 
significant decentralisation of power or the promotion of competition, and any 
attempt at decentralisation through reform must clash with those incentives. A 
more competitive market for governance is the most promising way of improving 
the range and quality of rules, but reforming existing jurisdictions from within is an 
unlikely way of bringing about such a situation.  
 
                                                     
88
 But see especially Olson (1982) and Caplan (2007).  
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 Dwight Lee (1989) makes a similar argument with respect to the impossibility of a 
desirable minimal state. Government power can be limited if and only if such limitation 
would be undesirable. 
146 
 
8.2.3. Technological intervention 
To robustly improve government, we need to promote competition by lowering the 
cost to consumers of switching governance providers (S. Sinn, 1992) and the 
barriers to new firms entering the governance market (P. Friedman & Taylor, 
2011). The standard structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial 
organisation sees such market conditions as determined by factors exogenous to the 
firm, such as technology and demand (Carlton & Perloff, 2005, p. 3). Likewise, to 
see what ultimately determines the conduct and performance of government, we 
need to consider factors exogenous to politics.90  Ideology, culture, geography,91 
and many other factors surely play a role, but cannot realistically be changed. 
Meanwhile, a factor which is constantly changing through concerted human action 
is technology.92 This is the level at which the equilibrium may more realistically be 
disrupted.  
The rise of the modern state is intimately connected with technological 
development (Márquez, 2007). Changes in military technology increased 
economies of scale in warfare and gave large national states with the power to 
support standing armies an advantage over smaller rivals (Tilly, 1985, 1990). 
Effective control of a region required a number of technologies such as censuses 
and communication technologies to render subjects ‘legible’ (Scott, 1998). 
Technologies can also decentralise power. Some argue, for example, that 
anonymous communication and exchange through digital currency and strong 
cryptography would allow people to escape government control (D. Friedman, 
2008; Ludlow, 1996, 2001). Technology has dramatically lowered the cost of 
moving capital across borders and thus increased international tax and regulatory 
competition (R. McKenzie & Lee, 1991). Current technological developments may 
be lowering the costs of individual mobility and making the threat of jurisdictional 
exit more credible (MacCallum, 2003). More importantly for our argument, 
technological change can also open new frontiers. A useful way of thinking about 
the frontier is as the point at which the net economic value of some resource 
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 Industry structure does feed back upon barriers to entry and switching costs, however: 
switching costs are partly determined by the geographic size of governance providers, and 
an uncompetitive industry will facilitate anticompetitive behaviour on the part of 
incumbents which makes entry more costly.   
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 While the geographic environment cannot easily be modified, locational decisions can be 
made for political reasons. Scott (2009) argues that moving to hilly areas beyond the reach 
of states can be a deliberate strategy of state-avoidance. Seasteading can be seen in this 
light, but the role of technology in opening frontiers is crucial.   
92
 The overall direction of technological change is undirected (Arthur, 2009), but human 
agency is effective in the development of particular technologies.   
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becomes positive (Anderson & Hill, 2004, pp. 10–11). The new technology of the 
railroad, for example, gave land in the American west positive value to non-
Indians, bringing it within the frontier. This allowed new settlements outside the 
reach of any state and thus lowered barriers to entry in the governance market.  
Technological innovation, then, can be a form of political activism. A significant 
advantage of technological activism over policy and constitutional activism is the 
relative ability of humans in each area. Humans have shown themselves to be 
extremely capable of solving very difficult technological problems, and 
technological progress has been extremely rapid in recent centuries. We are much 
less capable of solving large-scale social problems. While people in small, 
continually-interacting groups are able to creatively overcome collective action 
problems (Ostrom, 1990), the problems endemic to large governments are 
testament to our incompetence in large-scale social organisation. By reducing the 
political problem of how to improve rules to a technological problem – even a very 
hard one – we shift the challenge into the realm of human capability.   
The ocean is a wide open space with potential value in (among other things) its 
flexible regulatory environment and potential as a blank canvas for socio-political 
experiments, but this value is currently not exploited at any significant scale. There 
are a few examples of people taking to the sea to secure greater freedom, which we 
describe in the next section, but the total population of the sea has remained low. 
Developing the technological, economic, and legal knowledge required to settle the 
oceans would make the governance industry radically more competitive and 
innovative.  
8.3. Seasteading 
It may seem strange to argue that the way to improve policy is to settle the oceans, 
but the above analysis suggests that this unorthodox strategy is more likely than 
conventional political activism to significantly alter policy outcomes. We know 
that existing systems are robust against substantial reform, and that lowering 
barriers to entry allows potentially disruptive competitors to enter an industry.  
Some of these competitors will find new forms of organisation at the constitutional 
level which will increase innovation and efficiency at the policy level. To do this, 
we need a new frontier – a blank canvas on which social or constitutional 
entrepreneurs can create their products and test them in reality by seeing if they can 
attract citizens.  In the long term, space might provide such a frontier, but right now 
it is far too expensive.  In the shorter term, we have the ocean.  
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Seasteading is the establishment of permanent, autonomous communities on the 
ocean – homesteading the high seas. This could be done on modified ships or, in 
the longer term, on innovative designs resembling oil platforms. While de jure 
sovereignty may be desirable in the long term, the medium-term goal is simply de 
facto autonomy: seasteads will not be recognised as sovereign by other countries or 
be granted a seat at the UN for some time. Seasteads would be places where profit-
seeking entrepreneurs or groups of individuals motivated by other concerns could 
establish permanent settlements with the power to set their own rules. Early 
seasteading communities will likely be single vessels, while in the longer term we 
may see clusters of multiple vessels joining to take advantage of economies of 
scale while retaining individual or small-group mobility. Seasteading communities 
would be forced by their environment to compete with each other and with land-
based states for residents.  
 The biggest advantage of the ocean is its lower barriers to entry in the governance 
market.  Since existing states claim sovereignty over every piece of land and are 
reluctant to sell, the barriers to entry are extremely high.  Under international law, 
even a small rock extends resource rights in a 200nm circle, and hence states 
vigorously defend their ownership.  While the cost of creating marine real estate 
will not be insignificant, it is only moderate by first-world real estate standards. 
The cost of space on early seasteads will be comparable to that in major American 
cities, and will decrease rapidly with scale and technological development (Petrie, 
2011; Roddier & Aubault, 2010). Seasteading makes starting a new government 
difficult but possible.  
Insofar as it opens a new frontier on which to experiment, seasteading makes the 
ocean a substitute for land. Unclaimed land would be preferable, but there is none 
available. The ocean, though, has a further political advantage over land. The 
physical properties of water make it cheap to move large objects, which is how 
cargo ships enabled worldwide trade. In terms of seasteading, this would mean that 
buildings are not tied to a particular patch of ocean surface, but could move around. 
This sort of dynamic geography (P. Friedman, 2004) has three principle political 
advantages.  
First, it lowers the costs of switching government. If a family owns its own floating 
structure and becomes dissatisfied with the government it belongs to, it can simply 
sail away to another jurisdiction: with dynamic geography, people can vote with 
their houses. This lowers the cost of switching and thereby makes the market for 
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governance more competitive. Of course, people are tied in place by more than the 
difficulty of moving their possessions from one home to another. Mobility is surely 
limited far more by work and social obligations than by the physical costs of 
relocation (T. Lee, 2010). The possibility of voting with one’s house will therefore 
have only a minor effect on competition. The ease of relocation will be much more 
beneficial to businesses. Some businesses will remain tied in place by specialised 
staff tied in place by social factors, but others will be more footloose. Since 
competitive governments will respond to marginal consumers, this will increase 
governance quality even when most people and firms have significant costs of exit.  
Second, dynamic geography addresses the concern of Caplan (2001) that Tiebout 
competition is undermined by the fact that governance quality is capitalised into 
real estate values. When land is tied to a particular jurisdiction, reductions in the 
quality of governance will immediately lower land prices. This means that 
landowners have no incentive to exit bad jurisdictions, since they have the choice 
between putting up with low-quality governance and taking a capital loss when 
they try to sell. Fascinatingly, however, this is not the case on the ocean. Since 
floating real estate can be moved between jurisdictions, the value of floating real 
estate is not permanently reduced by a property tax increase, because there is the 
alternate use of moving the real estate to a new jurisdiction.  This restores the 
property of a well-functioning market, where goods go to their highest-valued use.  
Floating real-estate will move to the jurisdiction where it is the most valuable 
whenever the value difference is greater than the cost of moving it.  This cost will 
be substantial, yet based on the cost of moving oil platforms, is likely to be a small 
fraction of the value of the real estate.  Thus, exit remains a check on government 
power on the ocean.  
Third, dynamic geography allows jurisdictions to fail more gracefully. Olson 
(1982) argues that politically stable societies gradually accumulate and entrench 
powerful interest groups able to harvest social resources through rent-seeking. This 
impedes economic growth and makes the vast majority of the population worse off. 
When the prevailing political system is overthrown, the special interests are thrown 
out and we are likely to see better policy. Olson argues that the post-war 
performance of Germany and Japan, as well as a host of other countries, confirm 
this hypothesis. Unfortunately, political instability tends to be accompanied by 
bloodshed, producing a tradeoff between peaceful stability with high levels of rent-
seeking and violent instability with low levels of rent-seeking. Seasteading allows 
us to have political instability without bloodshed (Chamberlain, 2009). If rent-
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seeking becomes too harmful in an ocean polity, the population will gradually float 
away. This allows the polity to die without being overthrown violently. 
Dysfunctional governments would no longer take up valuable land, but would 
wither and die based on the preferences of citizen-consumers.    
While not everyone will want to live on the ocean, the greater possibility of exit 
will put competitive pressure on land-based nations and thus produce benefits for 
land-lubbers. Since firms respond to marginal consumers, a majority of citizens 
could be tied in place and still enjoy the benefits of competition. Moreover, the 
small-scale experiments enabled by seasteading will produce knowledge spill-overs 
with the potential to inform constitution and policy-making on land. 
8.3.1. Historical precedents 
While seasteading in its fullest sense has not yet occurred, there have been a 
number of near hits, where enterprising individuals used the freedom of the ocean 
to do things they cannot do on land. Some have been motivated by profit; others by 
principled opposition to prevailing laws. Where they differ from seasteading is in 
their narrow focus on a specific problem.  
Prior to the Second World War, a number of ships off the U.S. coast operated as 
floating casinos. Existing just outside territorial waters, these ships could 
legitimately provide gambling services. The US government, however, did not 
appreciate its citizens having a place to gamble and exceeded their territorial limits 
by shutting down some casinos. After the Second World War, it became a crime to 
own or transport people to a gambling ship (Strauss, 1984, p. 140).  
In the 1960s, a number of pirate radio operators used the freedom of the seas to 
provide commercial radio to the countries of Europe. This gave consumers what 
they wanted and also imposed competitive pressure on existing states, which 
eventually liberalised broadcasting laws. Before this liberalisation, though, the 
government harassed pirate broadcasters in a number of ways. The British 
government dealt a devastating blow to pirate radio by making it illegal for British 
businesses to advertise on these stations (Strauss, 1984, pp. 141-145).  
The most well-known proto-seasteading effort is the Principality of Sealand, which 
has managed to acquire a certain degree of international recognition as a country. 
Founded on an abandoned sea fort off the coast of England, Sealand has been home 
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to a pirate radio station and the data haven business HavenCo (Grimmelmann, 
2012; Strauss, 1984, pp. 132-138).  
Early this century, the Dutch non-profit group Women on Waves set out to provide 
safe and legal abortion outside territorial waters in countries where abortion is 
illegal.’ The group developed a mobile gynaecological unit which can be easily 
loaded on a ship which can then sail to wherever it is needed (Gomperts, 2002).93 
There have been a number of other proposals to use ships anchored just outside 
territorial water to provide services which are illegal or heavily-regulated on land, 
ranging from brothels to floating euthanasia clinics.  
Perhaps the greatest proto-seasteaders, though, are the ‘sea nomads’ of Southeast 
Asia (Chou, 2003; Sather, 1995, 1997, 2002; Sopher, 1977; Tagliacozzo, 2009). 
There have been a variety of peoples around Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia who have lived a nomadic life hunting and gathering in 
and around the ocean. The most nomadic lived entirely on their boats and came 
ashore only to trade, repair their boats, and gather from seaside jungles what the 
ocean could not provide. While the numbers have dwindled due to resource 
pressures, economic opportunities on land, and government intervention which 
made their way of life less feasible, a number of sea nomads remain.    
The social organisation of the sea nomads is of particular interest, since mobility 
seems to have led to a number of political advantages. While there was and 
remains some diversity, all sea nomads historically had a great deal of autonomy 
and organised their social life in roughly comparable ways. Sather (1997, 2002) 
describes the social, economic, and political life of the Bajau Laut. Until the 1950s, 
they lived entirely on their boats, each of which normally contained a single family 
of around five people. These families would form moorage communities of 
between five and fifty families. Within these communities, closely related families 
- most commonly married siblings - would form tighter units of cooperation - 
pagmunda' - sharing a single mooring post and often fishing together. The 
organisation of these communities was very egalitarian, with no formal authority 
providing governance. As in many customary systems of law (Benson, 1990), there 
were influential elders who would help settle disputes and deal with authorities on 
land, but they held their positions only by maintaining the respect of everyone else.  
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Being nomadic boat people, the cost of exit from these communities was low. As 
such, a pagmunda' would sometimes break off to form its own moorage 
community or join a neighbouring one. Moorage communities were thus subject to 
jurisdictional competition. These communities also took advantage of regulatory 
competition among land-based feudal lords. Bajau Laut moorage communities 
were vulnerable to outside attack when moored, particularly by slave raiders. This 
prompted them to enter into a type of feudal relationship with land-based political 
powers. A moorage community would ally with a coastal lord offering protection 
in exchange for a preferential trading relationship. This led to an interesting form 
of jurisdictional arbitrage. The Bajau Laut were mobile: there was little tying them 
to a particular mooring site. All they needed was a safe place to anchor during 
monsoon season and to collect fresh water and firewood, and someone with whom 
to trade. Since there was certain to be another lord a little further up the coast 
willing to provide that, lords were forced to compete to provide protection for 
Bajau Laut communities. This ensured decent protection, reasonable trading terms, 
and no undue interference in community matters despite the fact that the Bajau 
Laut were a highly stigmatised group (Sather, 2002, pp. 28-30) 
8.3.2. Challenges and strategy 
When viewed as an industry, governance is the largest in the world, representing 
approximately 30% of global GDP, or USD 18T/year.  Thus the potential gains to 
entrepreneurs creating start-up countries that may outcompete existing 
governments are enormous.  While the challenges are significant, they are not 
insurmountable, and there is clearly incentive to attempt to solve them.  The main 
organisation doing this presently is The Seasteading Institute,94 which is focused on 
three main areas of research: engineering, business, and legal.  
Many of the engineering challenges have been fully or partially solved by the 
cruise ship and offshore oil industries (Lamas, Carral, & Friedman, 2010).95 These 
industries have proved that, given enough economic incentive, people can live 
safely and comfortably at sea for long periods of time. The engineering challenge 
facing seasteading is to reduce the costs to enable a wider variety of economic 
activity, most likely by removing features of ships and platforms unneeded by 
seasteaders, such as the high speed of cruise ships and the individualised design of 
oil platforms (Hoogendoorn, 2011). 
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To beneficially live on the ocean, seasteaders need to be able to produce enough to 
pay for the overhead of marine real estate.96 Past floating city projects have 
neglected the business case, assuming that escaping government is a sufficient 
reason to head to the ocean (Strauss, 1984). This is naïve, as investors want to see 
concrete business plans.  While seasteading can someday be, like current 
governments, a real estate business offering jurisdictional space to a wide variety 
of economic activity, it is difficult to become a general platform without first 
having a specific application.  The move from application to platform only happens 
once there are enough applications to create economies of scale in serving them.  
Thus successful seasteading will require sound business plans which leverage the 
comparative advantages of the ocean. Certain businesses such as aquaculture can 
only be done at sea, while other industries are so heavily regulated on land that it 
will be worthwhile putting up with the inconveniences of the ocean to provide 
them – just as gambling ships and pirate radio operators did. One such business is 
The Blueseed Project,97 which plans to create a floating entrepreneurship centre 24 
miles from Silicon Valley, thus providing immigrants with access via ferry without 
the need for a residential visa. Medical tourism is another promising business 
model for seasteads, since it is a rapidly growing, multibillion dollar industry 
(Reisman, 2010). Those in first world countries such as the United States already 
spend enormous time and money flying long distances to places such as India for 
medical procedures. Medical seasteads could present a much cheaper and easier 
alternative. Beginning with low-cost procedures enabled by cheap labour, and 
progressing to promising new treatments still working their way through the 
labyrinthine FDA approval process could be a very lucrative enterprise.  
Perhaps the most serious challenges lie in the third area of research: international 
law and politics. If the governments of the world decide they do not like 
competition, seasteads will have little chance of survival (Balloun, 2010). The 
actions taken against gambling ships and pirate radio stations demonstrate that this 
is a real danger. This makes it paramount that seasteads respect both de jure and de 
facto international and local national law, and desist from engaging in business 
practices which enrage coastal states (Mutabdzija & Borders, 2011). The slightest 
suggestion that a seastead is being used to export drugs or enable the financing of 
terrorism will threaten its existence. This rules out certain otherwise viable 
business plans, such as anonymous digital banking, as it inherently enables money 
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laundering.  Fortunately, since almost every business benefits from more effective 
governance, seastead entrepreneurs can aggressively filter for those business 
models for which there is no proven history of intervention. 
The strategy of The Seasteading Institute is to focus on research in these three areas 
to reduce uncertainty and lower expected seastead costs, as well as building a 
community of interested seasteaders and entrepreneurs.  Together, these will create 
an environment that will give rise to the first seastead ventures, and the majority of 
Institute resources are focused on removing the barriers to these first attempts, with 
a minority devoted to long term work such as research on large floating structures 
and sovereignty. 
8.4. Conclusion 
A world of truly competitive governance – in which barriers to entry and switching 
costs are both low – would be an enormous boon to human wellbeing. Not only 
would competition constrain the power of government – thus fulfilling the promise 
of constitutionalism – it would also induce innovation and foster diversity in rules.   
Rules are a social technology in the sense that they allow us to cooperate to achieve 
our goals (R. R Nelson & Sampat, 2001). Like any technology, rules can be 
improved. We cannot predict precisely how the technology of governance will 
evolve given decentralised experimentation guided by individual choice – just as 
Alexander Graham Bell could not have foreseen the modern smartphone - but we 
can be confident that it will improve. Rules are a particularly crucial technology 
because they form the environment in which other technologies develop, and thus 
have a strong influence on the speed and variety of all other forms of innovation 
(Baumol, 2002). We tend to overlook the enormous potential of ongoing 
technological change, but the progress we have seen since the industrial revolution 
may be only the beginning. Human ingenuity will continue to make our lives 
better, and will do so more rapidly with better rules.  All the greatest problems of 
the world – poverty, disease, and existential risks like global warming – are deeply 
and directly affected by the quality of our rules.  Poverty happens where rule sets 
are bad; medical progress has been enormously slowed by regulation like the 1962 
Kefauver-Harris amendments in the US (Klein & Tabarrok, 2002; Peltzman, 1973, 
1974); and the mitigation of existential risks are global public goods, thus 
underprovided given the lack of good international coordination mechanisms 
(Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999). 
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Seasteading offers the potential to dramatically lower both barriers of entry and 
switching costs in the governance industry, influencing the rate of innovation at a 
deep level, and producing more, better, and cheaper rules. In essence, a little 
technological innovation could unlock an unprecedented level of political 
innovation, giving rise to a Cambrian Explosion in government. Seasteading is a 
means of producing political change and it is consistent with other proposals such 
as functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions (Frey & Eichenberger, 1999), 
for-profit governments (MacCallum, 1970), and deep local democracy (Kotler, 
1969). The beauty of working on the technological capabilities of actors rather than 
institutions themselves is that institutions become endogenous to the preferences of 
individuals. Experimentation will tell us whether unbundling government services 
is desirable and whether decisions should be made by proprietors or deliberating 
citizens.  
While the challenges in making seasteading a reality are not trivial, we have argued 
that seasteading, unlike most activism, improves the true determinants of 
governance quality while avoiding the vicious circularity of using deeply flawed 
and unresponsive political systems. Thus the expected value of this unusual form 
of activism is far higher than the dominant approach of proposing and advocating 
for specific policies or even constitutional rules.  By extending traditional public 
choice models to consider industry structure and the non-institutional determinants 
thereof, we believe we have found a lever – the frontier – and a fulcrum – the 
ocean – from which we can move the world. 
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9. Conclusion  
9.1. Introduction  
Each chapter of this thesis has relaxed one or more of the assumptions of 
mainstream public choice theory. I have endogenised epistemic rationality 
(chapters 1-2), assumed other-regarding (chapter 5) and expressive (chapter 4) 
preferences, modelled dispositional choice (chapters 4, 6), considered the out-of-
equilibrium dynamics of political institutions (chapters 6-8), used feasibility 
analysis to constrain normative theory (chapters 5-6), and discussed the 
demandingness of feasibility constraints (chapters 7-8). Though I have covered a 
great deal of ground, I wish to argue in this concluding chapter that these papers 
share a common methodological approach to rational choice analysis and a 
common positive and normative interest in the comparison of exit and voice.   
This chapter begins by arguing that revisionist elements have always been present 
in rational choice theory. It then outlines each chapter, paying special attention to 
the broad implications of the arguments made and how the relate to one another. 
Finally, the chapter draws on this discussion to point to important areas of future 
research for the revisionist public choice analysis of exit and voice.   
9.2. A revisionist history of public choice theory  
I have suggested repeatedly in this thesis that rational choice political theorists 
have for the most part retained a common set of simplifying assumptions taken 
from economics and that these assumptions have revealed some interesting causal 
mechanisms and obscured others. As a general claim I stand by this, but it is 
important to recognise that there has been a revisionist strand of public choice 
theory since its inception, particularly in the (implicitly or explicitly) comparative 
study of exit and voice. Indeed, many of the founders of public choice theory are 
revisionist in important respects. In this section I would like to review some of this 
work and suggest that revisionist public choice theory as understood here is a 
continuation of the public choice tradition rather than a challenge to it.  
There is a trace of revisionism in Downs’s (1957) discussion of rational ignorance 
and the paradox of voter turnout.98 While the idea of information costs was present 
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in economics when Downs was writing, imperfect information was not the 
prominent idea it became in the 1970s following the work of Akerlof (1970), 
Spence (1973), and Stiglitz (1975).99 While Downs did not embrace the potential 
implications of rational ignorance and rational abstention, some early work 
building on his analysis did have more explicitly revisionist elements. The problem 
of rational abstention identified by Downs (1957) is that since the value of a 
desirable electoral outcome must be discounted by the vanishingly small 
probability of pivotality, the expected value of a vote will be outweighed by the 
costs of voting unless the benefits of a desirable outcome are assumed to be 
implausibly high. Formally, the expected benefit of a vote is given by:100  
 R = PB – C  
Where R is the individual expected value (reward) of voting, P is the probability of 
pivotality, B is the individual differential benefit of a favourable electoral outcome, 
and C is the individual cost of voting. Rational choice theory predicts that 
individuals will vote if and only if R > 0. Since C is assumed to be positive and P is 
assumed to be very close to zero, R would have to be implausibly large for voting 
to be rational. Rational choice theory would seem to predict that voting is 
irrational, but large numbers of individuals do voluntarily turn out to vote. The fact 
that Downs and Tullock begin with rational choice assumptions and show that 
many people are behaving irrationally is something of a paradox for rational choice 
theory.   
There have been a number of attempted resolutions to this paradox,101 but one 
approach in particular has a revisionist flavour. Whereas Downs argued that people 
voted in order to instrumentally support democracy – a claim which seems 
implausible in light of the expected effect of a single person’s vote for democratic 
legitimacy – others wrestling with the problem were more willing to embrace the 
possibility that people voted out of a sense of duty rather than an instrumental 
desire to bring about some state of affairs.  Riker and Ordeshook (1968) seek to 
resolve the paradox by distinguishing between the individual costs and benefits of 
voting which depend on the individual’s contribution to the electoral outcome and 
those which do not. The paradox arises because all the benefits but none of the 
costs of voting are contingent on the individual’s influence on the electoral 
outcome. Riker and Ordeshook point out that there may be costs of voting which 
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depend on electoral outcomes and benefits which do not. The contingent costs of 
voting are likely to be rare and trivial in the real world, but the non-contingent 
benefits of voting are likely to be common and significant. Riker and Ordeshook, 
following the notation introduced above, define D as the benefits of voting 
accruing to an individual regardless of their effect on the electoral outcome and 
rewrite the reward function of voting as: 
R = PB – C + D  
D includes, among other things, the satisfaction deriving from compliance with a 
perceived duty to vote, symbolic support for democratic institutions, expression of 
partisan values, and feelings of political efficacy. These factors do not depend on 
the electoral outcome and thus need not be discounted by P. This means that when 
B is reduced to approximately zero, the relevant tradeoff is between C and D, and it 
is not at all implausible that the non-contingent benefits of voting exceed the non-
contingent costs for many people, making R positive. The fact that turnout is so 
high shows this to be the case; that turnout is well below 100% and differs across 
groups shows that R is sometimes negative. Riker and Ordeshook insist that people 
vote or not depending on the relative magnitude of the costs and benefits of voting, 
with the benefits of voting being predominantly non-instrumental.  
The argument that non-instrumental preferences such as a sense of civic duty are a 
major factor in getting people to the polls has proved popular (Goldfarb & 
Sigelman, 2010; Grofman, 1993; Knack, 1992), but many of those accepting this 
argument insist that people vote instrumentally once they arrive at the voting booth 
(Mackie, 2011, 2012). The idea that the content of voter choice is non-
instrumentally motivated is also present in early work by foundational figures in 
public choice theory.  
An interesting example is Buchanan’s (1954a) comparative analysis of individual 
choice in voting and the market. Buchanan makes two relevant claims in this paper. 
First, he argues that democratic choice will be based more heavily on values as 
opposed to interests when compared to market choices. This conclusion is an 
obvious precursor to the idea of expressive voting, but Buchanan’s argument for 
this conclusion is based not on individual insignificance but on its opposite. 
Individuals see market equilibria as beyond their control and thus focus on 
individual interests when making market choices. In the voting booth, on the other 
hand, individuals see themselves as contributing to a collective social decision. 
Since they are deciding for the group rather than themselves, they take a social 
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perspective (Buchanan, 1954a, pp. 336–337). Buchanan’s argument here is rather 
unconvincing from a rational choice perspective and is clearly at odds with his later 
insistence on symmetric motivational assumptions across institutional contexts. 
Buchanan posits no mechanism by which voters are motivated to expand their 
normative horizons beyond the claim that they ought to do so.  
Buchanan does consider the implications of individual insignificance in the voting 
booth, but in relation to the epistemic rather than the motivational dimension of 
choice. Pointing out that individual responsibility for choices is divided among 
many individuals in the voting booth, Buchanan argues that ‘there is neither an 
immediately realizable and certain benefit nor an imputable cost normally involved 
in the voter’s choice’ (Buchanan, 1954a, p. 337).  The difference in responsibility 
of voting and market choices means that market choice generally produces ‘a more 
precise and objective consideration of alternative costs’ (Buchanan, 1954a, p. 337) 
and ultimately ‘more rational behavior’ (Buchanan, 1954a, p. 341) in comparison 
to voting decisions. The argument here can be interpreted as an embryonic version 
of Caplan’s (2007) rational irrationality argument.  
Despite Buchanan’s argument for rational irrationality being much more 
compelling than his argument for sociotropic/expressive voting, the latter idea 
developed much earlier in the public choice literature and has thus far been far 
more influential. Tullock (1971) argues that individuals will expressively vote for 
higher levels of redistribution than they would prefer if individually decisive. 
Goodin and Roberts (1975) argue that the insignificance of a single vote makes the 
expression of ethical preferences cheap and thus promotes impartiality.  Fiorina 
(1976) builds on Riker and Ordeshook’s formulation of the voting decision by 
considering expressive benefits which vary across voting choices due to party 
allegiance, though this paper continues to focus on turnout rather than the choice 
between candidates. Brennan and Buchanan (1984) construct a simple general 
model of expressive voting, pointing to the normative complications arising from 
the separation between choice and preference. Brennan and Lomasky (1983, 1984, 
1985, 1989) extended the argument in various directions before publishing a book-
length formulation of the model (G. Brennan & Lomasky, 1993) which would 
serve as the foundation for more recent theoretical and empirical work  (Hamlin & 
Jennings, 2011). While there was clearly a significant uptick in the expressive 
voting literature in the 1980s and 1990s led by Brennan and co-authors, the brief 
review above suggests that this work is a refinement of earlier ideas in public 
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choice theory rather than a radical departure from a methodologically 
homogeneous mainstream.   
The possibility of epistemic irrationality as understood by Caplan (2007) has also 
been present in the public choice literature, though in a more subtle form. As 
suggested above, the idea was present in Buchanan (1954a), and it is quite explicit 
in Joseph Schumpeter’s 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
(Schumpeter, 2003). While Downs (1957) is generally regarded as the founding 
work in the economic approach to politics, I would like to make the case that 
Schumpeter has an equally valid claim to this title. Downs no doubt provided the 
classic formal treatment of democratic choice and competition and in this sense 
was a founding work in the methodology of public choice theory, but, I will argue, 
Schumpeter provided an imprecise but more general framework for political 
analysis. Downs was influenced by Schumpeter’s argument, but in creating a 
precise and rigorous formal model of democracy he was forced to make a number 
of simplifying assumptions of which Schumpeter would have disapproved 
(Mitchell, 1984; Wohlgemuth, 2005). Conventional public choice theory has 
followed Downs in terms of his commitment to positivist modelling and formal 
rigour, but at the same time its substantive concerns and assumptions have been 
moving in a more Schumpeterian direction. Revisionist public choice theory is a 
more serious and explicit move in this direction, though the connection to 
Schumpeter is not normally direct or explicit.   
If we define public choice theory in broad terms as ‘the application of economics to 
political science’ (Mueller, 2003, p. 1), Schumpeter clearly qualifies as a public 
choice theorist – he was an economist and used economic concepts such as 
competition and entrepreneurship to analyse democratic processes. If we read 
Mueller’s (2003, pp. 1–2) extended definition of public choice theory as 
postulating that political man is ‘an egotistic, rational, utility maximizer,’ 
Schumpeter is clearly excluded. Schumpeter was in general hostile to the methods 
of neoclassical economics and being suspicious of excessive abstraction he rejected 
the behavioural postulates of the emerging economic mainstream and instead 
combined informal economic reasoning with historical, sociological, and 
psychological analysis (Schumpeter, 1934; Wohlgemuth, 2005). 
Most important to the purpose at hand is Schumpeter’s discussion of human nature 
in politics, which uses informal economic reasoning backed by appeals to intuition 
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and anecdotal evidence to argue that people are severely and fundamentally 
irrational in the voting booth: 
Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of 
mental performance as soon as he enters the political 
field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would 
readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real 
interests. He becomes a primitive again. His thinking 
becomes associative and affective (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 
262).  
This frequently-quoted passage has been accused of violating the principle of 
behavioural symmetry generally thought central to public choice theory (Mitchell, 
1984, p. 76), but the argument provided for behavioural asymmetry is an informal 
approximation of Caplan’s theory of rational irrationality which can be justified 
without assuming motivational asymmetry. Schumpeter argues that in their 
ordinary lives individuals are ‘subject to the salutary and rationalizing influence of 
favorable and unfavorable experience’ (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 258). People tend to 
think carefully and dispassionately about things which directly concern them, and 
Schumpeter suggests that the objects of democratic choice generally fail to impose 
the epistemic discipline required for reasoned choice (Schumpeter, 2003, pp. 256–
264).  
It is easy to see the kernel of rational irrationality in Schumpeter’s argument and it 
is tempting to see Caplan’s model as a reinterpretation and formalisation of 
Schumpeter using the tools of modern economic theory. This interpretation is fine 
as far as it goes, but it leaves out an important part of the story. Schumpeter did 
point to the incentive differences between individual and collective choice, but he 
also considered the prospects for learning as influenced by the institutional 
environment. It is not simply that democratic choice is individually costless but 
that democracy does not allow for the trial-and-error feedback crucial to rationality. 
Irrationalities are cleared by prolonged experimentation, and this is generally not 
an option in democratic politics (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 258).102  
Moreover, there is a great deal of conceptual distance between the practical 
concerns of everyday life and the concerns of democratic politics. People are 
accustomed to thinking carefully and rationally about the management of their 
                                                     
102
 See Wohlgemuth (2008) for a recent argument to this effect.  
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household and the conduct of their profession, and if asked to answer hypothetical 
questions on such issues they would likely be fairly rational despite a lack of 
incentives. In those fields ‘distinguished by a sense of reality or familiarity or 
responsibility’ (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 259) decisions are generally made soundly. 
Most political decisions, however, fall outside of this realm for most people are 
will thus be made on flimsier epistemic foundations. Not all collective decisions 
are like this, however. Especially at a local level, the concerns collective action will 
be closely related to the everyday experience of voters: ‘The manufacturer, grocer 
or workman need not step out of his world to have a rationally defensible view 
(that may of course be right or wrong) on street cleaning or town halls’ 
(Schumpeter, 2003, p. 260).   
Schumpeter argues that incentives, feedback, and domain-specific experience 
promote rationality, and that each factor implies that individual exit decisions will 
be more rational than collective voice decisions, at least in large electorates.103 
Schumpeter offers no formal model and is vague on the relative contribution of 
each factor and the potential interactions between them. Caplan picks up the 
incentive side of the story and creates a model. As I suggested in chapter two, 
Caplan’s focus on incentives provides space for a more complex model considering 
the relative effect and interaction of incentives and feedback.  
Although the explicit consideration of epistemic rationality is for the most part 
absent from rational choice political theory between 1942 and 2000, there is a great 
deal of work in public choice theory which suggests that rational irrationality, like 
expressive voting, is a progression of the tradition rather than a radical break from 
it.104 Eichenberger and Serna (1996, p. 141) point out that many rational choice 
analyses implicitly rely on a form of irrationality which would be impossible on the 
neoclassical model of information economics (Stigler, 1961).  Whenever political 
failure is grounded in non-random errors of which voters should be aware, simple 
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 Schumpeter’s argument is more complicated than this. It is not simply that political 
preferences systematically deviate from underlying desires but that coherent political 
preferences are never formed. In the practically irrelevant world of politics people have 
‘wishes and daydreams and grumbles’ but not set of preferences capable of grounding 
rational action (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 261). Schumpeter is again vague here, but he seems 
to be suggesting that non-basic preferences (Hausman, 2012, p. 36) are constructed by the 
act of choice, with their coherence and congruity with basic preferences depending on the 
level of conscious deliberation. This idea would obviously be difficult to model in rational 
choice terms. There is some evidence from behavioural economics that preferences are in 
some sense constructed by choice rather than being a prior determinant of it (Lichtenstein 
& Slovic, 2006).    
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 Notable exceptions to the neglect of explicit consideration include Akerlof (1989) and 
Brady et al (1995).   
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rational ignorance does not work as an explanation. Thus, models of fiscal illusion 
(Buchanan & Wagner, 1977) and rent seeking (Olson, 1982; Tullock, 1989) which 
require that voters be systematically deceived are based in some sense on rational 
irrationality rather than rational ignorance. Wittman (1989, 1995) seizes on this 
point in arguing that public choice arguments for democratic failure implicitly 
assume irrationality, treating such assumptions as illegitimate on rational choice 
grounds and concluding that democratic outcomes are efficient after all.  
Non-equilibrium dynamics are also present in Schumpeter’s work, though his 
historical-evolutionary account of politics is much less developed than his theory 
of economic dynamics (Schumpeter, 1934). The ideas of non-equilibrium 
dynamics and creative political entrepreneurship, however, are also implicit in 
much foundational work in public choice theory. Most obviously, the possibility of 
intransitivity in majority choices raises the possibility of democratic disequilibrium 
(Arrow, 1951; Black, 1958), and this opens the possibility that political 
entrepreneurs can determine outcomes by manipulating the agenda (Riker, 1982, 
1986), logrolling (Tullock, 1981), or changing the rules of the game (Shepsle & 
Weingast, 1981). For Buchanan in particular, the instability which so troubled 
Black (1958), Arrow (1951), and Riker (1982) was a desirable property of 
democratic competition. The proper response to irresolvable disagreement is to not 
find some aggregation mechanism which consistently produces a definite but 
arbitrary answer; rather, it is to compromise. Instability is one form of compromise, 
since it divides power temporally (Buchanan, 1954b, p. 119).  
Moreover, instability provides scope for new alternatives to be proposed which 
make everybody better off and remove instability. The political entrepreneur able 
to devise mutually beneficial bargains is a central element in Buchanan and 
Tullock’s (1962) approach to constitutional economics. Through logrolling and 
side-payments, potential gains from trade can be realised and compromises can be 
made. In Buchanan’s later constitutional political economy the role of the 
entrepreneur is expanded to include the restructuring of the rules of the game in 
order to reach previously unattainable equilibria (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 2000; 
Buchanan, 1975b, 1987). Others in the public choice tradition have considered 
political entrepreneurship as a factor capable of promoting efficiency through the 
identification of mutually-beneficial political trades or as undermining it through 
rent-seeking (Holcombe, 2002; Niskanen, 1998; Sutter, 2002; Wagner, 1966, 
1977).  
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Insofar as political entrepreneurs rely on disequilibrium for profit opportunities but 
on realising such opportunities push the political market towards equilibrium, they 
are Kirznerian entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1973, 1997). Our understanding of 
Kirznerian political entrepreneurship in this sense is reasonably well-developed in 
many areas of politics, but the phenomenon of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship as 
a disequilibrating force is less well understood. The evolutionary work on Tiebout 
competition cited above is Schumpeterian in its focus on open-ended growth, but 
the analysis here is currently sparse, informal, and unconvincing. The importance 
of work on institutional evolution by new institutional economists such as 
Douglass North (2005) and Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2000) has been widely 
recognised, but the ideas have for the most part not been absorbed into the 
mainstream. Evolutionary public choice theory is not yet an active research project, 
but criticisms of public choice theory as being overly concerned with static 
concerns ignore the important role given to the entrepreneur by the most prominent 
members of the Virginia and Rochester schools.105   
Public choice theory has also had a more subtle normative approach than is 
recognised by its critics. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutional political economy 
had Pareto efficiency at its normative core, but it is important to recognise the ways 
in which Buchanan’s early work broke with the conventional understanding of 
efficiency in economics and was grounded deeply in normative political theory. 
Buchanan fully embraced the argument of Robbins (1935, Chapter 6) that 
interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible and insisted that preference can 
only be revealed by choice. Thus, he rejected the Kaldor-Hicks standard of 
potential Pareto efficiency as old and meaningless wine in new bottles. Unless we 
assume that utilities are definite quantities (which they are not) and that economists 
are omniscient (which they are not), the only way forward for welfare economics is 
to stick with the Pareto criteria strictly interpreted and do as much normative work 
as is possible on that basis (Buchanan, 1959, 1979).  
Buchanan’s official position is that political economy as an analytic tool for 
normative evaluation has no way of distinguishing between points on the Pareto 
frontier while admitting that other factors may be relevant, meaning that Pareto 
superiority is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a policy change to be 
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 The criticism is somewhat more valid of the Chicago school, but Becker (1983) and 
Wittman (1995) did rely on entrepreneurship to some extent. For what I consider a 
misguided critique of conventional public choice theory as overly static see Wohlgemuth 
(2005). On the Austrian elements in the Virginia and Chicago schools see Sutter (2002).  
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acceptable. Within the normative scope of Buchanan’s analytic framework the 
status quo is precisely as efficient as any move supported by some but opposed by 
others.106 The political economist can say that some redistributive scheme is not 
objectively good, but not that it is objectively not good (Buchanan & Tullock, 
1962, p. 92). Buchanan’s broader normative goals, however, are far more 
substantive and less focused on efficiency. He remains committed to the idea that 
collective choices should impartially consider the interests of individuals as 
exemplified by the Pareto principle, but his insistence that the status quo must 
serve as the starting point in both an analytic and normative sense reflects a 
partiality to existing institutions justified on non-efficiency grounds. Buchanan sees 
mutually beneficial exchange as the entire point of collective action, and since we 
start from the here and now only unanimously preferred policy changes are 
permissible. Thus Buchanan the normative theorist treats unanimous consent, 
subject to some accommodation for unreasonable men and decision making costs, 
as a sufficient and necessary condition for legitimate collective action (Buchanan, 
1959, 2004; Vanberg, 2004).107   
If we extend our focus to social choice theory, the work of Sen (1970, 1976, 1979b, 
1980, 1987) has been influential in introducing non-welfarist evaluative standards 
into rational choice analysis, while Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1980, 1985) has sought 
to justify efficiency as a practical tool on a broader liberal conception of neutrality. 
Further, there is much work at the intersection of philosophy, political theory, and 
economics which uses rational choice theory for a variety of normative purposes 
(Barry, 1965; Broome, 1991; Gauthier, 1986; Kavka, 1975; Kolm, 1996; Rawls, 
1971; Sugden, 1986).  
Based on the summaries of public choice theory written by both defenders 
(Buchanan, 1984; Mueller, 2003; Tullock, Seldon, & Brady, 2002) and critics 
(Green & Shapiro, 1994; Self, 1993; Wohlgemuth, 2005), one could be forgiven 
for thinking that the public choice theory which emerged in the latter half of the 
twentieth century had strictly followed neoclassical economics in terms of its 
assumptions, methods, and approach to normative evaluation.108 If we accept that 
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 It is important to keep in mind Buchanan’s emphasis on the idea that such disagreements 
can be resolved by logrolling or agreement on more general rules.  
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 Dowding and Hindmoor (1997) criticise this stronger formulation of the Pareto 
requirement for being excessively conservative and favouring without justification the 
existing distribution of wealth, property, and rights.  
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 The impression that public choice theory is fundamentally ideological in its support for 
the market and ambivalence towards democracy is also very clear in these critiques. While 
there is no doubt that the Virginia school is generally disposed towards markets, public 
166 
 
proposition the revisionist approaches discussed in this thesis appear to be highly 
deviant versions of public choice theory or entirely new and distinct approaches. 
As I have tried to show in this section, this view is mistaken. The work of Brennan 
and Lomasky (1984, 1985, 1993), Brennan and Hamlin (1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2002), and Caplan (2000, 2001a, 2001c, 2002, 2003, 2007) are major contributions 
to political theory, but rather than fundamentally overturning an established 
orthodoxy this work should be seen as a continuation of the public choice tradition 
emerging from the work of Schumpeter, Downs, Buchanan, Tullock, Olson, and 
Riker.   
9.3. The thesis  
The papers making up this thesis have considered various aspects of the 
relationship between exit and voice as individual responses to dissatisfaction and 
institutional mechanisms of control and communication. Each paper has also, like 
the works cited above, relaxed the conventional assumptions of rational choice 
theory in one way or another. In this section I reiterate what I take to be the main 
implications of each paper for the exit and voice debate and for revisionist public 
choice theory, focusing on the elements which connect the separate papers.  
9.3.1. Chapter two: Rational irrationality as dual process 
theory  
This chapter is first and foremost a clarification and defence of Bryan Caplan’s 
rational irrationality model of voter choice. Caplan (2007) formulates a simple 
model based on simple mainstream price theory but with the introduction of 
preferences over beliefs as well as outcomes. This model generates the conclusion 
that people will be less epistemically rational in the voting booth than the market 
place, with Caplan’s interpretation of the model tending towards the conclusion 
that voters will be very irrational indeed and that this irrationality produces serious 
political failures.  
Caplan’s price theoretic analysis is clearly valid in a comparative static sense. If we 
accept the premises that people have preferences over both beliefs and outcomes 
and some control over their beliefs, the conclusion that collective choices will be 
less focused on outcomes than otherwise identical individual choices can be 
straightforwardly demonstrated within the standard supply and demand framework. 
                                                                                                                                       
choice theory can and does ground a variety of normative conclusions (Dowding & 
Hindmoor, 1997).    
167 
 
In addition to the strength and generality of the rational irrationality effect, the 
open question is whether the ideas of preferences over beliefs and rational access to 
beliefs adequately capture genuine causal relationships between incentives and 
behaviour. It is this revisionist element of Caplan’s framework I clarify and defend 
in this paper.  
I respond to Bennett and Friedman’s (2008) claim that the idea of preferences over 
beliefs is incoherent by disputing their claim that Caplan implicitly assumes that 
voters knowingly hold false beliefs. I recast Caplan as a default-interventionist dual 
process theorist claiming that affect provides an automatic answer to some 
questions which will be overridden by rationality only when the instrumental 
importance of the judgement exceeds the expected emotional costs of impartial 
deliberation.   
Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is to the literature on political 
knowledge and democratic competence, and particularly to the comparative branch 
of this literature which compares individual and collective choice, often explicitly 
in the guise of exit and voice (Barber, 1993; Mackie, 2003; Self, 1993; Somin, 
2013). Against Bennett and Friedman (2008), I argue that economic theory is 
important to the study of political ignorance and irrationality. My paper does not 
claim to be a general argument for rational irrationality, but it does defend the 
plausibility of the argument in light of existing theory and evidence from 
psychology.  
The paper also points to the shortcomings of Caplan’s approach, in particular his 
focus on incentives for rationality and neglect of the cognitive costs of rationality 
and the institutional factors which influence these costs. The means by which 
voters can become rational have been studied by political scientists, most notably 
Lupia and McCubbins (1998), but the focus here has been ignorance rather than 
irrationality. I suggest that there is much promise in a public choice account of 
political rationality which considers both the costs. Moreover, such as an account 
need not be focused on preferences over beliefs understood in affective terms. 
There is good reason to think that affect does often bias judgement, but there are 
many other sources of bias unrelated to affect or desire. We do not misjudge 
probabilities because we want to, but because our cognitive machinery has been 
constructed in a way which does not handle probabilities well. We can overcome 
our biased intuitive judgements in this area, but it seems more reasonable to think 
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in terms of the costs of overcoming intuitive judgement rather than trading off the 
benefits of having false beliefs against the benefits of having true ones. 
Moreover, taking a broader view of rational irrationality helps distinguish this 
approach from expressive voting in terms of scope and empirical predictions. 
Caplan claims that voters will hold beliefs they find pleasing and make political 
choices on this basis. Brennan and Lomasky claim that voters will make choices 
which they find expressively valuable. In both cases we can expect voters to 
prioritise affect over practicality, meaning that the theories tend to make the same 
predictions and are relevant if and only if there are expressive or affective values at 
stake. Taking the default-interventionist view, rational irrationality theory 
potentially applies to a wider range of cases and makes additional predictions based 
on the complexity of questions and the feedback provided by the institutional 
environment.  
By emphasising the necessity of considering feedback, I take this paper as being a 
first step in developing a Schumpeterian rational choice account of epistemic 
rationality in politics, stressing the comparative analysis of exit and voice 
decisions.   
9.3.2. Chapter three: Exit and the epistemic quality of voice  
This chapter applies the approach defended in the chapter two by considering the 
interaction of epistemically rational exit decisions and epistemically irrational 
voice decisions. If the behavioural difference between exit and voice decisions is 
that exit decisions are more likely to prompt the rational updating of beliefs, we 
should think of exit decisions not as being made more rationally but as prompting 
the decision maker to become more epistemically competent in the relevant 
domain. Insofar as the relevant domain requires both exit and voice decisions, we 
should expect the epistemic discipline imposed by exit to improve the epistemic 
quality of all decisions.   
At one level this paper is an application of the rational ignorance and rational 
irrationality arguments to the interaction of exit and voice. At another level, it 
raises a more foundational possibility regarding the dynamics of democratic 
competence. Schumpeter’s argument that workmen will have defensible views on 
local public policy on roads is relevant here, and my argument can be seen as 
reflecting the broader point that political decisions made in one’s area of practical 
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concern and responsibility are likely to be made on a sounder epistemic basis than 
the logic of rational ignorance or rational irrationality would suggest.  
This can be seen as a form of political learning from feedback, but here the source 
of feedback is non-political decision making. In dual process terms, this learning 
might work to train system 1 and thus make intuitive judgements more reliable or 
provide system 2 with more accurate beliefs and more efficient cognitive tools for 
solving complex problems with little effort. I frame my argument in terms of the 
latter possibility in the paper, since the basic point can be made in this way without 
complicating the analysis with dual process theory.  
This and the previous paper also clarify the distinction between the rational 
irrationality and expressive voting accounts of political behaviour, both 
conceptually and empirically. While these approaches are sometimes considered as 
different statements of the same basic point, shifting the focus from preferences 
over beliefs to the costs of overcoming cognitive bias, chapter two makes the 
conceptual distinction clear. When we narrow the conception of rational 
irrationality to affective biases, the differences between the theories are obscured 
by large grey areas and convergent empirical predictions. If we think that the 
natives of a country would be better off with high levels of immigration but vote 
against pro-immigration reforms out of a broad sense of dislike for immigrants, it is 
unclear whether we should describe this situation as one of irrational voters failing 
to update their beliefs regarding the effects of immigration or of expressive voters 
booing immigrants as a group.  Similarly, it is not clear whether voters favour more 
redistribution than they would choose if personally decisive because they 
underestimate the costs of such redistribution or simply because they are 
expressing generosity without the constraint of self-interested rational calculation. 
When we consider non-affective cognitive biases, it becomes clear that my 
generalised version of rational irrationality theory is quite distinct from expressive 
voting theory.   
Chapter three provides a potential case demonstrating the empirical divergence 
between the theories.  In the standard model of expressive behaviour, choices made 
in one sphere need not have an impact on similar choices made in a different 
sphere. Even as exit options prompt people to make instrumentally rational choices 
among various policies, voting decisions over those same policies could continue 
to be decided by expressive preferences. The basic expressive model of choice 
holds the expressive and instrumental arguments in an individual’s utility function 
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to be distinct and independent, with the characteristics of the choice situation 
determining the relative importance of each. That an individual makes a choice 
consistent with their instrumental preferences in one context does not influence 
their expressive preferences and will therefore not alter choices which are made 
primarily on expressive grounds. Thus, individuals will often vote with their feet 
for one set of policies and vote with their ballots for a different set.  
The claim that the instrumental and expressive components of an individual’s 
preference function are independent may be questioned, however, and the 
expressive account of voting may be modified to allow for this. Psychological 
research into cognitive dissonance has shown that people prefer that their 
behaviour and attitudes are consistent with each other (J. Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 
1957). According to cognitive dissonance theory, whenever an individual’s 
behaviour, beliefs, or attitudes are visibly inconsistent, they will become 
uncomfortable and seek to reduce the dissonance in some way.109  
To bring cognitive dissonance into the expressive model of choice, we need to add 
an expressive preference for consistency between choices across spheres. If an 
individual makes a choice in one sphere, they will have a preference that choices in 
other spheres be consistent. Individuals remain motivated by a combination of 
instrumental and expressive preferences, but these previously distinct aspects of an 
individual’s preference function are no longer independent. If an instrumentally-
dominated locational decision prompts an individual to prefer policy X to Y, a 
voting decision of Y over X will produce cognitive dissonance. This dissonance 
could potentially be reduced by changing the locational decision to match the 
expressive preference, but the logic of expressive choice tells us that this is 
unlikely. Since the individual is decisive over locational choices, instrumental 
preferences will play a greater role than for voting decisions. In their voting choice, 
the individual will now be motivated by their pre-existing expressive preference for 
policy Y but also their expressive preference for consistency, and hence for policy 
X.  
Exit options will therefore tend to align individual and collective choice under the 
expressive model of choice if we incorporate a desire for consistency in 
individuals’ preference functions. Of course, the range of voting decisions for 
which this effect is relevant may be small. The policy options considered in voting 
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and locational choices are seldom identical, and rationalisation may be capable of 
resolving dissonance without altering behaviour.  
9.3.3. Chapter four: Strategic and expressive voting 
In this paper I argue against the claim that strategic voting is inconsistent with 
entirely expressive motivation. To do this, I provide a dispositional account of 
politics as serious business, suggesting that individuals feel compelled to make 
instrumentally defensible political choices given their ideological preferences, with 
those preferences (as dispositions) being chosen on entirely expressive grounds.  
Like chapter two, this chapter is ostensibly a defence of the extreme revisionist 
position against criticisms which I take to be based on a misunderstanding. Like 
chapter two, this chapter provides a modified version of the revisionist account in 
the process of defending it.110  
By interpreting expressive voting in dispositional terms, we can easily see how 
expressive voters could be responsive to simple instrumental arguments about 
wasted votes while continuing to choose their basic commitments in a way which 
completely disregards instrumental preferences. As discussed above in relation to 
chapter three, it is important to consider the expressive preferences people have for 
behaving in a way which appears consistent, reasonable, and competent. Such 
preferences might look instrumental in important ways, but the important point is 
that they are over the actions individuals take rather than states of the world 
defined in terms of culmination outcomes (Sen, 1997). As Mackie (2011) argues, 
even if this distinction is capable of preserving the conceptual consistency of 
expressive theory with strategic voting, it may yet completely strip it of empirical 
power. If we claim that people are voting as if instrumentally for expressive 
reasons, the expressive preferences are not doing any empirical work. By 
distinguishing between ideological and electoral dispositions, I show that this need 
not be the case.  
To consider expressive preferences for defensible or reasonable action, it is useful 
to bring in the concept of esteem as understood by Brennan and Pettit (2000, 2004). 
Brennan and Pettit see the good opinion of others as an economic good subject to 
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similar, assumptions. This chapter, on the other hand, is more extension than revision or 
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distinguish between the ideological and electoral levels of choice.     
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significant demand and limited supply. People want to be considered brave, wise, 
caring, intelligent, or fashionable by others and are willing to give up other goods 
in order to increase their esteem. The desire to make esteem-worthy choice in this 
sense can be seen as a subset of expressive preferences in that they are satisfied by 
expressing oneself to others rather than altering objectively-defined culmination 
outcomes. My argument could be reinterpreted as claiming that individuals gain 
esteem when others think of them as canny political actors, and people judge 
canniness in the political realm primarily on how people vote given their 
ideological preferences rather than on the content of those preferences. If voters are 
motivated by esteem or other expressive factors to hold particular views and by 
esteem based on canniness to take strategic action in order to pursue those views, 
strategic and expressive voting are entirely consistent.   
There is, however, a foundational conceptual issue here which I think is under-
theorised in the revisionist project: The distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental preferences needs to be made with reference to a particular outcome. 
In a tautological sense all preferences are instrumental in that they are aimed at 
achieving something. A preference for esteem is not satisfied simply by taking an 
action perceived as esteem-worthy but by the perceptions and judgements of 
others. When considering esteem as the outcome, actions aimed at securing it are 
indeed instrumental. If we shift focus from esteem to policy as the outcome, voting 
behaviour aimed at securing esteem can be seen as non-instrumental, since 
satisfaction of the preference does not depend on policy outcomes. Thus, esteem-
seeking behaviour is instrumental in one sense and non-instrumental in another. 
Disagreements over whether certain behaviours should be seen as expressive or 
instrumental could plausibly be resolved by more careful attention to the question 
‘instrumental of what?’ In the case of strategic voting, the answer to this question 
might be that the observed behaviour is instrumental of esteem but not of policy 
outcomes.   
9.3.4. Chapter five: Children’s rights with endogenous 
fertility 
The fifth chapter shifts gear from positive to normative theory and from a focus on 
voice to a focus on exit. Taking its starting point as debates around the appropriate 
liberal response to groups which deny members exit rights or parents who take 
advantage of a lack of exit options to subject their children to harmful cultural 
practices, it argues for feasibility analysis in the form of explicit consideration of 
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predictable but unobservable second-order effects of centralised intervention in the 
name of children’s rights. Analytically, the paper considers the actions of an 
illiberal parent prevented by law from engaging in some cultural practice which is 
by assumption harmful to the child, but not so harmful that their life would no 
longer be worth living. From a rational choice perspective, we can expect such 
laws to reduce the number of children demanded by illiberal parents. If we think 
lives subjectively worth living are objectively valuable, there is an axiological 
tradeoff between more and better lives when it comes to the introduction of 
children’s rights law. To consider this tradeoff the paper adopts a modified version 
of hypothetical contractarianism which populates the original position with 
possible rather than simply actual persons.   
This paper attempts to subject a large literature in normative political theory to 
feasibility analysis using rational choice theory, without attempting to reduce the 
question to one of efficiency. The existing debate is framed as being about 
protecting the welfare of children, with the preferences of parents being set aside. I 
retain the normative assumption that only children matter, though my 
consequentialist approach does by necessity shift the focus of the question away 
from the legitimacy of action to the desirability of the expected outcomes of action.  
As such, this is an attempt to introduce the methods of rational choice theory into 
normative debates outside this approach while being as careful as possible not to 
substitute the issue at stake in those debates for the more analytically tractable one 
of how to promote efficiency.  
The positive assumptions made about parents are also interesting from a revisionist 
perspective. Many rational choice theorists, and particularly those trained in 
economics, seem willing to admit that moral preferences will be expressed verbally 
but that willingness to pay for the satisfaction of these preferences will be 
approximately zero. If this is the case, the negative effect of legislation on fertility 
will be negligible and my argument is rendered practically irrelevant. The 
revisionist position of meddlesome preferences is that they obey the basic laws of 
price theory – when their expression becomes more costly in terms of other values 
their expression will be reduced. The expressive theory of voting requires only that 
expressive preferences are marginally greater than zero; my argument here is that 
meddlesome preferences a significant enough that some people are willing to break 
the law and risk punishment in order to satisfy them. This is a stronger assumption, 
though there is a great deal of evidence that people are willing to pay for the 
satisfaction of other-regarding preferences (D. Cooper & Kagel, forthcoming).  
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Even if we think the existence of meddlesome preferences sufficiently strong to 
produce the undesirable outcomes discussed in this paper is unlikely, there is a case 
for the consideration of such preferences on robustness grounds.111 When 
evaluating institutional alternatives of uncertain consequence, we should consider 
not only the empirically most likely outcome, but also the worst-case scenario (G. 
Brennan & Buchanan, 1983; Leeson & Subrick, 2006; D. Levy, 2002; Pennington, 
2011; B. Taylor, 2010). This may be because the negative deviations have a greater 
effect than positive ones (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 1983; G. Brennan & Hamlin, 
2004, 2006), or because we deem a conservative disposition to political change to 
be appropriate for reasons other than efficiency (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2013; 
Oakeshott, 1962).   
9.3.5. Chapter six: Analytic radicalism 
Chapter six continues to focus on the normative and deals more explicitly with the 
issue of robustness in relation to institutional change. Although it accepts the 
general argument made by Brennan and Hamlin (2004, 2006) that there are often 
good efficiency reasons for adopting a conservative disposition to institutional 
reform, the paper attempts to define the conditions under which this will not be the 
case. In this respect, the paper is best seen as an extension and clarification of the 
analytic approach to conservatism developed by Brennan and Hamlin.  
Another purpose of the paper is to argue that exit options reduce the cost of 
experimentation and thus makes an experimental disposition towards institutions 
consistent with robustness.112 If the costs of failed experiments can be avoided at 
moderate cost ex post, a radical approach to institutional change seems appropriate. 
This point is an important assumption of the final two chapters of the thesis and of 
the case for decentralisation and jurisdictional competition generally.  
The existence of exit options sufficiently low to significantly alter the expected 
value of institutional reform and thus justify a radical disposition may be unlikely 
when we think in terms of large nation states. Despite significant imperfections, the 
political systems of developed democracies produce results so comparatively good 
that radical constitutional reform in order to improve outcomes is foolhardy, and 
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this is likely to remain the case across a very wide set of assumptions about exit 
costs. Simply considering the existence of land as an immobile asset should make 
us reluctant to make any bold claims about the power of exit options to remove the 
risk from reform.113  
When we consider politics at a more local level, or especially when we consider 
unorthodox forms of decentralisation such us ‘functional overlapping competing 
jurisdictions’ (Frey & Eichenberger, 1996, 1999) and seasteading (chapter 8), exit 
costs sufficiently low to normatively ground a radical disposition on efficiency 
grounds become a more realistic possibility. Both of these proposals decouple 
governance and land, reducing the costs of failure by making the assets tied up in a 
jurisdiction endogenous to the success of that jurisdiction in Tiebout competition. 
Thus, failed institutional experiments need not reduce the value of immobile assets.   
Another means of institutional experimentation which avoids the conservative 
critique of large-scale reform is the creation of new sub-national jurisdictions on 
uninhabited land. Paul Romer (2010) made the case for ‘charter cities’ on the basis 
of opt-in experimentation. If such cities are built on uninhabited land, the cost of 
failure is limited to the initial investment. Advocates of ‘free cities’ or ‘start-up 
cities’ as an extension of the existing model of special economic zones have been 
even more insistent on the possibilities for low-cost experimentation based on 
starting small and making growth endogenous to success in Tiebout competition 
(Caceres, 2013; Strong & Himber, 2009).  
9.3.6. Chapter seven: Entry barriers and Tiebout 
competition 
This chapter (co-authored with Patri Friedman) deals more directly with the limits 
of exit options as a means of enabling robust experimentation in the existing 
system of nation states. In general, the dynamic effects of Tiebout competition are 
limited by institutional inertia and immobile assets. Only when we enable the birth 
of new jurisdictions can we expect Tiebout competition to be effective in a 
dynamic sense. Again, the possibility of low entry barriers in the market for 
governance may seem sufficiently remote to render our argument meaningless or 
entirely pessimistic. For the reasons provided above, I disagree. It is unlikely that 
the conditions required for robust and dynamic Tiebout competition will emerge in 
a general sense capable of constraining existing nations any time soon, but 
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seasteading and start-up city efforts are already underway at a small scale, and if 
the analysis provided in this and the previous chapter is correct, entry barriers will 
be an important determinant of their dynamism.  
This chapter contains another revisionist element which has been absent from the 
discussion so far: agent heterogeneity.114 Brennan and Hamlin (2008, p. 79) see 
motivational heterogeneity among humans as an important aspect of revisionist 
public choice theory.  This chapter makes the distinct point that the competing 
jurisdictions are heterogeneous and that representative agent models of Tiebout 
competition have led to a neglect of entry as a mediating factor in competitive 
dynamics. 
The accusation we level against representative agent models of Tiebout 
competition – with a homogeneous population of governments competing for 
residents – is similar to that levelled by new institutional economists such as 
Ronald Coase (1937; 1992) and Oliver Williamson (1985, 1996) against 
neoclassical models of markets. In ignoring the internal dynamics of firms, 
mainstream economics prior to the institutional revolution was blind to large 
portions of economic life.  It would of course be absurd to claim that mainstream 
public choice theory in general is unwilling to consider the internal dynamics of 
government, and in Tiebout models the idea of policy heterogeneity has always 
been a central part of the analysis.  
Models of Tiebout competition, however, have generally treated the behavioural 
capacity of competing governments as homogeneous. When there is competitive 
pressure, the government will rationally respond regardless of its institutional 
makeup. This is the same assumption made of firms in economics, and the 
assumption there is often defended by pointing to selective pressure for firms to 
behave as if they maximise profits, even though the human beings constituting the 
firm might have other preferences (Alchian, 1950). In governments, however, 
institutional structures seem less conducive to profit or revenue maximisation and 
historical levels of competitive pressure are a great deal lower. Thus, breaking open 
the black box of the Tiebout competitor in order to allow heterogeneity in 
motivation or capacity seems useful.  
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Our approach is to point to the empirically documented life-cycle dynamics of 
firms, with innovative capacity changing over time, and suggest that competing 
governments may face similar constraints. Over time, routines ossify and 
institutions become captured by special interests. Political stability, while 
extremely desirable on net, produces inflexibility and creeping inefficiency (Olson, 
1982). When new jurisdictions can be formed as a response to such problems (i.e. 
entrepreneurial exit at the jurisdictional level is possible), the problems can be 
avoided without suffering the serious and bloody consequences of political 
instability.  
9.3.7. Chapter eight: Seasteading: Competitive governments 
on the ocean  
The eighth chapter (also co-authored with Patri Friedman) builds on the points 
made in chapters six and seven to argue that the most plausible way of significantly 
increasing robust and dynamic Tiebout competition is to develop the technology to 
create politically autonomous settlements on the ocean. Like the previous two, this 
paper is premised on dynamic competition. In addition, it addresses the 
demandingness of feasibility analysis head-on.  In arguing that those proposing 
institutional reform as a means of increasing Tiebout competition are putting the 
cart before the horse, we are making a more general sceptical point regarding the 
practical value of political activism, and indeed of normative political theory.  
A perfectly practical person would be concerned only with the difference they can 
individually expect to make. We as individuals ought to consider our contribution 
to collective goods, but that contribution should be defined in terms of the 
difference in outcomes we cause. In many cases of collective action, the 
contribution we can expect to make is trivial. Turning out to vote or becoming 
politically informed are extremely unlikely to affect policy outcomes to any 
significant extent, so action taken or normative analysis directed at electoral choice 
would seem to run afoul of feasibility requirements thus conceived for individuals 
with no intrinsic interest in politics. In a selfishly rational sense, they would be 
better off watching enjoyable but uninformative reality television than rationally 
updating their political beliefs. In an altruistically consequentialist sense, they 
might also be well-advised to direct their efforts elsewhere – perhaps by helping 
old ladies cross the street or engaging in whatever work pays best for similar levels 
of effort and donating the proceeds to charity.  
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If an individual is intent on changing policy outcomes, we argue in the paper, a 
more feasible approach might be to consider the individual actions they could take 
to alter the extra-political conditions shaping collective choice. We focus on 
technology, and particularly seafaring technology, as means of lowering the costs 
of entrepreneurial Tiebout exit. Historical examples of technologies which altered 
political and social equilibria abound – the printing press, mass transit, oral 
contraceptives. In most cases the political consequences are unintended, but 
ideologically-driven technological activism can be seen in the creation of Bitcoin 
and other digital currencies which lower the effective cost of exit from government 
currency.   
The motivational dimension of revisionist public choice theory tells us that people 
are not perfectly practical. This might explain why people apparently violate the 
requirements of feasibility, but more interestingly it might alter how we ought to 
think about feasibility. If people are motivated by symbols and fads, individuals 
may be more capable of directing institutional change than the analysis of chapter 
eight would suggest. I will discuss this issue at some length in section 9.4.4 below.  
9.4. Open questions and ways forward for the revisionist analysis 
of exit and voice  
Public choice theory is a young discipline, and the analysis of exit and voice from a 
revisionist public choice theory is younger still. The papers of this thesis have, I 
hope, contributed to this literature, but I am under no illusions that we are anything 
close to a conclusive answer on even the most basic of questions. While new 
questions will no doubt reveal themselves over time, I see four important 
revisionist areas in need of further investigation if we are to get a decent grasp of 
the relative advantages of exit and voice and the causal relationships between them.  
9.4.1. How do voters perceive electoral choices? 
A good deal of the revisionist project relies on the insignificance of a single vote, 
and voters’ (perhaps implicit) recognition of this insignificance. It is easy to show 
under reasonable assumptions in an instrumental sense that voters ought to treat 
decisions in large elections quite differently, but since we have relaxed the 
rationality assumptions of public choice theory we must be open to the possibility 
that they behave differently. There are, I think, two possible ways in which my 
revisionist conclusion that exit and voice are behaviourally very different might be 
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undermined by the introduction of new revisionist elements: the overweighting of 
the probability of pivotality and ‘the voter’s illusion.’  
The evidence we have from psychology and behavioural economics makes it clear 
that human beings often get probability judgements badly wrong. One important 
finding is that people tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight 
moderate and large probabilities when making judgments and decisions 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). If this is the case, then the small probabilities which 
revisionist public choice theory tends to see as ‘negligible’ (G. Brennan & 
Buchanan, 1984, p. 187) and round down to ‘roughly zero’ (Caplan, 2007, p. 94) 
may in fact play a significant role in democratic choice.  
Although the claim that humans overweight small probabilities has received 
empirical confirmation from a number of experimental studies (Bleichrodt, 2001; 
Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996), the 
subjects in these studies are given probabilities through description. Recently, a 
number of experimental studies have attempted to establish whether the effect 
continues to hold when individuals estimate probabilities based on experience 
rather than being given objective probabilities through descriptions. These have 
found that in such situations individuals tend to underweight small probabilities 
and overweight moderate and large ones.115 The question for politics becomes 
whether voters estimate the probability of making a difference to an electoral 
outcome through description or experience. Obviously, perceptions of democratic 
efficacy are based on a combination of factors and it is difficult to make any a 
priori judgement about which dominates.  
In any case, it is difficult to see voters as overestimating their probability of 
deciding an election to such an extent that the comparative predictions of Caplan or 
Brennan and Lomasky between exit and voice decisions are seriously undermined. 
Even if the average American overestimated the probability of pivotality by a 
factor of 1000, a large collective action problem would remain in that voters would 
see themselves as deciding outcomes with one chance in 60 thousand rather than 
one in 60 million (Gelman et al., 2009).  
A more compelling possibility is that voters confuse diagnostic and casual 
contingencies in the way described by Quattrone and Tversky (1984, 1988) under 
the guise of ‘the voter’s illusion.’ The idea here is that voters exhibit the common 
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psychological quirk of knowingly taking costly actions which are correlated with 
but not causal of desirable outcomes. Consider the Calvinist doctrine of 
predetermination and the response of the faithful to this doctrine. Predetermination 
states that one’s fate in the afterlife is divinely determined prior to birth: one is 
either chosen or not, and no amount of piety or sin can either damn the chosen or 
save the unchosen. However, the chosen will have a righteous disposition, thus 
tending to avoid sin. In this case, sinning is diagnostic but not causal of eternity in 
hell. Still, it seems that many Calvinists struggled to live a life free of sin in order 
to show themselves worthy and talk of salvation remained common. Here, 
diagnostic contingency was treated as if it were causal (Quattrone & Tversky, 
1984, pp. 238–239).    
Voters would make a similar mistake in voting on the basis that their preferred 
candidate is more likely to win if like-minded people voted for them. If a voter 
knows that they are typical of many other voters, their decision to vote is 
diagnostic but not causal of like-minded individuals voting in large numbers. If 
voters mistake the causal and the diagnostic and thus attempt to ‘induce’ others to 
vote by voting themselves, this provides an additional possible explanation for the 
paradox of turnout (Quattrone & Tversky, 1984, p. 244). This possibility has a 
good deal of plausibility as a solution to the paradox of turnout. When confronted 
with the argument for rational abstention, most people will respond with some 
variant of the ‘if everybody thought like that bad things would happen’ response. 
This could be interpreted as some sort of Kantian deontological claim, but 
anecdotally I would suggest that is often based on faulty consequentialist reasoning 
of the sort described here.  
This could potentially also mitigate the problems of rational ignorance and 
irrationality and reduce the effect of expressive voting. If people reasonably 
perceive that high levels of political knowledge and instrumental policy evaluation 
in people like them are diagnostic of desirable policy outcomes, they might choose 
to invest in more political information and be more rational than would be the case 
if they distinguished causal and diagnostic contingencies more carefully.   
I will not here attempt to make any general claim about strength or generality of 
the voter’s illusion but instead flag it as a potentially important issue which 
deserves attention in future research. Indeed, the introduction of revisionist 
elements – both motivational and epistemic – points to a more general need to 
think about the perceptions of political actors in addition to objective reality. 
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Whether expressive preferences tend towards the altruistic or the parochial depends 
on how voters perceive electoral choice, and how they perceive the importance of a 
single vote is likely to depend critically on how they cognitively frame democratic 
choice.  
Needless to say, incorporating these factors into political science is a difficult 
prospect, though the vast literature on framing in psychology (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, 1986) and the inroads made recently in political science 
(Druckman, 2001; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010) is encouraging. Given the 
difficulty of measuring framing effects in the wild, experimental studies are an 
attractive way of coming to grips with the general mechanisms which might be in 
play. To a significant extent this work needs to continue on the path forged by 
experimental psychologists and political scientists. Experimental methods are a 
powerful means of testing general hypotheses in abstract settings, but ecological 
validity is a general problem, meaning that the lab situation may not adequately 
resemble the natural situations (in this case elections) about which we are 
attempting to make inferences (S. Levitt & List, 2007).  
The issue here is similar to the more general one of how we might measure 
expressive preferences, dispositions, or preferences over beliefs. The ideas of 
expressive voting and dispositional choice have opened interesting theoretical 
possibilities but have thus far had only a limited effect on empirical political 
research.116 Empirical investigation of symbolic politics is well-established 
(Edelman, 1964; Gusfield, 1963), though this research has been qualitative and 
interpretive in nature and as such has not been concerned with testing the claims of 
revisionist theory.  
Given the difficulty of collecting natural data on framing or perception and the 
problems of generalising from lab to voting booth, a promising avenue would seem 
to be field experimentation (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Harrison & List, 2004; S. 
Levitt & List, 2009). Recent work on turnout by Green, Gerber, and colleagues is a 
good example of field research in political science which often points to revisionist 
elements in motivation (Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008; Gerber, Green, & 
Shachar, 2003; Gerber, Huber, & Washington, 2010; Gerber, Karlan, & Bergan, 
2006; Gerber & Green, 1999, 2000, 2000, 2001).  Gerber et al (2008), for example, 
used a field experiment to find that voters told that their turnout would be 
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publicised were more likely to vote and interpret this as evidence that social 
pressure is an important determinant in turnout.  
As I suggest in chapter four, it seems to me that voters see politics as serious 
business in some important respects but remain motivated by purely expressive 
concerns in others. Empirically determining just what seriousness requires in 
politics and how far it extends is an important open question. I argued in chapter 
four that strategic voting is consistent with what I take to be a plausible 
specification of expressive preferences, but showing that these are the preferences 
voters actually have is another matter entirely. I suggest that future research 
attempting to tackle the latter issue will most likely need to rely on some form of 
field experimentation.  
9.4.2. When do decision makers learn? 
As emphasised in chapters two and three, I take the ability to learn from feedback 
to be an important constraint on the argument of Caplan (2007), Somin (2013), and 
others that individual exit decisions are more well-informed and rational than 
collective voice decisions. The general question of how decision makers learn from 
experience is the subject of a large and diverse literature in psychology. This 
literature is too large and diverse to survey here, but from a public choice 
perspective we can concern ourselves with the somewhat simpler, but nevertheless 
mind-bogglingly complex, question of when people learn from experience – i.e. the 
institutional determinants of convergence towards epistemic rationality. I suggested 
some partial answers to this question in chapters two and three, but we are a long 
way from a general answer to this question.    
Fortunately, a reasonable amount of theoretical and empirical work relevant to this 
question has been conducted by psychologists, economists, and political scientists. 
In this section I would like to present some stylised facts, interpret these facts in 
light of the exit-voice debate, and point to important questions which remain 
unanswered.  
First, we know that incentives do sometimes encourage rational reflection, 
cognitive effort, and better performance on a range of judgment and decision tasks 
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Smith & Walker, 1993a; Smith, 2008, pp. 173–181). 
However, the relationship between incentives and rationality is not a simple one. In 
reviewing the literature, Camerer and Hogarth (1999, p. 8) conclude that ‘[t]he 
extreme positions, that incentives make no difference at all, or always eliminate 
183 
 
persistent irrationalities, are false.’ In general, it seems that incentives play a 
greater role in tasks for which performance depends heavily on effort (Libby & 
Lipe, 1992), because ‘[i]ncentives do not operate by magic: they work by focusing 
attention and by prolonging deliberation’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 
S274).Thus, very difficult and very easy tasks are likely to be relatively 
unresponsive to incentives. Some problems are simply too difficult to be solved 
even when motivation is high, and others are so easy that the normative response is 
automatic and need not be motivated (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999, p. 22).  
Even for non-trivial problems incentives may be unnecessary in prompting 
rationality, since people are often intrinsically motivated to solve problems and 
make rational decisions. This effect may be overstated in laboratory experiments, 
since those volunteering for such experiments might be more likely than others to 
have an interest in problem-solving and the alternative to cognitive effort in these 
situations is often boredom rather than pleasant recreation or effort expended on 
more important tasks (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999, p. 23). Moreover, as Frey (1997) 
argues, extrinsic incentives may sometimes undermine performance by reducing 
intrinsic motivation, and there is evidence that this happens in some cases (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001, pp. 596–606). 
Laboratory experiments may understate the effect of incentives by focusing on 
rationality in the short term and ignoring the possibility that individuals invest in 
cognitive capital in order to improve future performance in problems deemed 
important. An individual asked to play poker and told the stakes are high may be 
unable to play well due to a lack of familiarity with probability theory. Individuals 
who find they often play poker for high stakes may be compelled to acquire 
statistical competence by reading books or taking classes, and thus incentives may 
increase rationality in the long but not the short term (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999, 
pp. 8–11).   
There is also evidence that feedback and experience matters. In one sense, 
feedback is a substitute for incentives (Smith & Walker, 1993b). For feedback to 
work there must be some level of motivation, though if feedback is strong a low 
level of intrinsic motivation may be enough to improve performance over time. In 
many cases it seems that incentives and feedback are complementary, with the 
effect of incentives being stronger when learning opportunities are present and 
incentives increasing performance only in later rounds of repeated experiments (J. 
Lee, 2007).   
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On my interpretation, these findings do not bode well for the rationality of voters in 
mass democracy as it exists today. Voters currently have weak incentives and poor 
feedback, and it is difficult to see how this could be changed without extremely 
radical reform. However, it may be that a sense of civic duty provides intrinsic 
motivation for rationality, with cognitive shortcuts facilitating learning and 
reducing task complexity to a level which enables wise electoral choice with 
extrinsic motivation (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991).  
The extent to which cognitively and motivationally limited voters are nevertheless 
able to vote reasonably is an open question, as is the extent to which democracy 
can provide sufficient motivation and information to enable rationality. Recent 
experimental work has provided some important insights (Druckman, 2001; Gerber 
et al., 2008, 2003, 2010; Krupnikov et al., 2006; Prior & Lupia, 2008; Prior, Sood, 
& Khanna, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006), and extending this approach in a more 
comparative direction is of the utmost importance.  
9.4.3. How do we model endogenous institutional change? 
We know that human choice at the psychological level is not in general based on 
optimisation and that social processes are dynamic in ways which cannot be fully 
captured by comparative static analysis. Chapters 6-8 of this thesis attempt in 
various ways to move beyond the optimising equilibrium approach of mainstream 
rational choice theory in favour of the dynamic approaches of Austrian (Kirzner, 
1973, 1997; Lachmann, 1986; Littlechild & Owen, 1980), complexity (Arthur, 
1999; Rosser, 1999), and evolutionary economists (Dopfer & Potts, 2007; Loasby, 
1991; R. R. Nelson & Winter, 2002). 
While there have been attempts to combine these approaches with public choice 
theory and a number of interesting arguments have emerged (Boettke, Coyne, & 
Leeson, 2007; Boettke & López, 2002; Pennington, 2011; Witt, 1992; 
Wohlgemuth, 2002), there is no coherent research project – based on a shared set 
of assumptions and methods – in dynamic public choice theory in the way there has 
been in mainstream public choice theory on the one hand and evolutionary, 
complexity, and Austrian economics on the other.117  
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The problems with this lack of theoretical grounding can be seen in existing 
dynamic analyses of Tiebout competition. Vihanto (1992) suggested from an 
Austrian perspective that Tiebout competition can be seen as a discovery 
mechanism, and Vanberg and Kerber (1994) argue that the dynamic effects of 
Tiebout exit should be seen as an evolutionary process. Following these early 
analyses, a number of scholars have reiterated the need to study Tiebout 
competition dynamically (Wohlgemuth, 1995; Gerken, 1995; Kerber & Heine, 
2003; Kerber & Vanberg, 1995; Kerber, 2008; Saam & Kerber, 2013; Stansel, 
2012; Wohlgemuth, 2008), but much of this work has simply reiterated the insights 
of the two early papers or applied the ideas to a particular policy area. This is not a 
vibrant programme of research.  
A useful way of thinking about this problem is to compare Vanberg and Kerber’s 
explicitly evolutionary approach to the general evolutionary economic framework 
developed by Dopfer and Potts (2007). While the political realm differs from the 
economic in important respects, the framework developed by Dopfer and Potts 
seems general enough to enable consideration of political dynamics while avoiding 
the confusions and ambiguities in Vanberg and Kerber’s work.   
A key element of the Dopfer-Potts framework is the rejection of the micro-macro 
framework of mainstream economics in favour of the micro-meso-macro 
framework. Microeconomics is concerned with the behaviour of individual agents 
and agencies; mesoeconomics is concerned with rules and their carrier populations; 
and macroeconomics is concerned with the entire economy as a complex of rules 
and carrier populations. At the micro level, individuals and firms originate, adopt, 
and retain rules. This involves purposeful action, as in neoclassical economics. 
Unlike neoclassical economics, however, the agent is seen as a complex of rules 
which are subject to change. Agents will formulate or adopt new rules which 
enable them to better achieve their goals (Dopfer & Potts, 2007, Chapter 3). This 
gives rise to the abstract but analytically central concept of the meso unit as a rule, 
its carrier population, and trajectory. Economic evolution happens at the meso level 
as rules are originated, adopted, and retained by a population of carriers. Novel 
ideas are introduced and the most successful become established in the economic 
system (Dopfer & Potts, 2007, Chapter 4). As new rules become established, the 
                                                                                                                                       
work here, I would make two points. First, this work is primarily empirical rather than 
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macroeconomic status quo is disturbed and a new equilibrium emerges. At the 
macro level, populations become structures (Dopfer & Potts, 2007, Chapter 5). The 
meso, then, provides a non-aggregative link between micro and macro. It is 
ultimately individual behaviour which has macro consequences, but 
macroeconomic phenomena emerge proximately from the interaction of meso units 
rather than micro agents (Dopfer & Potts, 2007, p. 22).  Mesoeconomics is 
fundamentally concerned with the process of rule change. Evolution is a 
phenomenon of populations rather than individuals, however, and thus happens at 
the meso rather than micro level.  
An important distinction in this framework is between agents and agencies. Agents 
are individual human beings conceived as rule-makers and rule-users. Where the 
neoclassical notion of Homo Economicus sees humans as rational in the operational 
domain, the evolutionary model of Homo Sapiens Economicus also recognises that 
humans are imaginative in the domain. People do not simply consider their options 
given a static set of behavioural, cognitive, technical, and social rules, but also 
formulate and adopt new rules which open new operational possibilities (Dopfer & 
Potts, 2007, pp. 29–31).  Agencies are socially constructed rule-carriers which use 
social rules to organise the capabilities of many individuals and give rise to 
emergent capabilities possessed by no single individual. Firms, for example, create 
or adopt rules which are held by no employee or manager. Agencies are created by 
agents, but their knowledge cannot be reduced to that of individual agents (Dopfer 
& Potts, 2007, pp. 31–33).  
Evolutionary economists often see market competition for profit as the selection 
mechanism which drives economic evolution (R. R Nelson & Winter, 1982). As 
firms in competitive markets seek to maximise profit, they are forced to innovate. 
In the Dopfer-Potts framework, competition as a selection mechanism would 
involve micro units competing at both the operational and generic levels. Once a 
firm originates a new rule which increases profitability, other firms will tend to 
adopt and retain that rule. These processes at the micro level will produce meso 
trajectories in which rules tending to increase profitability attract larger carrier 
populations. While competition is a microeconomic phenomenon, its evolutionary 
effects operate at the mesoeconomic level.  
Dopfer and Potts, however, have relatively little to say about competition. This is 
because competition is not the only selection mechanism which operates in 
markets. Even in very competitive markets, a firm’s response to competitive 
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pressure is mediated by its organisational rules and the decisions of individual 
agents within it. The fitness of a rule is not defined in terms of profitability, but in 
terms of its tendency to attract a large population of carriers. For some purposes, 
the competitive market process is an acceptable proxy for fitness. Dopfer and Potts 
are attempting to develop a general framework for the study of economic 
evolution, however, and market competition is too narrow for such purposes.  
Just as evolutionary economic analysis needs to be careful about what it borrows 
from evolutionary biology, evolutionary political analysis needs to be careful about 
what it borrows from evolutionary economics. Governments are not like firms and 
citizens are not like consumers in all relevant senses. The Dopfer-Potts framework, 
however, is sufficiently abstract to be applicable to non-market forms of human 
decision making. Just as neoclassical price theory as a framework for static 
economic analysis has been usefully applied to non-economic situations, the 
Dopfer-Potts framework for dynamic economic analysis can, I suggest, be applied 
outside the economic realm narrowly conceived.  
At the most abstract level, the general theory of economic evolution is about the 
dynamics of rules intended to create value for certain agents via their effect on the 
operational capabilities of agents and agencies. At the micro level, agents 
formulate ideas and agents or agencies will possibly adopt and retain these rules, 
depending on their internal decision making machinery and environmental effects. 
At the meso level, these abstract rules have carrier populations which vary 
according to the selection mechanisms defined by the decisions of micro-units 
responding to environmental decisions. These meso trajectories collectively give 
rise to the macro pattern of rules. This framework does not require firms or prices 
and is applicable to political dynamics.  
States, legislatures, government departments, and political parties are, like firms, 
socially constructed agencies capable of carrying various technical and social rules. 
Political agencies are jointly constructed and maintained by various human agents, 
with decision making procedures emerging from the interaction of various agents 
along with technical and social rules. Along with political agents (voters, 
candidates, bureaucrats), political agencies are the micro-units in this framework 
and are thus not themselves subject to evolution. Rather, the population of rules 
emerging from the interaction of agents and agencies is the meso-unit which is 
subject to evolution. The mesopolitical trajectory of a rule is the process through 
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which it is originated, adopted, and retained. Generic political evolution is 
concerned with change in such rules.  
The Dopfer-Potts framework makes the problems with existing work on 
evolutionary Tiebout competition clear. Perhaps the most important point which 
needs to be made is that an evolutionary theory built entirely around Tiebout 
competition is infeasible. In biological evolution, genes compete for instantiation in 
organisms. The selection mechanism here is how well they are able to do this, and 
this involves a number of lower-level pressures such as the ability to harvest 
energy, to avoid danger, and (for sexually reproducing organisms) to attract mates. 
No single one of these lower-level pressures can be treated independently of the 
others, since there will be interdependencies among them which are relevant to the 
overall fitness of a gene. Thus, we cannot have a useful evolutionary biological 
theory which only considers danger avoidance, since this leaves out too many 
relevant factors. All theories are abstractions, of course, but when predictable 
mechanisms with strong correlations to the independent variables under 
consideration are left out, empirical prediction becomes problematic. To continue 
with the example of danger avoidance, an evolutionary theory which considered 
only danger avoidance would presumably predict that organisms spend all their 
resources avoiding danger. This would clearly be a false prediction, and only by 
considering the tradeoffs between safety and energy harvest, for example, can we 
make well-grounded empirical predictions.    
Tiebout competition is, like danger avoidance in biology, a lower-level mechanism 
which needs to be considered alongside the other mechanisms which jointly 
determine the fitness of any rule. Depending on the environment, Tiebout 
competition may be a weak or strong force in institutional evolution, but it will 
never be the only relevant mechanism. Thus, any evolutionary theory of Tiebout 
competition will be theoretically poorly-grounded and empirically fruitless. An 
evolutionary theory of institutional development, however, may include Tiebout 
competition as a lower-level pressure. This could produce interesting empirical 
predictions regarding Tiebout competition in relation to other such pressures, such 
as desirability to interest groups, the median voter, etc. 
In other words, evolutionary Tiebout models cannot treat competing governments 
as black boxes which seek to maximise population or tax revenue. The 
mesopolitical phenomenon of institutional evolution depends on the micropolitical 
behaviour of individual governments, and the behaviour of these socially 
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constructed agencies emerges from the interaction of human agents constrained by 
the constitutional and mechanism rules of the government in question. Models of 
government motivation need to be built from the ground up with an awareness of 
how collective decisions are actually made. Public choice theory has made a great 
deal of progress on this front in recent decades, but the degree of fidelity required 
for evolutionary analysis presents serious problems.   
In biology, the fitness of an organism is externally defined by environmental 
conditions, and the fitness of a gene is defined by its contribution to organisms’ 
fitness in interaction with other genes. In the political realm, the situation is more 
complicated. There is no meaningful way to measure micropolitical fitness; some 
jurisdictions may be more likely to persist and thrive than others, but jurisdictions 
do not replicate and this type of fitness has no place in evolutionary theory. The 
mesopolitical concept of rule fitness, then, is not so solidly grounded at the 
micropolitical level. The fitness of a rule is ultimately determined by the decisions 
of micropolitical actors, of course, but such fitness emerges only at the meso level 
based on the various mechanisms which influence micro-level choice.  
This makes the motivational heterogeneity of agents and agencies a very serious 
difficulty with no obvious solution for formal evolutionary theory. The 
mesopolitical trajectory of a rule depends on the extent to which it is adopted and 
retained by various jurisdictions. If each jurisdiction has its own idiosyncratic 
constellation of decision making machinery which collectively define mesopolitical 
fitness, analysis at the population level becomes very difficult. Unless the analyst 
can somehow abstract away or integrate the motivational heterogeneity of 
jurisdictions into their models, the concept of mesopolitical fitness cannot be 
operationalised.  
This is also a problem in evolutionary economics, but it is much more manageable 
in that context. All firms in a competitive market can reasonably be assumed to 
have profit as a major argument in their objective functions. While other factors 
also influence firm behaviour, the profit motive provides an imperfect proxy for 
microeconomic fitness which is good enough for many analytic and empirical 
purposes. In a political context, there is no single environmental constraint as 
universal or powerful as the profit motive. We are forced to deal with motivational 
heterogeneity head-on.  
The model implicit in Vanberg and Kerber seems to be a representative agent one 
in an important respect. The population of jurisdictions competing for citizens have 
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heterogeneous knowledge but homogeneous motivations: jurisdictions are 
population maximisers.  This is clearly not appropriate, and the tools of agent-
based modelling and other computational methods could potentially be very helpful 
here in formally modelling interaction among heterogeneous agencies. There has 
been some computational work on related topics. Some studies have simulated 
Tiebout exit by individual citizens (Kollman, Miller, & Page, 1997; Nishida, 
Yamada, Yoshikawa, & Terano, 2011), and others have considered the search for 
optimal policy solutions in decentralised systems of governance (Kollman, Miller, 
& Page, 2000; Saam & Kerber, 2013). These studies shed light on particular 
aspects of the Tiebout process, but they do not come to grips with the central 
problem of motivational heterogeneity revealed by the micro-meso-macro 
framework.  
Evolutionary economics in the Dopfer-Potts sense has serious parallels to 
revisionist public choice theory in the Brennan-Hamlin sense. The concerns and 
methodology are quite different of course, but at a broad level both retain as much 
of conventional rational choice theory as possible while relaxing some of the 
epistemic and motivational assumptions to investigate mechanisms and processes 
rendered invisible by a strict adherence to the Homo Economicus model of choice. 
Moreover, both approaches are important if we want to understand the dynamics of 
political systems. Evolutionary economics provides a general framework which, I 
suggest, is capable of structuring rational choice political analysis in a way which 
allows for non-equilibrium dynamics and endogenous structural change. To apply 
this approach to political questions, however, we need to carefully and explicitly 
define the motivations and capacities of agents, as well as the emergent capacities 
of agencies. The motivational, dispositional, expressive, and epistemic dimensions 
of revisionist public choice theory are clearly important here. 
Exit and voice, considered as institutional means of control and communication, 
have important roles as selection mechanisms. If, as argued elsewhere in this 
thesis, exit and voice decisions are made on quite difference motivational and 
epistemic foundations, the selective forces operative in exit-constrained systems 
will be quite different than those in voice-constrained systems. As Kerber and 
Vanberg (1995) emphasise, there is nothing about selection in general which 
guarantees that evolution produces desirable outcomes, but selection based on the 
rational exit decisions of individuals will tend to produce institutions which satisfy 
individual preferences. If the connection between voice and preference is weaker, 
this cannot so readily be concluded and evolution towards welfare-enhancing 
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institutions (i.e. institutional innovation) is less likely through voice than exit.  
Moreover, the origination of rules at the micro level is limited by entrepreneurial 
exit options. Given that the current system of nation states makes it difficult to opt 
out of existing governments and experiment with new institutional arrangements, 
the variation on which evolutionary selection is able to work is limited. Chapters 
seven and eight make this point at some length and argue for seasteading as a 
solution, but I take the viability of this approach as an open question which will 
ultimately be settled by the market rather than the academic research.  
9.4.4. Is reform ever feasible?  
The idea that we should subject normative theory to feasibility analysis is a central 
element of revisionist public choice theory (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2009), and 
indeed of normative public choice theory in general. Buchanan’s (1984) 
description of public choice theory as ‘politics without romance’ gets at the heart 
of the feasibility issue. There are many social outcomes we might think desirable in 
various ways, but we need to be realistic. For Buchanan, realism requires that we 
(1) start from the here and now, and (2) only consider attainable institutional 
options. We might like to fundamentally remake society from a blank slate, but we 
need to consider the constraints imposed by the status quo. We might want public 
offices manned by angels, but there is no reliable way of guaranteeing this is the 
case.   
Buchanan recognised that political outcomes within a set of rules are governed by 
the interests and constraints of various political actors and that no individual can 
control the resulting outcomes. Politics, as emphasised in chapter eight, is a 
spontaneous order – ‘the result of human action, but not the execution of any 
human design’ in Adam Ferguson’s colourful phrase (Ferguson, 1995, p. 119). 
While rational choice theory is often criticised as being excessively individualistic, 
its conventional version is better seen as a structural theory in which individual 
actions are determined by exogenous incentives. Agents in rational choice theories 
have preferences, but the prominence of representative agent theories in economics 
and rational choice politics makes the claim that rational choice theory in general 
emphasises individual agency over social structure a shaky one to say the least. 
Rational choice models are built of individual agents, but those agents are seriously 
constrained by the exogenously given structure of the model. In a normal form 
game between two players, individuals choose a row or a column, but never a cell 
(Kliemt, 2006).  
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The feasibility constraint on normative theory can be considered at various levels 
of stringency. A weak feasibility requirement might insist only that logically 
possible alternatives be considered. A more stringent requirement would restrict 
attention to stable equilibria, and an even more demanding one might additionally 
insist on there being a plausible path from here to there. The appropriate level of 
feasibility constraint depends on the purpose of our normative theorising. If we are 
engaged in a purely evaluative exercise devoid of any ambitions of institutional 
reform, the stability requirement may be sufficient. If we want our normative 
theory to guide institutional design, however, we surely need a stronger feasibility 
constraint which considers the possibility of the reform being adopted given the 
current institutional environment. If we push feasibility analysis to its logical 
conclusion and recognise that we never choose cells but only rows or columns, we 
should focus on what we as individuals can do to shift the institutional equilibrium. 
This is clearly a very demanding condition which would seem to render irrelevant 
virtually all forms of normative political analysis.  
This is essentially the point made by Thomas Christiano (2004) when he claims 
that normative rational choice theory is self-defeating. If rational choice theorists 
accept that ‘ought implies can’ and that the basic structure of institutions are 
beyond the control of any individual, Christiano argues that normative evaluation 
of institutional alternatives would be pointless.  Individual actions collectively 
determine outcomes, but no individual has a significant enough influence on the 
outcome for evaluative knowledge to have any practical purpose. We may take a 
pessimistic view and think the self-defeating nature of normative public choice 
theory dooms us to live with inferior institutions. That is, we might agree with 
Gerhard Wegner (2004, pp. 339–340) that economics is ‘a discipline which both 
conceptualizes improvements in politics but simultaneously shows why such 
improvements must remain unrealised.’ On the other hand, we may think desirable 
outcomes are likely to emerge through social interaction, but not because we want 
them to in any meaningful sense.  
Buchanan’s solution to the emergent nature of politics was to ask political actors to 
step back and bargain over the rules of the games. If we want to alter political 
outcomes, we should not go tinkering with policies piecemeal but rather change the 
rules which structure political interactions and thus allow particular political 
outcomes to emerge (G. Brennan & Buchanan, 2000).  A potential problem with 
this reasoning is that constitutions are not made in a political vacuum. 
Constitutions, like policies, are the result of a decentralised process of decision 
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making which nobody fully controls. The human weaknesses of selfishness and 
irrationality are present at the constitutional level, and this means that constitutions 
are not the impartial and powerful things many constitutional political economists 
take them to be (G. Brennan & Hamlin, 2002; Crampton & Farrant, 2004; de Jasay, 
1989; Farrant & Paganelli, 2005; Farrant, 2004; R. McGuire & Ohsfeldt, 1986, 
1989; R. McGuire, 1988). As Andrew Farrant (2004, p. 449) puts it, Buchanan’s 
constitutional political economy does not rid itself of romance entirely, but lets it in 
through the back door by taking a romantic view of the impartiality of 
constitutional decision making and the binding power of constitutional constraints.  
It is true that in most cases an individual voice cannot expect to make a difference, 
but politics is not a solitary pursuit. Buchanan’s contractarianism emphasises the 
cooperative nature of politics, and Mackie’s mandate model of democracy 
emphasises the fact that political actors see themselves as contributing to a 
collective effort rather than individually attempting to bring about some outcome. 
In a tautological sense all action is taken individually, but decentralised individual 
action can often result in spontaneous or conscious cooperation. Political 
insignificance is a social dilemma, and as Elinor Ostrom (1990) and others have 
shown, such collective action problems can often be solved through human 
creativity in bargaining and institutional tinkering.  
Representative democracy as it exists in developed countries today does an 
unusually good job of protecting against predation and securing economic growth, 
but it is far from perfect. The question for those seeking improvement and aware of 
feasibility constraints is whether democracy as it exists today provides sufficient 
mechanisms which enable and incentivise individuals to cooperate in the 
improvement of democratic institutions. If this is not the case, it is unclear whether 
any reforms pass the feasibility test in its strong form. Policy and institutions might 
drift, but if we as political theorists, policy analysts, and activists cannot in any real 
sense influence the direction of drift, we might as well pack up and go home.  
If we accept the constitutional imperative of stepping back from everyday politics 
and looking at rules, what we need to evaluate the fatalist claim is a theory of 
constitutional entrepreneurship. When can individuals or groups initiate 
constitutional change, and are such periods of change likely to lead to 
improvement? The latter question is of course very context-sensitive, but the only 
plausible answer to the former question is ‘not very often.’ This does not 
automatically lead us to the fatalist position, however, since it may be that 
194 
 
constitutional moments are rare but extremely empowering. Returning to the 
evolutionary framework, it may be that constitutional evolution is ‘punctuated’ in 
the sense that there are long periods of stasis interrupted by short bursts of radical 
change (Eldredge & Gould, 1972). One such punctuation seems to be the 
readjustment of the English civil war and Glorious Revolution; another is the 
opening of the American frontier. Constitutional rules are difficult to improve upon 
in the course of everyday politics, but periods of instability and the opening of new 
frontiers provide conditions under which individuals acting cooperatively can make 
a difference. If this is the case, those seeking institutional change will need to wait 
for the next crisis or, more optimistically, the next frontier.  
It is also worth noting that constitutions and policies are endogenous to 
preferences, and preferences can to a certain extent be changed. Buchanan 
recognised this when he wrote of the need for a ‘constitutional attitude’ among the 
general population as a prerequisite for meaningful constitutional reform (G. 
Brennan & Buchanan, 2000, Chapter 9). There is an interesting irony and a 
satisfying symmetry to this claim. Constitutional political economy tells us to 
ignore the players and focus on the rules of the game, but the only way to change 
the rules of the game is to change the players.  
Needless to say, there are serious feasibility issues with the idea of persuasion as a 
strategy for reform. If we take a conventional rational choice view of preferences 
as instrumental and beliefs as rational, the prospects for persuasion seem very slim. 
The only mechanism would seem to be the discovery and dissemination of new 
information to a large audience, which for most of us in the current media-saturated 
and globalised world would not be a realistic prospect. Rationally irrational or 
expressive voters, on the other hand, will respond to rhetoric and framing, which is 
amenable to more small-scale change. The chances of an individual altering the 
institutional equilibrium through persuasion are surely small, but they are increased 
by the revisionist factors of expressive preference and rational irrationality. Unless 
the truth has an advantage over falsehood in persuasion there is no reason to think 
that this makes institutional improvement more likely, but it does potentially 
restore some power to individuals and thus gives normative public choice theory 
some practical purpose (Caplan, 2010; Stringham & Hummel, 2010; Stringham, 
2011).   
Moreover, it may be that radical and widespread preference change is more likely 
to occur due to individual action than we might estimate by looking at publicly 
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expressed preferences. Kuran (1989, 1995) argues that preference falsification 
produces a self-reinforcing type of conformity which can be disrupted by small 
changes in public preferences. If people prefer to publicly express their true 
preferences but only when a sufficient number of others share their preference, 
there may be significant groups of preference falsifiers who would be willing to 
public express their true preferences if a sufficient number of others did likewise. If 
individuals differ in terms of the threshold at which they will reveal their 
preferences, we may see cascades of preference revelation following from a 
relatively small number of individuals revealing their preferences. Such 
‘availability cascades’ can also happen without preference falsification if people 
condition their beliefs on the stated beliefs of others or if the expressive value of an 
opinion is increased by its popularity (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999). Again, there is no 
guarantee that such processes will produce good outcomes rather than bad, but it 
does open the possibility that individuals can significantly shift the institutional 
equilibrium.  
9.5. Conclusion  
I have repeatedly argued in this thesis that rational choice theory as a method 
provides a useful way of structuring argument in order to make assumptions 
explicit and prevent covert leaps of logic. At the same time I have insisted that the 
more specific assumptions of the homo economicus model need to be relaxed in 
order to tackle a number of interesting questions. In this I follow Brennan and 
Hamlin’s revisionist method, which has already produced a great deal of important 
theoretical work and a small but interesting empirical literature. I have also claimed 
that the scope of revisionist public choice theory ought to be widened to include 
other factors such as the epistemic, the dynamic, and the evaluative. 
Revisionist public choice theory is an interdisciplinary exercise, and at present the 
disciplines involved are philosophy, political science, and economics. In arguing 
for increased focus on epistemic factors and the use of experimental methods, I 
have implicitly been suggesting that psychology should be included as an 
important discipline for the future of the revisionist project. What we need, I think, 
is a behavioural public choice theory to match the behavioural economics which 
has documented the imperfections of rationality and the ways they are overcome by 
real humans making real choices. Explicit experimental comparison of individual 
and collective choices in the face of uncertainty and biasing influences has been 
rare, and it seems to me that there is serious scope for empirical testing of 
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revisionist theory here.  At the same time, revisionist theorists need to extend their 
understanding of how expressive preferences and esteem are interpreted and 
transmitted in political, relative to economic, contexts. The claim that people seek 
esteem seems to me obviously true and Brennan and Pettit’s (2004) analysis gets a 
lot of traction out of some very basic assumptions, but if we want to go further in 
this direction, it seems that we might also want to welcome sociologists into the 
revisionist public choice theory family.   
The need to sharpen the psychological and sociological aspects of revisionist 
public choice theory once again points us towards Schumpeter as its patron saint.  
In a few short pages, Schumpeter (2003, pp. 256–264) sketched an account of 
political behaviour amenable to economic analysis while being aware of the 
psychological and sociological issues in play. Schumpeter also subjects the 
classical doctrine of democracy to philosophical analysis and concludes, like social 
choice theorists such as Arrow (1951) and Riker (1982), that the notion of 
collective preference is meaningless (Schumpeter, 2003, pp. 250–256). These 
arguments are informal and often vague, but it seems to me that revisionist public 
choice theory has a lot to learn from Schumpeter’s study of politics using the tools 
of economics, philosophy, psychology, and sociology.  
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